647
Vol. i. 96.
Any states having granted and withdrawing the use of a jail, the marshal, under direction of the judge, may hire a place, &c.having complied with the recommendation of Congress, in the resolution of the twenty-third day of September, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine, shall have withdrawn, or shall hereafter withdraw, either in whole or in part, the use of their jails for prisoners committed under the authority of the United States, the marshal in such state or states, under the direction of the judge of the district, shall be, and hereby is, authorized and required to hire a convenient place to serve as a temporary jail, and to make the necessary provision for the safe keeping of prisoners committed under the authority of the United States, until permanent provision shall be made by law for that purpose; and the said marshal shall be allowed his reasonable expenses, incurred for the above purposes, to be paid out of the treasury of the United States.
Approved, March 3, 1821.
debtors imprisoned on execution issuing from the courts of the United States, are now regulated. The United States v. Knight et al., 3 Sumners’ C. C. R. 358
The act of 1823, ch. 68, has adopted the state laws on the subject of jail liberties then existing in the states, under the words “that writs of execution and other final process issued on judgment and decrees rendered in any of the courts of the United States and the proceedings thereon shall be the same, &c., as are now used in such states,” &c. Ibid. Action on a bond given to the United States for liberty of the jail-yard, in Portland, in the state of Maine. The condition of the bond was that J. K. and B. K. should continue true prisoners, in the custody of the jailer, within the limits of the jail-yard. It was agreed by the counsel of the plaintiff and defendant that J. K. and B. K. had remained within “the limits of the jail-yard” as established under the laws of Massachusetts of 1787, then prevailing in Maine, the limits of the jail-yard having, in October, 1798, been extended over the whole county; but had not remained within the limits established on the 28th of May, 1787, and existing when the act of Congress was passed, 4th January, 1800, authorizing persons under process from the United States, to have “the jail limits,” as established by the laws of the states. Held, that the act of Congress of May 19, 1828, gives the debtor imprisoned under execution from the courts of the United States, at the suit of the United States, the privilege of the jail limits, in the several states, as they were fixed by laws of the several states at the date of that act. The United States v. Knight et al. 14 Peters, 301. Whatever might be the liability of the officer who took the bond from the defendants, if the jail limits continued to be such as were established under the law of Massachusetts of 1787, the bond not having been taken under that law, and the condition being different from the requirements of those regulations, the parties to the bond, the suit being upon the bond, are bound for nothing whatever, but what is contained in the condition, whether it be or be not conformable to the law. Ibid. The statute of May 19, 1828, entitled “An act to regulate process in the courts of the United States,” which proposes only to regulate the mode of proceeding in civil cases, does not divest the public of any right, does not violate any principle of public policy, but on the contrary makes a provision with the policy which the government has vindicated by many acts of previous legislation, to conform to the laws of the state, in giving to persons imprisoned under execution the privilege of jail limits, embracing executions at the suit of the United States. Ibid. Action for an escape against the sheriff of Madison, Mississippi, he having received into his custody as a prisoner, the defendant in an action in the circuit court of Mississippi, taken under execution, and having permitted and suffered him to escape. The declaration set out the judgment obtained by the plaintiffs against Scott, the defendant in the circuit court, the execution, the arrest of Scott, and his delivery to Long, the sheriff, who received him into his custody under the execution, and detained him, until, without leave or license of the plaintiffs in the execution, and against their will, he permitted him to escape and to go at large, &c., &c. To this declaration the defendant pleaded that he does not owe the sum of money demanded in the declaration “in the manner and form as complained against him,” and the jury found that the defendant Long “doth owe the debt in the declaration mentioned as therein alleged,” and assessed damages for the detention thereof, at one thousand and sixteen dollars and ninety-six cents, upon which the court gave judgment for six thousand three hundred and fifty-six dollars, and one thousand and sixteen dollars and ninety-six cents damages. Held, that the judgment of the circuit court is correct under the provisions of the statute of Mississippi of 7th June, 1822. The jury were not required in the action to find specially that the prisoner that the prisoner escaped with the consent, and through the negligence of the sheriff. The plea alleged that the defendant did not owe the sum of money demanded, “in the manner and form as the plaintiff complained against him.” This plea put in issue every material averment in the declaration; on this issue, on the most strict and rigid construction, the jury have expressly found all that is required to be found by the requirement of the act. Long v. Palmer et al. 16 Peters, 65. If the sheriff suffers or permits a prisoner to escape, this, both in common parlance, and legal intendment, is an escape with the consent of the sheriff. Ibid. The object of the act is to make the sheriff liable for a voluntary or negligent escape; and that this shall be found by the jury; and if this appear from the record by express finding, or by the necessary conclusion of law, it is sufficient. Ibid.