Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 2.djvu/408

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Rules and regulations, formerly in force, abolished.which the armies of the United States have heretofore been governed, and the resolves of Congress thereunto annexed, and respecting the same, shall henceforth be void and of no effect, except so far as may relate to any transactions under them, prior to the promulgation of this act, at the several posts and garrisons respectively, occupied by any part of the army of the United States.

Approved, April 10, 1806.

Statute Ⅰ.

April 10, 1806.

Chap. XXI.—An Act relating to bonds given by Marshals.^[1]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the bond heretofore

↑ By the 27th section of the act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, vol. i. 87, the appointment of a marshal in each district, is provided for, and his duties and powers regulated.
The decisions of the courts of the United States as to the duties, powers, and liabilities of Marshals are:—
The marshal may have an attachment to enforce the payment of his fees of office, against suitors in the court; so also against the endorser on the writ, who by the lex loci, is liable to respond for costs, Anonymous, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 101.
The marshal is entitled to his full commissions according to the act of 1799, chap. 19, upon all interlocutory sales of prize property. The act of 27th January, 1813, applies only to sales after final condemnation. The Avery, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 308.
It is the duty of the marshal, upon all interlocutory sales, to bring the proceeds into court, with a regular account of the sales. Ibid.
The marshal is entitled to commissions upon prize property, removed from his district, by consent of the parties, and there sold. The San Jose Indiana, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 311.
After a rule on the marshal to return the capias ad satisfaciendum issued against the defendants, on the return of the marshal that the plaintiff had directed him not to serve the writ on one defendant, and that the other could not be found, the court have nothing more to do with the rule. If the marshal has misconducted himself, the remedy is an action for a false return. Segourney v. Ingraham et. al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 336.
Where an individual, acting in pursuance of what he conceives a just claim to property, proceeds by legal process to enforce it, and causes a levy to be made on property which is claimed by another, without abusing or perverting its true object, there is and ought to be a very different rule for damages, from the case in which vindictive damages may be allowed, if after a due course of legal investigation, his case is not well founded. Where the defendant had acted as the marshal of the United States, in the execution of his duties as a public officer, and had made a levy, but had done nothing out of the strictest line of duty, the circuit court instructed the jury to allow compensation for the injury sustained, and nothing more. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Conard, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 143.
It has long been settled that a jury ought not in any case to find exemplary damages against a public officer, acting in obedience to orders from the government, without any circumstances of aggravation, if he violates the law in making a seizure of property. Ibid.
A marshal is not removed by the appointment of a new one, until he receives notice of such appointment; all acts done by the old marshal, after the appointment of a new one, before notice, are good; but his acts subsequent to notice are void. Wallace’s C. C. R. 119.
If a debtor, committed to the state jail under process from the courts of the United States, escape, the marshal is not liable. Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch, 76; 3 Cond. Rep. 280.
The act of Congress has limited the responsibility of the marshal to his own acts and the acts of his deputies. The keeper of a state jail is, neither in fact nor in law, the deputy of the marshal; he is not appointed by, nor removable at the will of the marshal. When a prisoner is regularly committed to a state jail by the marshal, he is no longer in the custody of the marshal, or controllable by him. Ibid.
If a marshal, before the date of his official bond, receive, upon an execution, money due to the United States, with orders from the comptroller to pay it into the Bank of the United States, which he neglects to do, the sureties in his official bond, executed afterwards, are not liable therefor upon the bond; although the money remain in the marshal’s hands after the execution of the bond. The United States v. Giles and others, 9 Cranch, 212; 3 Cond. Rep. 377.
Query. Whether the sureties in a marshal’s bond conditioned for the faithful execution of his duty, “during his continuance in the said office,” are liable for money received by him after his removal from office, upon an execution which remained in his hands at the time of such removal? Ibid.
The comptroller of the treasury has a right to direct the marshal to whom he shall pay money received upon executions, and a payment according to such directions is good; and it seems he may avail himself of it upon the trial without having submitted it as a claim to the accounting officers of the treasury. Ibid.
It is the duty of the marshal of a court of the United States, to execute all process which may be placed in his hands; but he performs this duty at his peril, and under the guidance of law. He must, of course, exercise some judgment in the performance. Should he fail to obey the exigit of the writ without a legal excuse, or should he in its letter violate the rights of others, he is liable to the action of the injured party. Life and Fire Ins. co. of New York v. Adams, 9 Peters, 573.
The marshal makes distribution of proceeds of prize sales in his hands, at his peril; and on his mispayment a libel lies against him. For safety the marshal should obtain the order of the court, which ought not to be made without previous measures guarding against fraud, and providing for latent claims. Keene et al. v. The Gloucester, 2 Dallas, 36.

[p408-1] By the 27th section of the act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, vol. i. 87, the appointment of a marshal in each district, is provided for, and his duties and powers regulated.
The decisions of the courts of the United States as to the duties, powers, and liabilities of Marshals are:—
The marshal may have an attachment to enforce the payment of his fees of office, against suitors in the court; so also against the endorser on the writ, who by the lex loci, is liable to respond for costs, Anonymous, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 101.
The marshal is entitled to his full commissions according to the act of 1799, chap. 19, upon all interlocutory sales of prize property. The act of 27th January, 1813, applies only to sales after final condemnation. The Avery, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 308.
It is the duty of the marshal, upon all interlocutory sales, to bring the proceeds into court, with a regular account of the sales. Ibid.
The marshal is entitled to commissions upon prize property, removed from his district, by consent of the parties, and there sold. The San Jose Indiana, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 311.
After a rule on the marshal to return the capias ad satisfaciendum issued against the defendants, on the return of the marshal that the plaintiff had directed him not to serve the writ on one defendant, and that the other could not be found, the court have nothing more to do with the rule. If the marshal has misconducted himself, the remedy is an action for a false return. Segourney v. Ingraham et. al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 336.
Where an individual, acting in pursuance of what he conceives a just claim to property, proceeds by legal process to enforce it, and causes a levy to be made on property which is claimed by another, without abusing or perverting its true object, there is and ought to be a very different rule for damages, from the case in which vindictive damages may be allowed, if after a due course of legal investigation, his case is not well founded. Where the defendant had acted as the marshal of the United States, in the execution of his duties as a public officer, and had made a levy, but had done nothing out of the strictest line of duty, the circuit court instructed the jury to allow compensation for the injury sustained, and nothing more. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Conard, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 143.
It has long been settled that a jury ought not in any case to find exemplary damages against a public officer, acting in obedience to orders from the government, without any circumstances of aggravation, if he violates the law in making a seizure of property. Ibid.
A marshal is not removed by the appointment of a new one, until he receives notice of such appointment; all acts done by the old marshal, after the appointment of a new one, before notice, are good; but his acts subsequent to notice are void. Wallace’s C. C. R. 119.
If a debtor, committed to the state jail under process from the courts of the United States, escape, the marshal is not liable. Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch, 76; 3 Cond. Rep. 280.
The act of Congress has limited the responsibility of the marshal to his own acts and the acts of his deputies. The keeper of a state jail is, neither in fact nor in law, the deputy of the marshal; he is not appointed by, nor removable at the will of the marshal. When a prisoner is regularly committed to a state jail by the marshal, he is no longer in the custody of the marshal, or controllable by him. Ibid.
If a marshal, before the date of his official bond, receive, upon an execution, money due to the United States, with orders from the comptroller to pay it into the Bank of the United States, which he neglects to do, the sureties in his official bond, executed afterwards, are not liable therefor upon the bond; although the money remain in the marshal’s hands after the execution of the bond. The United States v. Giles and others, 9 Cranch, 212; 3 Cond. Rep. 377.
Query. Whether the sureties in a marshal’s bond conditioned for the faithful execution of his duty, “during his continuance in the said office,” are liable for money received by him after his removal from office, upon an execution which remained in his hands at the time of such removal? Ibid.
The comptroller of the treasury has a right to direct the marshal to whom he shall pay money received upon executions, and a payment according to such directions is good; and it seems he may avail himself of it upon the trial without having submitted it as a claim to the accounting officers of the treasury. Ibid.
It is the duty of the marshal of a court of the United States, to execute all process which may be placed in his hands; but he performs this duty at his peril, and under the guidance of law. He must, of course, exercise some judgment in the performance. Should he fail to obey the exigit of the writ without a legal excuse, or should he in its letter violate the rights of others, he is liable to the action of the injured party. Life and Fire Ins. co. of New York v. Adams, 9 Peters, 573.
The marshal makes distribution of proceeds of prize sales in his hands, at his peril; and on his mispayment a libel lies against him. For safety the marshal should obtain the order of the court, which ought not to be made without previous measures guarding against fraud, and providing for latent claims. Keene et al. v. The Gloucester, 2 Dallas, 36.

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Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 2.djvu/408

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