of the RSA. After initially meeting with Branch, AT&T was interested in distributing it, but sought reassurance from Google that if it did so, it would not violate the RSA. Ezell Dep. Tr. at 237:619, 239:15-23. AT&T felt that it was not “black and white or cut and dry,” and that “there might be some risks associated with” partnering with Branch, because it could be “considered a competing or alternative search,” which would require AT&T to “forego[] the Internet search revenue from Google and instead just earn[] this on-device search revenue from Branch.” Id. at 240:1-5, 242:25–243:9.
396. Ultimately, AT&T was unable to get a clear response from Google, see UPX982 at 686–87 (Google referring AT&T back to the “alternative search services” term without a concrete answer), and thus AT&T declined to preload Branch because it was not worth the risk, Ezell Dep. Tr. at 340:20–341:4 (“[T]he way it was reported back to me was that Google indicated they felt that it was inconsistent with the RSA.”); id. at 247:1–249:9 (“It didn’t appear that the economic upside from Branch was significant enough to . . . potentially put at risk a device not being eligible for our Google Search revenue.”).
- 3. Mobile Services Information Agreements
397. In 2021, every wireless carrier entered into a Mobile Services Incentive Agreement (MSIA) with Google, also known as a “go-to-market” agreement, wherein Google pays carriers incentives as consideration for meeting various requirements that are unrelated to search. See JX92; JX96; JX94; Tr. at 9460:24–9461:23 (Rosenberg).
398. The MSIAs are separate and apart from the MADAs and RSAs. Tr. at 9376:21–9377:8 (McCallister). They require partners to collaborate with Google as to how the incentive is spent, which goes towards the goal of supporting the sale of Android devices and the Android ecosystem. Id. at 9460:24–9461:23 (Rosenberg); id. at 9378:23–9379:1 (McCallister).
133
