Statute II.
Chap. XXXIX.—An Act for carrying into execution the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded at Washington on the twenty-second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen.[1]
- ↑ See note to the act of March 3, 1819, for the acts passed relating to the territory of Florida. The decisions of the Supreme Court upon the treaty between the United States, and upon the act of March 3, 1821, have been: By the stipulations of a treaty, are to be understood its language and apparent intentions, manifested in the instrument; with a reference to the contracting parties, the subject matter and persons on whom it is to operate. United States v. Arredondo et al., 6 Peters 710. The judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its interest against foreign powers is confided; and its duty, commonly, is to decide upon individual rights according to those principles which the political departments of the nation have established. If the course of the nation has been a plain one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous. However individual judges might construe the treaty of St. Ildefonso, it is the province of the Supreme Court of the United States to confine its decisions to the will of the legislature, if that will has been clearly expressed. Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 307. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peters, 710. A treaty of cession is a deed of the ceded territory; the sovereign is the grantor, and the act is his; so far as relates to the cession the treaty is his act and deed, and all courts must so consider it; and deeds are construed in equity by the rules of law. Ibid. 738. The Spanish version of the Florida treaty was in the words of the king, and expressed his intention; and though the American version showed the intention of the American government to be different, the Supreme Court cannot adopt it to decide what was granted by the king of Spain, what accepted and what reserved: the rules of law are too imperative to be disregarded or mistaken. The true interpretation of the Spanish language of the treaty is, that the grants of lands in Florida, made before the treaty, except those specially excepted, is that these grants remain confirmed.—The proprietors of such grants could bring suits to recover them without any action of Congress; and any question arising would be purely a judicial question. Ibid. 741. The object of the treaty with Spain, which ceded Florida to the United States, dated 22d May, 1819, was to invest the commissioners with full power and authority to receive, examine, and decide upon the amount and validity of asserted claims upon Spain, for damages and injuries. Their decision, within the scope of this authority, is conclusive and final, and is not re-examinable. The parties must abide by it, as the decree of a competent tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction. A rejected claim cannot be brought again under review in any judicial tribunal. But it does not naturally follow that this authority extends to adjust all conflicting rights, of different citizens, to the fund so awarded. The commissioners are to look to the original claim for damages and injuries against Spain itself; and it is wholly immaterial, who is the legal or equitable owner of the claim, provided he is an American citizen. Comegys et al. v. Vasse, 1 Peters, 212. After the validity and amount of the claim has been ascertained by the award of the commissioners, the rights of the claimant to the fund, which has been passed into his hands and those of others, are left to the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, in the established courts of justice. Ibid. 212. The treaty with Spain recognised an existing right in the aggrieved parties to compensation; and did not, in the most remote degree, turn upon the notion of donation or gratuity. It was demanded by our government as matter of right, and as such was granted by Spain. Ibid. 217. Even in cases of conquest, it is very unusual for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of right, which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world, would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled on a change in the sovereignty of the country, by the Florida treaty. The people change their allegiance, their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other and their rights of property remain undisturbed. Had Florida changed its sovereign by an act containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who became subjects or citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by the change. It would have remained the same as under the ancient sovereign. United States v. Percheman, 7 Peters 51. The language of the second article of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of 22d February, 1819, by which Florida was ceded to the United States, conforms to this general principle. Ibid. The eighth article of the treaty must be intended to stipulate expressly for the security to private property, which the laws and usages of nations would, without express stipulation, have conferred. No construction which would impair that security, further than its positive words require, would seem to be admissible. Without it, the titles of individuals would remain as valid under the new government as they were under the old. And those titles, so far at least as they were consummated, might be asserted in the courts of the United States, independently of this article. Ibid. The treaty was drawn up in the Spanish as well as in the English languages. Both are original, and were unquestionably intended by the parties to be identical. The Spanish has been translated; and it is now understood that the article expressed in that language is, that “the grants shall remain ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of them, to the same extent,” &c.; thus conforming exactly to the universally received law of nations. Ibid. If the English and Spanish part can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which establishes this conformity ought to prevail. Ibid. No violence is done to the language of the treaty by construction which conforms the English and Spanish to each other. Although the words “shall be ratified and confirmed,” are properly words of
