ish the salaries of the officers of Carroll County, and there was no intention to repeal or abolish the office of tax collector as created by act No. 32 of the Acts of 1897. He invokes the rule that, where it appears that there is any ambiguity, the intent of the Legislature should be determined from a consideration of the entire body of the act, regard being had for its various provisions, taking into consideration the occasion and necessity of the law and the mischief intended to be remedied and the object and remedy in view. It is his contention that the sole purpose of act No. 77 of the Acts of 1927 was to repeal that part only of act No. 32 regulating the salaries of the officers of Carroll County, which intent is established by an application of the rule above announced to the construction of said act. He cites the case of Cotton v. Boone County, 177 Ark. 249, 6 S. W. (2d) 283, as conclusive of this question.
The court is of the opinion that the language of § 1, act 77, of the Acts of 1927, is not ambiguous, but that the language used can be susceptible of but one meaning, namely, that act No. 32 of the Acts of 1897 was repealed, and where the language is plain it will need no construction. The language in the title following the numbers of the acts sought to be repealed, i. e., regulating the salaries of certain county officers of Carroll County," and that following the numbers of the sections to be repealed by § 1 of the act; i. e., "all of said acts being special acts relating to and fixing the salaries of certain officers of Carroll County," is merely descriptive of the act to be repealed, and which, in connection with the number of the act, identifies the law which the Legislature has in mind and which it is repealing. It is a well-settled rule of law that, where the will of the Legislature is clearly expressed, the court should adhere to the literal expression of the enactment without regard to consequences, and every construction derived from a consideration of its reason and spirit should be discarded; for it is dangerous to interpret a statute contrary to its express words, where
