it shall be the duty of the Postmaster General to cause a suit to be commenced against the person or persons so neglecting or refusing: Penalty on his neglect thereof.and if the Postmaster General shall not cause such suit to be commenced within six months from the end of every such three months, the balances due from every such delinquent, shall be charged to, and recoverable from, the Postmaster General.
Appropriation of penalties, &c.Sec. 25. And be it further enacted, That all pecuniary penalties and forfeitures incurred under this act, shall be, one half for the use of the person or persons informing and prosecuting for the same, and the other half to the use of the United States.
Postmaster General to make provision for the conveyance of letters by sea.Sec. 26. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the Postmaster General, to make provision, where it may be necessary, for the receipt of all letters and packets intended to be conveyed by any ship or vessel, beyond sea, or from any port of the United States to another port therein; and the letters so received shall be formed into a mail, sealed up, and directed to the postmaster of the port, to whichThe provisions of the act of March 3, 1825, substitute a certified statement of the settled account as evidence in suits against deputy postmasters, in lieu of the certified account current required by the act of April 30, 1810. Ibid.A mail carrier is within the 18th section of the “act regulating the post-office establishment,” subjecting to a penalty in certain cases, persons employed in any departments of the general post-office. United States v. Belew, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 280.The United States instituted a suit against the Bank of the Metropolis, claiming twenty-seven thousand eight hundred and eighty-one dollars and fifty-seven cents, the balance, according to the statements of the Treasury, due to the United States. The defendant claimed credits amounting to twenty-three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest, which had been presented to the proper accounting officers, for acceptances of the post-office department of the drafts of mail contractors, and an item of six hundred and eleven dollars and fifty-two cents, overdraft of an officer of the post-office department, on the Bank of the Metropolis. The drafts of the contractors, accepted by the post-office department, were discounted by the Bank, in the way of business; one draft was accepted unconditionally, the other drafts were accepted, “on condition, that the contracts be complied with.” Held: That the Bank became the holder of the draft unconditionally accepted, for valuable consideration; and its right to charge the United States with the amount cannot be defeated by any equities between the drawers, and the post-office. The United States v. The Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Peters, 377.It was no matter, how the account of the drawer of the draft unconditionally accepted stood with the post-office department; whether he was a debtor or a creditor; whether the Bank knew one or the other. An unconditional acceptance was tendered to the Bank for discount. It was not the duty of the Bank to inquire how the account stood, or for what purpose the acceptance was made. All it had to look to was the genuineness of the acceptance, and the authority of the officer to give it. Ibid.The rule is, that the want of consideration between the drawer and the acceptor is no defence against the rights of a third party, who has given a consideration for the bill: and this, even though the acceptor has been defrauded by the drawee, if that be not known to such third party. Ibid.If one purpose making a conditional acceptance only, and commit that acceptance to writing, he should be careful to express the condition therein. He cannot use general terms, and then exempt himself from liability, by relying upon particular facts which have already happened, though they are connected with the conditional acceptance. By express terms the acceptor might have guarded against any construction, other than that which was intended by, or was the apparent meaning of the words of the acceptance. It matters not what the acceptor meant by a cautious and precise phraseology, if it be not expressed as a condition. Ibid.Nothing out of the condition expressed in the words of the acceptance can be inferred; unless it be in a case where the words used are so ambiguous as to make it necessary that parol evidence should be resorted to, to explain them. Ibid.If two persons deal in relation to the executory contracts of a third, and one of them, being the obligee, induces the other to advance money, “upon condition that his contracts be complied with,” and he knows that forfeitures have been already incurred by the obligor, for breaches of his contract, and does not say so, he shall not be permitted afterwards to get rid of his liability, by saying, “I cannot pay you, for when I accepted there was already due to me from the drawer of the bills more than I accepted for; you did not choose to make inquiry.” Ibid.The terms “accepted, when the contracts of the drawer of the bill are complied with,” are not retroactive; they do not refer to past transactions, to the subsequent performance of the contractors. Ibid.The postmaster general had the same power, and no more, over the credits allowed by his predecessor, if allowed within the scope of his official authority, as given by law to the head of the department. This right in an incumbent of reviewing a predecessor’s decisions, extends to mistakes in matters of fact, arising from errors in calculation, and to cases of rejected claims in which material testimony is afterwards discovered and produced. But, if a credit has been given, or an allowance made by the head of a department, and it is alleged to be an illegal allowance, the judicial tribunals must be resorted to, to construe the law under which the allowance was made; and to settle the right between the United States and the party to whom the credit was given. It is no longer a case between one officer’s judgment, and that of his successor. No statute is necessary to authorize the United States to sue in such a case. The right to sue is independent of statute, and it may he done by the direction of the incumbent of the department. The United States v. The Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Peters, 377.
