Opinion of the Court
discretion by law,” §701(a)(2). The Service contends, and the lower courts agreed, that Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA commits to the Secretary’s discretion decisions not to exclude an area from critical habitat.
This Court has noted the “tension” between the prohibition of judicial review for actions “committed to agency discretion” and the command in §706(2)(A) that courts set aside any agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 829 (1985). A court could never determine that an agency abused its discretion if all matters committed to agency discretion were unreviewable. To give effect to §706(2)(A) and to honor the presumption of review, we have read the exception in §701(a)(2) quite narrowly, restricting it to “those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U. S. 182, 191 (1993). The Service contends that Section 4(b)(2) of the ESA is one of those rare statutory provisions.
There is, at the outset, reason to be skeptical of the Service’s position. The few cases in which we have applied the §701(a)(2) exception involved agency decisions that courts have traditionally regarded as unreviewable, such as the allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation, Lincoln, 508 U. S., at 191, or a decision not to reconsider a final action, ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 282 (1987). By contrast, this case involves the sort of routine dispute that federal courts regularly review: An agency issues an order affecting the rights of a private party, and the private party objects that the agency did not properly justify its determination under a standard set forth in the statute.
Section 4(b)(2) states that the Secretary
