The viceroy and other authorities in Mexico had now become thoroughly aroused. The situation was critical. The rebels were sending messengers in all directions, and aimed at nothing less than the extermination of the foreigners throughout America. Their superstitious fear of the Spaniards, of their powder and of their horses, which had rendered conquest possible, had to a great extent disappeared. It was now well understood by the native leaders that they had to deal with men, not gods; united action might throw off the yoke. This unity of action it seemed well-nigh impossible to attain. In the region about Mexico a successful rebellion could not be set on foot; the only hope for the natives and danger to the Spaniards lay in the frontier provinces. Let two or three of these expel the intruders, regain their independence, establish fortified camps in naturally strong positions, offer an asylum and rallying-point to the disaffected everywhere, divide the forces of the Spaniards and thus gain time to arouse the native patriotism, and perfect a general plan of action: the result would be a desperate struggle from which the Spaniards had everything to fear. The Indian chiefs of New Galicia had hit upon the only plan which offered any chance of success; the hated invaders must be crushed wholly and immediately.
Mendoza raised a force of about four hundred and fifty Spaniards, and some thirty thousand Tlascaltec and Aztec warriors, whose fidelity was assured by promises of honors and wealth to their leaders. And not without misgivings and opposition they were intrusted by the viceroy with horses and fire-arms, being authorized for the first time to manufacture and to carry Spanish weapons. The army set out from Mexico on the day of the battle at Guadalajara, and marched through Michoacan by nearly the same route as that followed by Nuño de Guzman in 1529.[1]
- ↑ There was some evidence of a plot for revolt between the natives of Michoacan and the Tlascaltecs, as explained by Lopez in a letter to the emperor
