Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 3.djvu/686

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646

SIXTEENTH CONGRESS.Sess. II. Res. 2.1821.

March 3, 1821.

II. Resolution providing for jails in certain cases, for the safe custody of persons committed under the authority of the United States.^[1]

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That where any state or states

↑ The resolutions and acts of Congress relating to jails are:
Resolution of September 23, 1789, vol. i. 96. Resolution of March 3, 1821. An act for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt, Jan. 6, 1800, ch. 4. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68.
The cases decided within the courts of the United States on the laws of “escapes” are,
A discharge from the prison rules, by the insolvent law of Virginia, although obtained by fraud, is a discharge in due course of law; and upon such discharge, no action can be sustained upon the prison bound bond for an escape. Simms and Wise v. Slacum, 3 Cranch, 300; 1 Cond. Rep. 539.
The obligors in a bond for the prison limits, are not discharged from their liability for an escape, by the subsequent assent of the plaintiff. Such assent, to have any effect, must be given prior to the escape. Slocum et a. v. Hathaway, 1 Paine, 290.
The condition of a bond, that a prisoner “shall faithfully and absolutely remain within the limits of the jail, and not depart therefrom,” &c. is not broken by the escape of the prisoner, while in a state of insanity. Hazard v. Hazard et al. 1 Paine, 295.
The liability of the sureties in a prison bounds bond, for an escape, is not co-extensive with that of the sheriff: as it regards the latter, the prisoner on the limits is supposed to be in his immediate custody, and the escape of an insane prisoner, therefore, is as much a negligent escape as any other; and he is not allowed to excuse himself, when he might so easily collude, or be imposed upon. But there is no analogy, in these respects, between a sheriff and the sureties. Ibid.
Under the act of Congress of January 6, 1800, ch. 4, the sheriff of a county is bound to take a bond for the limits, as provided by the state laws, from a prisoner confined on process from the courts of the United States; and false imprisonment would lie, on his refusal. Such a bond has, in all respects, the same incidents, and the like legal effect with a bond taken under the state laws. It is assignable; and an assignment discharges the sheriff from liability for a subsequent escape. The United States v. Noah, 1 Paine, 368.
The United States are not expressly named in the act, and bound by it; and an assignment of the bond to them, when they are plaintiffs, is valid. Ibid.
The Secretary of the Treasury having accepted such an assignment, will be presumed to be authorized; and the United States are bound by such acceptance. Ibid.
The term “process,” includes executions as well as mesne process. Ibid.
After a prisoner has been enlarged upon a limit bond, the sheriff can confine him again only on the bail’s becoming insufficient; he cannot accept a surrender of him; at all events, not after the assignment of the bond. Ibid.
If a debtor, committed to the state jail under process from the courts of the United States, escape, the marshal is not liable. Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch, 76; 3 Cond. Rep. 280.
The act of Congress has limited the responsibility of the marshal to his own acts, and the acts of his deputies. The keeper of a state jail is, neither in fact nor in law, the deputy of the marshal, he is not appointed by, nor removable at the will of the marshal. When a prisoner is regularly committed to a state jail by the marshal, he is no longer in the custody of the marshal, or controllable by him. Ibid.
Under the laws of Rhode Island, a discharge according to the act for the relief of poor prisoners for debt, although obtained by fraud and perjury, is a lawful discharge, and not an escape; and upon such a discharge, no action can be maintained upon a bond for the liberty of the prison limits. Ammidon v. Smith et al. 1 Wheat. 447; 3 Cond. Rep. 619.
At common law, it is not an escape for a jailer to allow prisoners, confined for debt, the liberty of all the apartments within the jail wall; for a confinement within the walls, is salva et arcta custodia. Steere v. Field, 2 Mason’s C. C. R. 486.
It is an escape, in the jailer, to make a prisoner for debt, a turnkey; and to intrust him with the keys of the outer doors, as well as inner doors, at all times by night and by day. Ibid.
If the jailer be committed to his own jail, on execution by the sheriff, and no new keeper is appointed, it is an escape of the jailer, for which the sheriff is answerable; but it is not an escape of the other prisoners, if they are in fact kept in custody, under the authority of the jailer or his agents. Ibid.
In Rhode Island, the doctrine as to escapes is the same as at common law; and the statutes giving the liberty of the limits to prisoners, on giving bonds not to escape, &c. have not altered the common law. In Rhode Island, an action of debt for an escape, is a legal remedy; that action being incorporated into the laws, by implication, by the adoption of the laws of England. Ibid.
Where the conditions of a bond for the jail limits, in Rhode Island, required the party to remain a true prisoner in the custody of the keeper of the prison, and within the limits of the prison, “until he shall be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape or escapes, during the time of restraint, then this obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force and virtue:” Held, that a discharge under the insolvent laws of the state, obtained from the proper court, in pursuance of a resolution of the legislature, and discharging the party from all his debts, &c. and “from all imprisonment, arrest, and restraint of his person therefor,” was a lawful discharge; and that his going at large under it, was no breach of the condition of the bond. Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; 6 Cond. Rep. 535.
After judgment obtained in the circuit court of the United States against the drawer of a note, a capias ad satisfaciendum was issued against him by the holder, and he was put in prison. Two justices of the peace ordered his discharge, claiming to proceed according to the law of Kentucky, in the case of insolvent debtors; and the jailer permitted him to leave the prison. The jailer made himself and his securities liable for an escape, by permitting the prisoner to leave the prison. Bank of the United States v. Tyler, 4 Peters, 366.
The act of Congress of 1800, ch. 4, is not that by which the liberties of the jail-yard allowed to

[p646-1] The resolutions and acts of Congress relating to jails are:
Resolution of September 23, 1789, vol. i. 96. Resolution of March 3, 1821. An act for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt, Jan. 6, 1800, ch. 4. Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68.
The cases decided within the courts of the United States on the laws of “escapes” are,
A discharge from the prison rules, by the insolvent law of Virginia, although obtained by fraud, is a discharge in due course of law; and upon such discharge, no action can be sustained upon the prison bound bond for an escape. Simms and Wise v. Slacum, 3 Cranch, 300; 1 Cond. Rep. 539.
The obligors in a bond for the prison limits, are not discharged from their liability for an escape, by the subsequent assent of the plaintiff. Such assent, to have any effect, must be given prior to the escape. Slocum et a. v. Hathaway, 1 Paine, 290.
The condition of a bond, that a prisoner “shall faithfully and absolutely remain within the limits of the jail, and not depart therefrom,” &c. is not broken by the escape of the prisoner, while in a state of insanity. Hazard v. Hazard et al. 1 Paine, 295.
The liability of the sureties in a prison bounds bond, for an escape, is not co-extensive with that of the sheriff: as it regards the latter, the prisoner on the limits is supposed to be in his immediate custody, and the escape of an insane prisoner, therefore, is as much a negligent escape as any other; and he is not allowed to excuse himself, when he might so easily collude, or be imposed upon. But there is no analogy, in these respects, between a sheriff and the sureties. Ibid.
Under the act of Congress of January 6, 1800, ch. 4, the sheriff of a county is bound to take a bond for the limits, as provided by the state laws, from a prisoner confined on process from the courts of the United States; and false imprisonment would lie, on his refusal. Such a bond has, in all respects, the same incidents, and the like legal effect with a bond taken under the state laws. It is assignable; and an assignment discharges the sheriff from liability for a subsequent escape. The United States v. Noah, 1 Paine, 368.
The United States are not expressly named in the act, and bound by it; and an assignment of the bond to them, when they are plaintiffs, is valid. Ibid.
The Secretary of the Treasury having accepted such an assignment, will be presumed to be authorized; and the United States are bound by such acceptance. Ibid.
The term “process,” includes executions as well as mesne process. Ibid.
After a prisoner has been enlarged upon a limit bond, the sheriff can confine him again only on the bail’s becoming insufficient; he cannot accept a surrender of him; at all events, not after the assignment of the bond. Ibid.
If a debtor, committed to the state jail under process from the courts of the United States, escape, the marshal is not liable. Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch, 76; 3 Cond. Rep. 280.
The act of Congress has limited the responsibility of the marshal to his own acts, and the acts of his deputies. The keeper of a state jail is, neither in fact nor in law, the deputy of the marshal, he is not appointed by, nor removable at the will of the marshal. When a prisoner is regularly committed to a state jail by the marshal, he is no longer in the custody of the marshal, or controllable by him. Ibid.
Under the laws of Rhode Island, a discharge according to the act for the relief of poor prisoners for debt, although obtained by fraud and perjury, is a lawful discharge, and not an escape; and upon such a discharge, no action can be maintained upon a bond for the liberty of the prison limits. Ammidon v. Smith et al. 1 Wheat. 447; 3 Cond. Rep. 619.
At common law, it is not an escape for a jailer to allow prisoners, confined for debt, the liberty of all the apartments within the jail wall; for a confinement within the walls, is salva et arcta custodia. Steere v. Field, 2 Mason’s C. C. R. 486.
It is an escape, in the jailer, to make a prisoner for debt, a turnkey; and to intrust him with the keys of the outer doors, as well as inner doors, at all times by night and by day. Ibid.
If the jailer be committed to his own jail, on execution by the sheriff, and no new keeper is appointed, it is an escape of the jailer, for which the sheriff is answerable; but it is not an escape of the other prisoners, if they are in fact kept in custody, under the authority of the jailer or his agents. Ibid.
In Rhode Island, the doctrine as to escapes is the same as at common law; and the statutes giving the liberty of the limits to prisoners, on giving bonds not to escape, &c. have not altered the common law. In Rhode Island, an action of debt for an escape, is a legal remedy; that action being incorporated into the laws, by implication, by the adoption of the laws of England. Ibid.
Where the conditions of a bond for the jail limits, in Rhode Island, required the party to remain a true prisoner in the custody of the keeper of the prison, and within the limits of the prison, “until he shall be lawfully discharged, without committing any manner of escape or escapes, during the time of restraint, then this obligation to be void, or else to remain in full force and virtue:” Held, that a discharge under the insolvent laws of the state, obtained from the proper court, in pursuance of a resolution of the legislature, and discharging the party from all his debts, &c. and “from all imprisonment, arrest, and restraint of his person therefor,” was a lawful discharge; and that his going at large under it, was no breach of the condition of the bond. Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; 6 Cond. Rep. 535.
After judgment obtained in the circuit court of the United States against the drawer of a note, a capias ad satisfaciendum was issued against him by the holder, and he was put in prison. Two justices of the peace ordered his discharge, claiming to proceed according to the law of Kentucky, in the case of insolvent debtors; and the jailer permitted him to leave the prison. The jailer made himself and his securities liable for an escape, by permitting the prisoner to leave the prison. Bank of the United States v. Tyler, 4 Peters, 366.
The act of Congress of 1800, ch. 4, is not that by which the liberties of the jail-yard allowed to

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