President authorized to take possession of east and west Florida.
And remove Spanish troops, according to treaty.
May employ the army, navy and militia.United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of, occupy, the territories of east and west Florida, and the appendages and appurtenances thereof; and to remove and transport the officers and soldiers of the king of Spain, being there, to the Havanna, agreeably to the stipulations of the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded at Washington, on the twenty-second day of February, in the year one thousand eight hundred and nineteen, providing for the cession
And remove Spanish troops, according to treaty.
May employ the army, navy and militia.United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take possession of, occupy, the territories of east and west Florida, and the appendages and appurtenances thereof; and to remove and transport the officers and soldiers of the king of Spain, being there, to the Havanna, agreeably to the stipulations of the treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded at Washington, on the twenty-second day of February, in the year one thousand eight hundred and nineteen, providing for the cession
contract, stipulating for some future legislation, they are not necessarily so. They may import that “they shall be ratified and confirmed” by force of the instrument itself. When it is observed that in the counterpart of the same treaty, executed at the same time, by the same parties, they are used in this sense, the construction is proper, if not unavoidable. Ibid.
In the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 253, the Supreme Court considered those words importing a contract. The Spanish part of the treaty was not then brought into view, and it was then supposed there was no variance between them. It was not supposed that there were even a formal difference of expression in the same instrument, drawn up in the language of each party. Had this circumstance been known, it is believed it would have produced the construction which is now given by the article. Ibid. By the law of nations, the inhabitants, citizens, or subjects of a conquered or ceded country, territory, or province, retain all the rights of property which have not been taken from them by the orders of the conqueror; and this is the rule by which we must test its efficacy according to the act of Congress, which we must consider as binding authority. United States v. Clarke, 9 Peters, 168. A treaty of cession is a deed or grant by one sovereign to another, which transferred nothing to which he had no right of property; and only such right as he owned, and could convey to the grantee. By the treaty with Spain, the United States acquired no lands in Florida to which any person had lawfully obtained such a right, by a perfect or inchoate title, that this court could consider it as property under the second article; or which had, according to the stipulations of the eighth article of the treaty, been granted by the lawful authorities of the king; which words, grants, or concessions, were to be construed in their broadest sense, so as to comprehend all lawful acts which operated to transfer a right of property, perfect or imperfect. Ibid. The effect of the clauses of the confirmation of grants made was, that they confirmed them presently on the ratification of the treaty, to those in possession of the lands; which was declared to be, that legal seisin and possession which follows title, is con-extensive with the right, and continues till it is ousted by an actual adverse possession, as contradistinguished from residence and occupation. Ibid. The United States, by accepting the cession under the terms of the eighth article, and the ratification by the king, with an exception of the three annulled grants to Allegon, Punon Rostro, and Vargas, can make no other exceptions of grants made by the lawful authorities of the king. Ibid. The meaning of the words lawful authorities, in the eighth article, or competent authorities in the ratification, must be taken to be, “by those persons who exercised the granting power by the authority of the crown.” The eighth article expressly recognises the existence of these lawful authorities in the ceded territories, designating the governor or intendant, as the case might be, as invested with such authority: which is to be deemed competent till the contrary is made to appear. Ibid. By “the laws of Spain” is to be understood the will of the king expressed in his orders, or by his authority, evidenced by the acts themselves; or by such usage and customs in the province as may be presumed to have emanated from the king, or to have been sanctioned by him, as existing authorized local laws. Ibid. In addition to the established principles heretofore laid down by this court as the legal effect of an usage or custom, there is one which is peculiarly appropriate to this case. The act of Congress giving jurisdiction to this court to adjudicate on these causes, contains this clause in reference to grants, &c., “which was protected and secured by the treaty, and which might have been perfected into a complete title, under and in conformity to the laws, usages and customs of the government under which the same originated.” This is an express recognition of any known and established usage or custom in the Spanish provinces, in relation to the grants of land, and the title thereto, which brings them within a well established rule of law: that a custom or usage, saved and preserved by a statute, has the force of an express statute, and shall control all affirmative statutes in opposition, though it must yield to the authority of negative ones, which forbid an act authorized by a custom or usage thus saved and protected; and this is the rule by which its efficacy must be tested, according to the act of Congress, which must be considered of binding authority. Ibid. By the eighth article of the treaty ceding Florida to the United States, the same time is allowed to the owners of land granted under the authority of Spain, to fulfil the conditions of their grants, after the date of the treaty as was limited in the grants. It has been decided by this court, in the case of Arredondo, that as to individual rights, the treaty is to be considered as dated at its ratification. United States v. Sibbald, 10 Peters, 313. It has been decided, in Arredondo’s case, that that provision of the treaty as to the performance of the conditions in grants, is not confined to owners of land by occupancy or residence; but extends to persons who have a legal seisin and possession of land, in virtue of a grant; and that, in the situation of the province, and the claimants to land at the time of the cession, it was enough that they should show a performance of the condition cy pres. Ibid. In the construction of the Florida treaty, it is admitted that the United States succeeds to all those equitable obligations which we are to suppose would have been influenced his Catholic majesty, to secure their property to his subjects, and which would have been applied by him in the construction of a conditional grant, to make it absolute; and further, that the United States must maintain the rights of property under it, by applying the laws and customs by which those rights were secured, before Florida was ceded; or by which an inchoate right of property would, by those laws and customs, have been adjudicated by the Spanish authority to have become a perfect right. United States v. Mills’ Heirs, 12 Peters, 215.