Opinion of the Court
§1533(b)(2). To satisfy its obligation to consider economic impact, the Service commissioned a report estimating the costs of its proposed critical-habitat designation. The Service concluded that the costs of designating the proposed areas, including Unit 1, were not “disproportionate” to the conservation benefits and, “[c]onsequently,” declined to make any exclusions.
Weyerhaeuser claims that the Service’s conclusion rested on a faulty assessment of the costs and benefits of designation and that the resulting decision not to exclude should be set aside. Specifically, Weyerhaeuser contends that the Service improperly weighed the costs of designating Unit 1 against the benefits of designating all proposed critical habitat, rather than the benefits of designating Unit 1 in particular. Weyerhaeuser also argues that the Service did not fully account for the economic impact of designating Unit 1 because it ignored, among other things, the costs of replacing timber trees with longleaf pines, maintaining an open canopy through controlled burning, and the tax revenue that St. Tammany Parish would lose if Unit 1 were never developed. Brief for Petitioner 53–54. The Court of Appeals did not consider Weyerhaeuser’s claim because it concluded that a decision not to exclude a certain area from critical habitat is unreviewable.
The Administrative Procedure Act creates a “basic presumption of judicial review [for] one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action.’ ” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (quoting 5 U. S. C. §702). As we explained recently, “legal lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no consequence. That is why this Court has so long applied a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (slip op., at 7–8). The presumption may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review, 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(1), or if the action is “committed to agency
