Report of the Commission of Enquiry/Chapter 4
Chapter IV.
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS IN MANCHURIA ON AND SUBSEQUENT TO SEPTEMBER 18th, 1931.
Situation immediately preceding the outbreak.
(See Map No.5[1])In the preceding chapter, the growing tension between the Japanese and Chinese interests in Manchuria was discussed and its effect on the attitudes of the military forces of the two nations described. Certain internal, economic and political factors had undoubtedly for some time been preparing the Japanese people for a resumption of the "positive policy" in Manchuria. The dissatisfaction of the army; the financial policy of the Government; the appearance of a new political force emanating from the army, the country districts and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political parties, which despised the compromise methods of Western civilisation and relied on the virtues of Old Japan and which included in its condemnation the self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians; the fall in commodity prices, which inclined the primary producer to look to an adventurous foreign policy for the alleviation of his lot; the trade depression, which caused the industrial and commercial community to believe that better business would result from a more vigorous foreign policy: all these factors were preparing the way for the abandonment of the Shidehara "policy of conciliation" with China which seemed to have achieved such meagre results. This impatience in Japan was even greater among the Japanese in Manchuria, where the tension throughout the summer was increasing. As September wore on, this tension reached such a point that it was apparent to all careful observers that a breaking-point must soon be reached. The public Press of both countries tended rather to inflame than to calm public opinion. Vigorous speeches of the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by their army in Manchuria, were reported. Protracted delay by the Chinese authorities in making satisfactory investigation of and redress for the murder of Captain Nakamura had particularly incensed the young officers of the Japanese Army in Manchuria, who clearly showed their sensitiveness to irresponsible remarks and slurs made by equally irresponsible Chinese officers on the streets or in restaurants and other places of close contact. And so the stage was set for the events which followed.
The night of September 18th–19th.
(See Map No. 6)On the morning of Saturday, September 19th, the population of Mukden woke to find their city in the hands of Japanese troops. During the night sounds of firing had been heard, but there was nothing unusual in this; it had been a nightly experience throughout the week, as the Japanese had been carrying out night manœuvres involving vigorous rifle and machine-gun firing. True that, on the night of September 18th, the booming of guns and the sound of shells caused some alarm to the few that distinguished them, but the majority of the population considered the firing to be merely another repetition of Japanese manœuvres, perhaps rather noisier than usual.
Appreciating the great importance of this occurrence, which, as will be shown, was the first step of a movement which resulted in the military occupation of practically the whole of Manchuria, the Commission conducted an extensive enquiry into the events of that night. Of great value and interest, of course, were the official accounts of the Japanese and Chinese military leaders involved. The Japanese case was presented by Lieutenant Kawamoto, who is the earliest witness in the story, by Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, the Commanding Officer of the battalion which carried out the attack on the North Barracks (Peitaying), and by Colonel Hirata, who captured the walled city. We also heard evidence from Lieutenant-General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and from several members of his staff. The Chinese case was presented by General Wang I-Cheh, the officer in command of the Chinese troops in the North Barracks, supplemented by the personal narratives of his Chief of Staff and of other officers who were present during the operations. We also heard the evidence of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and of his Chief of Staff, General Yung Chen.
The Japanese version.According to the Japanese versions, Lieutenant Kawamoto, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty on the night of September 18th, practising defence exercises along the track of the South Manchuria Railway to the north of Mukden. They were proceeding southwards in the direction of Mukden. The night was dark but clear and the field of vision was not wide. When they reached a point at which a small road crosses the line, they heard the noise of a loud explosion a little way behind them. They turned and ran back, and after going about 200 yards they discovered that a portion of one of the rails on the down track had been blown out. The explosion took place at the point of junction of two rails; the end of each rail had been cleanly severed, creating a gap in the line of 31 inches. On arrival at the site of the explosion, the patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the line. Lieutenant Kawamoto immediately ordered his men to deploy and return the fire. The attacking body, estimated at about five or six, then stopped firing and retreated northwards. The Japanese patrol at once started in pursuit and, having gone about 200 yards, they were again fired upon by a larger body, estimated at between three and four hundred. Finding himself in danger of being surrounded by this large force, Lieutenant Kawamoto then ordered one of his men to report to the Commander of No. 3 Company, who was also engaged in night manœuvres some 1,500 yards to the north; at the same time, he ordered another of his men to telephone (by means of a box telephone near the spot) to Battalion Headquarters at Mukden for reinforcements.
At this moment the south-bound train from Changchun was heard approaching. Fearing that the train might be wrecked when it reached the damaged line, the Japanese patrol interrupted their engagement and placed detonators on the line in the hope of warning the train in time. The train, however, proceeded at full speed. When it reached the site of the explosion it was seen to sway and heel over to one side, but it recovered and passed on without stopping. As the train was due at Mukden at 10.30 p.m., where it arrived punctually, it must have been about 10 o'clock p.m., according to Lieutenant Kawamoto, when he first heard the explosion.
Fighting was then resumed. Captain Kawashima, with No. 3 Company, having heard the explosion, was already proceeding southwards when he met Lieutenant Kawamoto's messenger, who guided them to the spot. They arrived at about 10.50 p.m. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, the Battalion Commander, on receipt of a telephone message, at once ordered the 1st and 4th Companies that were with him at Mukden to proceed to the spot. He also sent orders to the 2nd Company, which was at Fushun—an hour and a-half away—to join them as soon as possible. The two Companies proceeded by rail from Mukden to Liutiaohu Station, and then on foot to the scene of action, where they arrived a little after midnight.
Lieutenant Kawamoto's patrol, reinforced by Captain Kawashima's Company, was still sustaining the fire of the Chinese troops concealed in the tall kaoliang grass, when the two Companies arrived from Mukden. Although his force was then only 500, and he believed the Chinese army in the North Barracks numbered 10,000, Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto at once ordered an attack on the Barracks, believing, as he told us, that "offence is the best defence". The ground between the railway and the North Barracks—a distance of about 250 yards—was difficult to cross in mass formation because of patches of water, and, while the Chinese troops were being driven back over this ground, Lieutenant Noda was sent up the railway with a section of the 3rd Company to intercept their retreat. When the Japanese reached the North Barracks, which were described as glittering with electric light, an attack was made by the 3rd Company, which succeeded in occupying a corner of the left wing. The attack was vigorously contested by the Chinese troops within, and there was fierce fighting for some hours. The 1st Company attacked on the right and the 4th Company in the centre. At 5 a.m. the south gate of the Barracks was blown in by two shells from a small cannon left in an outhouse immediately opposite to it by the Chinese, and by 6 o'clock a.m. the entire barracks were captured at the cost of two Japanese privates killed and twenty-two wounded. Some of the barracks caught fire during the fighting; the remainder were burned out by the Japanese on the morning of the 19th. The Japanese stated that they buried 320 Chinese, but only found about 20 wounded.
In the meantime, operations in other places were being carried out with equal rapidity and thoroughness. Colonel Hirata received a telephone message from Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto about 10.40 p.m. to the effect that the South Manchuria Railway track had been destroyed by Chinese troops and that he was about to start to attack the enemy. Colonel Hirata approved his action and himself decided to attack the walled city. The concentration of his troops was complete by 11.30 p.m. and his attack commenced. No resistance was offered, only occasional fighting on the streets, mostly with the Chinese police, of whom 75 were killed. At 2.15 a.m. the wall of the city was scaled. By 3.40 a.m. he had captured it. At 4,50 a.m. he received information that the staff of the 2nd Division and a part of the 16th Regiment had left Liaoyang at 3.30 a.m. These troops arrived shortly after 5 a.m. At 6 a.m. the occupation of the eastern wall was completed; the arsenal and aerodrome were captured at 7.30. The East Barracks were then attacked and by 1 p.m. were occupied without fighting. The total casualties in these operations were 7 Japanese wounded and 30 Chinese killed.
Lieutenant-General Honjo, who had only returned from his tour of inspection that very day, received the first news of what was happening at Mukden by telephone from a newspaper agency at about 11 o'clock a.m. The Chief of Staff received a telegraphic report at 11.46 a.m. from the Special Service Station at Mukden, giving details of the attack, and orders were immediately sent to the troops at Liaoyang, Yingkow and Fenghuangsheng to proceed to Mukden. The fleet was ordered to leave Port Arthur and proceed to Yingkow and the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea was asked to send reinforcements. Lieutenant-General Honjo left Port Arthur at 3.30 a.m. and arrived at Mukden at noon.
The Chinese version.According to the Chinese version, the Japanese attack on the Barracks (Peitaying) was entirely unprovoked and came as a complete surprise. On the night of September 18th, all the soldiers of the 7th Brigade, numbering about 10,000, were in the North Barracks. As instructions had been received from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang on September 6th[2] that special care was to be taken to avoid any clash with the Japanese troops in the tense state of feeling existing at the time, the sentries at the walls of the Barracks were only armed with dummy rifles. For the same reason, the west gate in the mud wall surrounding the camp which gave access to the railway had been closed. The Japanese had been carrying out night manœuvres around the barracks on the nights of September 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th. At 7 p.m. on the evening of the 18th, they were manœuvring at a village called Wenkuantun. At 9 p.m., Officer Liu reported that a train composed of three or four coaches, but without the usual type of locomotive, had stopped there. At 10 p.m. the sound of a loud explosion was heard, immediately followed by rifle fire. This was reported over the telephone by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding Officer, General Wang I-Cheh, who was at his private house situated near the railway, about six or seven miles from the barracks, to the south. While the Chief of Staff was still at the telephone, news was brought to him that the Japanese were attacking the barracks and that two sentries had been wounded. At about 11 o'clock p.m., a general attack on the south-west corner of the barracks began, and at 11.30 p.m. the Japanese had effected an entry through a hole in the wall. As soon as the attack began, the Chief of Staff gave orders for the lights to be extinguished, and again reported to General Wang I-Cheh by telephone. The latter replied that no resistance was to be offered. Distant artillery fire was heard at 10.30 o'clock p.m. from the south-west and north-west. At midnight, live shells began to fall inside the barracks. On reaching the south gate, the retreating troops of the 621st Regiment found that the Japanese were attacking that gate and that the guard was withdrawing. They accordingly took shelter in some trenches and earthworks until after the Japanese soldiers had passed through into the interior, when they were able to make their escape through the south gate and reached the village of Erhtaitze, to the north-east of the barracks, about 2 a.m. Other troops made their escape through the east gate and the empty barracks just outside the east wall, finally reaching the same village between 3 and 4 a.m.
The only resistance was offered by the 620th Regiment, quartered in the north-east corner building and the second building south of it. The commander of this regiment stated that, when the Japanese troops entered through the south gate at 1 a.m., the Chinese troops withdrew from one building to another, leaving the Japanese to attack empty buildings. After the main body of the Chinese troops had withdrawn, the Japanese turned eastwards and occupied the eastern exit. The 620th*Regiment thus found themselves cut off, and had no option but to fight their way through. They started to break through at 5 a.m., but did not get completely clear until 7 a.m. This was the only actual fighting that took place in the barracks and was responsible for most of the casualties. This regiment was the last to reach the village of Erhtaitze.
As soon as they were all assembled, the Chinese troops left the village in the early morning of the 19th for Tungling Station. From here they made their way to a village near Kirin, where they obtained a supply of winter clothing. Colonel Wang was sent to obtain permission from General Hsi Hsia for the troops to enter Kirin City. The Japanese residents at Kirin were so alarmed at the approach of the Chinese soldiers that reinforcements were at once sent from Changchun, Ssupingkai and Mukden to Kirin. Consequently, the Chinese turned back towards Mukden. They left their trains 13 miles outside Mukden, separated into nine groups, and marched round Mukden by night. To escape detection by the Japanese, General Wang I-Cheh himself rode through the town disguised as a peasant. In the morning, the Japanese obtained news of their presence and sent aeroplanes to bomb them. They were obliged to lie hidden by day, but continued their march at night. Eventually they reached a station on the Peiping-Mukden railway, and here they were able to order seven trains, which brought them to Shanhaikwan by October 4th.
Opinion of the Commission.Such are the two stories of the so-called incident of September 18th as they were told to the Commission by the participants on both sides. Clearly, and not unnaturally in the circumstances, they are different and contradictory.
Appreciating the tense situation and high feeling which had preceded this incident, and realising the discrepancies which are bound to occur in accounts of interested persons, especially with regard to an event which took place at night, the Commission, during its stay in the Far East, interviewed as many as possible of the representative foreigners who had been in Mukden at the time of the occurrences or soon after, including newspaper correspondents and other persons who had visited the scene of conflict shortly after the event, and to whom the first official Japanese account had been given. After a thorough consideration of such opinions, as well as of the accounts of the interested parties, and after a mature study of the considerable quantity of written material and a careful weighing of the great mass of evidence which was presented or collected, the Commission has come to the following conclusions:
Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th–19th, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese, in accordance with the instructions referred to on page 69, had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorised attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10.30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and-was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.
The narrative of the subsequent events must now be resumed.
Movements of Japanese troops.On the night of September 18th, the Japanese troops in Manchuria were distributed as follows: In addition to the four Companies of the Battalion of Railway Guards which took part in the attack on the North Barracks, and the 29th Regiment of the 2nd Division under Colonel Hirata, which captured the Walled City of Mukden, already described, the rest of the 2nd Division was distributed in various places; the Headquarters of the 4th Regiment was at Changchun, of the 16th at Liaoyang, of the 30th at Port Arthur; other parts of these regiments were stationed at Antung, Yingkow, and at many smaller places on the Changchun-Mukden branch and the Antung-Mukden branch of the South Manchuria Railway. Another battalion of Railway Guards was at Changchun, and units of the Railway Guards and Gendarmerie were distributed with the 2nd Division in the smaller places already mentioned. Lastly, there were the garrison troops of Korea.
All the forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18th over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur. Their total strength was as follows: 2nd Division, 5,400 men and 16 field-guns; Railway Guards about 5,000 men; Gendarmerie about 500. The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance. The Railway Guards and Gendarmerie remained in these places, while the units of the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the more serious operations. The 16th and 30th Regiments arrived in time to join Colonel Hirata and assisted in the capture of the East Barracks. The 39th Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division (4,000 men and artillery) concentrated at 10 a.m. on the 19th at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed the Yalu river on the 21st, and arrived at Mukden at midnight. From here detachments were sent to Liaoyuan and Hsinmin, which they occupied on the 22nd.
Occupation of Changehun on September 18th–19th, and Kirin on September 21st.The Chinese Garrisons of Kuanchengtze and Nanling at Changchun, with an estimated strength of 10,000 men and 40 guns, were attacked on the night of September 18th by the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division and 1st Railway Guard Battalion stationed there (under Major-General Hasebe). Here, however, some resistance was shown by the Chinese. Fighting began at midnight. Nanling barracks were captured by 11 a.m. on the 19th, those of Kuanchengtze by 3 p.m. that day. The total Japanese casualties involved were 3 officers and 64 men killed and 3 officers and 85 men wounded. As soon as the fighting at Mukden was over, the Regiments of the 2nd Division were concentrated at Changchun, the staff, with General Tamon, the 30th Regiment and one Battalion of Field Artillery arriving on the 20th, and the 15th Brigade under General Amano arriving on the 22nd. Kirin was occupied on the 21st without the firing of a shot, and the Chinese troops were removed to a distance of about 8 miles.
The Herald of Asia, a semi-official Japanese publication of that time, states that all military operations were then regarded as completed, and that no further movements of troops were anticipated. The military operations which in fact ensued are attributed to Chinese provocation: an anti-Japanese demonstration at Chientao on the 20th, the destruction of a railway station at Lungchingtsun, and the explosion of some bombs which did no damage on Japanese premises at Harbin on September 23rd are mentioned as examples of such provocation. Complaint is also made of growing banditry and of the activities of disbanded soldiers. All of these things, it is claimed, finally forced the Japanese to new military operations against their will.
Bombing of Chinchow.The first of these operations was the bombing, on October 8th, of Chinchow, to which place the Provincial Government of Liaoning Province had been transferred by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang at the end of September. According to the Japanese account, the bombing was chiefly directed against the military barracks and the Communications University, where the offices of the Civil Government had been established. The bombing of a civil administration by military forces cannot be justified and there is some doubt whether the area bombed was in fact as restricted as the Japanese allege. Mr. Lewis, an American honorary adviser of the Chinese Government, arrived at Chinchow on October 12th and wrote an account of what he found there to Dr. Koo, who passed on the information later to the Commission in his capacity of Assessor. According to Mr. Lewis, the military barracks were in fact not touched at all and a multitude of bombs fell everywhere in the town, even on the hospital, as well as on the University buildings. The Commander of the bombing-planes informed a Japanese newspaper shortly afterwards that four planes from Changchun were ordered to Mukden at 8.30 a.m. on the 8th. There they joined other planes and a squad of six scouting and five bombing-planes were immediately despatched to Chinchow heavily loaded with bombs and fuel. They arrived at about 1 p.m., within ten to fifteen minutes dropped eighty bombs, and immediately returned to Mukden. The Chinese, according to Mr. Lewis, did not return the fire.
Nonni Bridge operations.The next operation was that of the Nonni River Bridges, which started in the middle of October and ended on November 19th with the occupation of Tsitsihar by the Japanese troops. The justification for this given by the Japanese was that they were attacked while repairing the bridge over the Nonni River which had been destroyed by General Ma Chan-shan. But the story must be begun earlier and an explanation given of the destruction of the bridges.
At the beginning of October, General Chang Hai-peng, the Garrison Commander at Taonan, who in former times had held the same rank as Ma Chan-shan and Wan Fu-lin, and had tried to become Governor of Heilungkiang Province in their place, started an advance movement along the Taonan-Angangchi Railway with the obvious object of seizing the Provincial Government by force. It is alleged in the Chinese Assessor's document No, 3, and this view is supported by information from neutral sources, that this offensive was instigated by the Japanese. In order to prevent the advance of Chang Haipeng's troops, General Ma Chan-shan ordered the destruction of the bridges over the Nonni river and both armies faced each other across the large and swampy valley of that river.
The Taonan-Angangchi Railway had been built with capital supplied by the South Manchuria Railway and the line was pledged as security for the loan. Accordingly, the South Manchuria Railway authorities felt that the interruption to the traffic on this line could not be allowed to continue at a season when the transportation of crops from the north of Manchuria was particularly needed. The Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar, on instructions from his Government, requested General Ma Chan-shan, who had arrived at Tsitsihar on October 20th, to have the bridges repaired as soon as possible, but no time-limit accompanied this request. The Japanese authorities believed that General Ma Chan-shan would delay as long as possible the repairing of the bridges, as this interruption helped him to keep General Chang Hai-peng's troops at a distance. On October 20th, a small party of employees of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, without military escort, attempted to inspect the damage to the bridges, and was fired upon by Chinese troops in spite of explanations previously given to an officer of the Heilungkiang Provincial forces. This aggravated the situation and accordingly, on October 28th, Major Hayashi, the representative of General Honjo at Tsitsihar, demanded the completion of the repairs by noon of November 3rd, stating that, if they were not carried out by that date, engineers of the South Manchuria Railway, under the protection of Japanese troops, would take over the work. The Chinese authorities asked for an extension of the time-limit, but no answer was returned to this request and Japanese troops were despatched from Ssupingkai for the purpose of protecting the execution of the repair work.
By November 2nd, the negotiations had not progressed and no decision had been reached. On that day, Major Hayashi delivered an ultimatum to Generals Ma Chan-shan and Chang Hai-peng, demanding that neither of them should use the railway for tactical purposes and that both should withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 kilometres from each side of the river. It was intimated that, if the troops of either of these Generals obstructed the repair of the bridges by the engineers of the South Manchuria Railway, the Japanese would regard them as enemies. The ultimatum was to take effect as from noon of November 3rd, and the Japanese protective detachment was under orders to advance to Tahsing Station, on the north side of the valley, by noon of November 4th. The Chinese Assessor (document No. 3), the Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar and various officers of the 2nd Division all concur that General Ma Chan-shan replied that, pending instructions from the Central Government, he provisionally accepted, on his own authority, the Japanese demands. But the Japanese witnesses, on the other hand, added that they did not believe in the sincerity of General Ma, who obviously did not intend to permit the damaged bridges to be quickly or effectively repaired. Twice on November 4th a joint commission, including Major Hayashi, a representative of the Japanese Consul-General, and Chinese officers and civil officials went to the bridges in order to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, and the Chinese delegates asked for a postponement of the Japanese advance. The demand was not complied with, and Colonel Hamamoto, the Commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, in compliance with his orders, advanced to the bridges with one battalion of his regiment, two companies of field artillery and one company ofengineers, to begin the repair work in accordance with the terms of the Japanese ultimatum. The engineers, under the command of Captain Hanai, started work on the morning of November 4th, and one infantry company, with two Japanese flags, began its advance to Tahsing Station by noon of that day.
Hostilities actually began during the second attempt of the above-mentioned mixed commission, which went to the spot early in the afternoon of the 4th in order to make a last attempt to secure the withdrawal of the Chinese troops. As soon as firing began, Colonel Hamamoto realised that his men were in a very difficult position and went immediately to their support with whatever troops he had available. A rapid reconnaissance convinced him that a frontal attack was impossible on account of the swampy ground, and that nothing but an encircling movement against the left wing of the opposing force would help him out of this difficult situation. Accordingly, he despatched his reserve companies to attack the hill on which the left wing of the opposing forces rested, but the small number of his forces and the impossibility of bringing his guns near enough for action prevented him from gaining the position before nightfall. The hill was captured by 8.30 p.m., but no further advance was possible on that day.
The Kwantung Army Headquarters, on receiving a report of the position, immediately despatched strong reinforcements, and another battalion of infantry arrived during the night, enabling the Colonel to re-open his attack at dawn of November 5th. Even then, after a couple of hours and reaching the first Chinese position, he found himself confronted with a strong line of trenches, defended, according to his own statement to the Commission, with about seventy automatic and machine-guns. His attack was held up, and his troops suffered heavy losses as a result of a Chinese encircling counter-attack executed by infantry and cavalry men. The Japanese troops were forced to retire and for the second time they could do nothing but hold their position until nightfall. During the night of November 5th-6th, two fresh battalions arrived. This relieved the situation, and a renewed attack on the morning of the 6th rolled up the entire Chinese front, and brought Tahsing Station into the hands of the Japanese troops by noon. As Colonel Hamamoto's mission was only to occupy Tahsing Station in order to cover the repair work of the bridges, no pursuit of the retreating Chinese troops was made, but the Japanese troops remained in the vicinity of the station.
The Chinese Assessor, in the same document No. 3, alleges that Major Hayashi, on November 6th, made a new request to the Heilungkiang Government, asking (1) that General Ma Chan-shan should resign from the Governorship in favour of General Chang Hai-peng, and (2) that a public safety committee should be organised. A photograph of Major Hayashi's letter containing these requests was shown to the Commission. This document further states that, on the following day, without waiting for a reply, the Japanese troops began a new attack on the provincial forces now stationed at Sanchienfang, about 20 miles north of Tahsing, and that, on November 8th, Major Hayashi sent another letter repeating the demand for General Ma Chan-shan's retirement from the Governorship of the province in favour of General Chang Hai-peng, and for a reply before midnight of that day. On November 11th, the Chinese account continues, General Honjo himself asked by telegram for General Ma Chan-shan's retirement, the evacuation of Tsitsihar, and the right for the Japanese troops to advance to Angangchi Station, again requiring a reply before nightfall of that day. On November 13th, Major Hayashi increased the third demand to one for the Japanese troops to occupy, not only Angangchi Station, but Tsitsihar Station as well. General Ma Chan-shan pointed out in reply that Tsitsihar Station had nothing to do with the Taonan-Angangchi Railway.
On November 14th and 15th, the Japanese combined forces renewed their attack with the support of four aeroplanes. On November 16th, General Honjo demanded the retreat of General Ma Chan-shan to the north of Tsitsihar, the withdrawal of Chinese troops to the north of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and an undertaking not to interfere in any way with the traffic and operation of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, these demands to be carried out within ten days from November 15th, and a reply to be sent to the Japanese Special Bureau at Harbin. When General Ma Chan-shan declined to accept these terms, General Tamon began a new general attack on November 18th. General Ma Chan-shan's troops retreated, first to Tsitsihar, which was taken by the Japanese on November 19th, and then to Hailun, to which place the administrative offices of the Government were removed.
According to the evidence of Japanese Generals commanding on the spot, the new operations did not begin before November 12th. General Ma Chan-shan at that time had gathered about 20,000 of his troops to the west of Sanchienfang, and even sent for the land colonisation troops in Heilungkiang Province and the forces of General Ting Chao. Against these large forces, which showed an increasingly threatening attitude, the Japanese could oppose only the now concentrated division of General Tamon, consisting of two brigades under Generals Amano and Hasabe. In order to relieve this tense situation, General Honjo demanded, on November 12th, that all Heilungkiang troops should retire to the north of Tsitsihar and that his troops should be allowed to proceed northward for the protection of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway. The advance did not begin before November 17th, when the Chinese sent cavalry troops around the right flank of the Japanese and attacked them. General Tamon informed the Commission that, in spite of his small strength of 3,000 infantrymen and 24 field-guns, he ventured to attack the Chinese forces and completely defeated them on November 18th, with the result that Tsitsihar was occupied on the morning of the 19th. One week later, the 2nd Division returned to its original quarters, leaving General Amano with one infantry regiment and one battery of artillery at Tsitsihar to hold the place against General Ma Chan-shan's troops. This small Japanese force was subsequently reinforced by the newly-formed "Manchukuo" troops, but these new troops, at the time of our visit to Tsitsihar in May 1932, were not yet considered capable of fighting the forces of General Ma Chan-shan.
(See Map No. 7)The attached Map No. 7 (Military Situation Chart) shows the distribution of regular troops of both sides at the time of the first resolution of the Council. No account is taken of disbanded soldiers and bandit groups which, at that time, specially infested the areas east and west of the Liao River and the Chientao district. Both the parties have accused each other of purposely instigating banditry—the Japanese attributing to the Chinese the motive of wishing to create disorder in the lost parts of Manchuria, and the Chinese suspecting the Japanese of wishing to find pretexts for occupying the country and still further extending their military operations. The strength and military value of these gangs are so vague and changeable that it would not be possible to insert an accurate estimate of their significance into the picture of the military situation. The chart shows that the Command of the North-Eastern troops had succeeded in organising a force of considerable strength in the south-western part of Liaoning Province. These troops had been able to construct a strongly entrenched position on the right bank of the Taling River very close to the foremost Japanese outposts. Such a situation may well have caused the Japanese military authorities some anxiety, as they estimated the total strength of these regular troops at 35,000 men, or about double the total admitted strength of their own forces in Manchuria at that moment.
The Tientsin incident.This situation was relieved by action taken in consequence of certain events which occurred at Tientsin during the month of November. Reports as to the origin of the trouble differ widely. There were two outbreaks, on November 8th and 26th, respectively, but the whole affair is extremely obscure.
Outbreak of November 8th: Japanese version.According to the Japanese account in the Herald of Asia, the Chinese population at Tientsin was divided between those who supported and those who opposed Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and the latter organised forces to create a political demonstration in the Chinese city by attacking the guardians of public order on November 8th. In this dispute between two Chinese factions, the Commander of the Japanese garrison observed strict neutrality from the beginning, but was forced to open fire when Chinese guards in the vicinity of the Japanese Concession began to shoot indiscriminately into his district. His demand that the combating Chinese forces should keep at 300 yards distance from the border of the Concession did not relieve the situation, which grew so tense that, on November 11th or 12th, all foreign garrisons mounted guard.
Chinese version.The account given by the Municipal Government of Tientsin is very different. They assert that the Japanese employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese plain-clothes men, who were formed into operating gangs within the Japanese Concession, in order to start trouble in the Chinese city. Their police authorities, being timely informed by agents of this situation, were able to repulse the disorderly bands emerging from the Japanese Concession. They say that, from the confession of arrested members of these gangs, they are able to prove that the riot was organised by the Japanese and that the men were armed with guns and ammunition of Japanese make. They admit that the Japanese garrison Commander complained on the morning of the 9th that some of his men had been wounded by stray bullets and that he had asked for a withdrawal to a distance of 300 yards, but they assert that, in spite of their acceptance of these conditions, the Japanese regular troops attacked the Chinese city with armoured cars and shelled it.
The account of the Municipal Government further states that, on November 17th, an agreement was reached which fixed the details for the withdrawal to a distance of 300 yards, but it asserts that the Japanese did not carry out their part of the agreement, and that consequently the situation grew worse.
On November 26th, a terrific explosion was heard, immediately followed by firing of cannon, machine-guns and rifles. The electric lights in the Japanese Concession were put out, and plain-clothes men emerged from it attacking the police stations in the vicinity.
Outbreak of November 26th: Conflicting accounts.The Japanese account of this later disturbance as given in the Herald of Asia is to the effect that, on the 26th, the situation had become so much better that their volunteer corps was disbanded and that, on the same evening, the Chinese opened fire on the Japanese barracks, and as the fire, in spite of their protests, did not stop until noon of the 27th, they had no choice but to accept the challenge and to fight the Chinese. The battle went on until the afternoon of the 27th, when a peace conference was held. On that occasion, the Japanese demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Chinese troops and police forces to a distance of 20 Chinese li from all places where foreign troops were stationed. The Chinese agreed to withdraw their soldiers, but not their police forces, which were alone responsible for the safety of foreigners in that district. The Japanese say that, on November 29th, the Chinese offered their withdrawal from the neighbourhood of the Concession; their offer was accepted; the Chinese armed police withdrew on the morning of the 29th and the defence work was removed on the 30th.
Effect of the Tientsin disturbances on the situation in Manchuria.The threatening situation at Tientsin on the 26th caused the staff officers of the Kwantung Army to propose to the Commander an immediate expedition of troops via Chinchow and Shanhaikwan to reinforce the endangered small force at Tientsin. As a mere transport problem it would have been easier and quicker to despatch reinforcements by sea via Dairen. But considered strategically, the suggested route had this advantage, that it would enable the advancing troops to dispose en route of the very inconvenient Chinese concentration around Chinchow. It was assumed that the delay in taking this route would not be long, as little or no resistance from the Chinese was anticipated. The suggestion was approved, and one armoured train, one troop train, and a couple of aeroplanes crossed the Liao River on November 27th, and their attack on the first Chinese outposts was sufficient to initiate a retreat of the Chinese troops from their entrenched position. The armoured-car corps also changed its position. A shade of resistance led the Japanese to reinforce their strength by more armoured trains, infantry trains, and artillery. They also repeatedly threw bombs on Chinchow, but news of the improved situation at Tientsin soon deprived the expedition of its original objective and, on November 29th, to the great surprise of the Chinese, the Japanese forces were withdrawn to Hsinmin.
Another consequence of the earlier disturbances at Tientsin was that the former Emperor, who had been living in the Japanese Concession there, sought a safer refuge at Port Arthur on November 13th, after a talk with Colonel Doihara.
The occupation of Chinchow.The districts evacuated by the Japanese were re-occupied by the Chinese troops, and this fact was widely advertised. Chinese morale was slightly raised; and the activities of irregular forces and bandits increased. Profiting by the winter season, they crossed the frozen Liao River at many points and raided the country around Mukden. The Japanese military authorities realised that, even to maintain their existing positions, reinforcements would be necessary, and with these reinforcements they hoped to be able to get rid of the menace of the Chinese concentration at Chinchow.
Japanese reservation when accepting the resolution of the Council on December 10th.Meanwhile, the situation in Manchuria was a subject of further discussion in Geneva. When accepting the resolution on December 10th, the Japanese delegate stated that his acceptance "was based on the understanding that this paragraph (No. 2) was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be necessary 'to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activity of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria'. Such action was admittedly 'an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria', and its necessity would end when normal conditions should be restored there". To that the Chinese representative replied "that the injunction to the parties not to aggravate the situation should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by the state of affairs in Manchuria", and several Council members taking part in the discussion admitted that "circumstances might arise there causing danger to Japanese lives and property and in such an emergency it might be inevitable that Japanese forces in the neighbourhood should take action". When this matter has been referred to by Japanese officers who have given evidence before the Commission, it has been usually asserted that the resolution of December 10th "gave Japan the right to maintain her troops" in Manchuria, or made the Japanese Army responsible for the suppression of banditry there. In describing the subsequent operations, they assert that, while executing this right against the bandit forces near the Liao River, they incidentally came in conflict with the remaining Chinese forces near Chinchow, which were in consequence withdrawn within the Great Wall. The fact remains that, having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans.
Arrival of reinforcements.
(See Map No. 8.)The 2nd Division, with the exception of its garrison at Tsitsihar, was concentrated west of Mukden. Reinforcements soon began to arrive; the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division[3] between December 10th and 15th. On December 27th, Imperial sanction was obtained for the despatch of the Staff of the 20th Division and another brigade from Korea. Changchun and Kirin were for the time being only protected by Independent Railway Guards.
Abortive negotiations for the withdrawal of Chinese troops.As a Japanese advance on Chinchow was imminent, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs made an attempt to prevent further fighting by offering to withdraw the Chinese troops to within the Great Wall, provided that three or four foreign Powers were willing to guarantee the maintenance of a neutral zone north and south of Chinchow. Nothing came of the proposal. Meanwhile, conversations were initiated between Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping, but these too were abortive for different reasons. The Chinese allege in their document No. 3, Annex E, that, at each successive visit, on December 7th, 25th and 29th, the Japanese delegate increased his demands concerning the Chinese retreat, and his promises with regard to the restraint of the Japanese troops became more and more vague. The Japanese, on the other hand, claim that the Chinese promises to withdraw were never sincere.
Attack on Chinchow.The concentrated attack of the Japanese forces began on December 23rd, when the 19th Chinese Brigade was forced to give up its position. From that day, the advance continued with perfect regularity and hardly met with any resistance at all, the Chinese Commander having given out a general order to retreat. Chinchow was occupied on the morning of January 3rd and the Japanese forces continued their advance right up to the Great Wall at Schanhaikwan, where they established a permanent contact with the Japanese garrison in that place.
The complete evacuation of Manchuria by the troops of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, practically without striking a blow, was not unconnected with the internal conditions of China south of the Wall. Reference has been made in an earlier chapter to the feuds between rival Generals and it must be remembered these feuds had not ceased.
The occupation of Harbin.The comparative ease with which the offensive down to Shanhaikwan was carried out enabled the Japanese to release some of their troops from their original positions and make them available for advances in other directions. The main force of the 2nd Division, which had done nearly all the fighting so far, returned to their quarters at Liaoyang, Mukden, and Changchun for a rest. On the other hand, the increased length of railway line to be protected against possible bandit raids at any point necessitated the use of a large number of troops the fighting strength of which was diminished by their distribution over such wide areas. The two brigades under the command of the Staff of the 20th Division were left for this purpose in the newly occupied zone, and the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division joined them more to the north. The Japanese military authorities assured us that, within these well-guarded areas, a state of law and order was soon established and that banditry was practically extinguished on both sides of the Liao River during the following weeks. This statement was made to us in the month of June, but, at the moment of writing this Report, we read of vigorous raids from volunteer troops on Yingkow and Haicheng, with threats even to Mukden and Chinchow.
The district which, at the beginning of this year, gave more trouble than any other was that north and east of Harbin, to which the remaining followers of the two former Provincial Governments of Kirin and Heilungkiang had withdrawn. The Chinese Generals in this northern sector seemed to have maintained some contact with Headquarters at Peiping, whence they received some support from time to time. The advance on Harbin began, as that on Tsitsihar had done, by an encounter between two Chinese forces. General Hsi Hsia at the beginning of January prepared for an expedition to the North with the view to occupying Harbin. Between him and that city were Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu, with what are described as anti-Kirin forces. According to information provided by the Japanese Assessor, when our preliminary report was under consideration, satisfactory terms would have been arranged by negotiation between the parties had it not been for the influence of the authorities at Peiping. Negotiations were in fact initiated and, while they were being carried on, General Hsi Hsia advanced with his troops as far as Shuangchong, which they reached on January 25th, but, when it came to serious fighting on the following morning in the immediate neighbourhood south of the city, the advance was at once checked. The situation thus created was felt by the Japanese to be full of danger for the large Japanese and Korean colonies at Harbin. Fighting between two more or less irregular Chinese forces in the immediate neighbourhood would have resulted in the retreat on the town of a defeated army, the horrors of which the recent history of China provides so many examples. Urgent appeals were therefore sent to the Kwantung Army, even Chinese merchants, so the Japanese assert, joining in the appeal from fear that their property might be looted.
Colonel Doihara, now General, who, in this emergency, was sent to Harbin on the 26th in order to take over the office of the special Japanese service there, told the Commission that the fighting between the two Chinese forces around Harbin continued for about ten days, and that there was great anxiety for the 4,000 Japanese residents, who mostly lived in a menaced area, together with 1,600 Koreans in the Chinese suburb of Fuchiatien, who were exposed to the danger of massacre. In spite of the fact that the anti-Kirin forces held the town during ten days of continual fighting, the casualties among the Korean and Japanese residents were comparatively few. The latter organised themselves into armed volunteer bands and helped their nationals to escape from the Chinese suburb. One Japanese and three Koreans are said to have been killed while trying to escape. In addition, one of the Japanese aeroplanes, sent to reconnoitre the threatening situation, was forced to land owing to engine trouble and its occupants are said to have been killed by Ting Chao's troops.
These two incidents decided the Japanese military authorities to intervene. Again the 2nd Division was called upon to help its endangered countrymen. But this time the problem was not so much one of fighting as of transportation, the railing north of Changchun being a joint SinoRussian undertaking. As the rolling-stock of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway was greatly depleted, the Commander of the 2nd Division decided to send, in the first instance, only General Hasebe and two infantry battalions. Negotiations with the railway authorities were started, but, when these seemed likely to be long drawn out, the Japanese officers decided to enforce the transport of their troops. The railway authorities protested and refused to work the trains, but, in spite of their opposition, the Japanese military authorities succeeded on the night of January 28th in forming three military trains, which went as far north as the second Sungari bridge, which they found damaged by the Chinese forces. As the repairs were made on the 29th, Shuangcheng was reached on the afternoon of January 30th. Early on the following morning, and still under cover of darkness, the small Japanese force was attacked by Ting Chao's troops and severe fighting took place, resulting in the repulse of the Chinese, but no further progress was possible that day. By that time, the Soviet and Chinese railway authorities had agreed that the transport of Japanese troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway would be allowed, on the understanding that they were proceeding with the sole object of giving protection to the Japanese residents at Harbin. The fares of the troops were paid for in cash. On February 1st, the Japanese troops began to arrive and the main force of the 2nd Division was concentrated near Shuangcheng on the morning of February 3rd. Reinforcements were even called upon from Tsitsihar, where, as will be remembered, a part of the 2nd Division had remained since November 19th. But many difficulties had still to be overcome, as the line between Harbin and Tsitsihar was cut by the Chinese, who, at the same time, attacked detachments of the Independent Railway Guards on the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway at different places.
On February 3rd, the anti-Kirin troops, now estimated to have a total strength of about 13,000 to 14,000 soldiers with 16 guns, had taken up an entrenched position along the southern boundary of the city. The 2nd Division began to advance against this position on the same day, reaching the Weitangkou (Nanchengtze) River, about 20 miles north of Shuangcheng, on the night of February 3rd–4th. Fighting commenced on the following morning. On the evening of the 4th, the Chinese position was partly taken by the Japanese troops, and by noon of the 5th a final decision was reached. Harbin was occupied on the afternoon of the same day, and the Chinese withdrew in the direction of Sanhsing.
Further Japanese military operations up to the end of August 1932.
(See Maps Nos. 9 and 10.)The successful attack of the 2nd Division brought the town of Harbin into the hands of the Japanese authorities, but, as it was not immediately followed by any pursuit of the retiring Chinese forces, little change was produced on the situation in Northern Manchuria as a whole. The railways north and east of Harbin and the important waterway of the Sungari River still remained under the control of the anti-Kirin troops and those of Ma Chan-shan. The arrival of further reinforcements, repeated expeditions to the east and north and six months of fighting took place before the occupied area was extended as far as Hailun in the north and the districts of Fangchung and Hailin in the east. According to Japanese official statements, the antiKirin troops, with those of General Ma Chan-shan, were completely routed, but, according to official Chinese sources, they are still in existence. Although reduced in their fighting strength, they continually hamper the Japanese forces, at the same time avoiding actual encounters in the open field. According to newspaper information, both the eastern and western branches of the Chinese Eastern Railway are still being attacked and damaged at different places between Harbin and Hailin.
The Japanese operations since the beginning of February may be summarised as follows:
Towards the end of March, the main part of the 2nd Division left Harbin in the direction of Fangcheng in order to suppress the anti-Kirin troops of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. The Division advanced as far as the region of Sanhsing and returned to Harbin in the earlier part of April. By that time, the 10th Division had arrived at Harbin and took over the sector from the 2nd Division. This unit was engaged for about a month in constant fighting against the anti-Kirin troops with the greater part of its forces in the district near Sanhsing and with a minor detachment along the eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in the direction of Hailin.
In the earlier part of May, the Japanese forces in the north of Manchuria were further reinforced by the 14th Division. A detachment of this unit took part in the fighting against the anti-Kirin forces and advanced as far as the valley of Mutan River, south of Sanhsing, forcing the opposing troops to withdraw to the most eastern corner of Kirin Province. But the main operations of the 14th Division, which began in the latter part of May, took place in the region north of Harbin and were directed against the troops of General Ma Chan-shan. The 14th Division carried out its main attack to the north of Harbin, along the Hulan-Hailun Railway, and, with minor forces to the east of Koshan, the proposed terminus of the Tsitsihar-Koshan Railway. The Japanese claim that, during the earlier part of August, the troops of General Ma Chan-shan were again effectively routed and that they have strong evidence that the General himself was killed. The Chinese assert that the General is still alive. In this action, cavalry newly arrived from Japan likewise took part.
During the month of August, several minor engagements took place on the borders of Fengtien and Jehol Provinces, mainly near the Chinchow-Peipiao branch line (of the Peiping-Mukden Railway), which is the only means of access to Jehol by railway. There are widespread fears in China that these events are only a prelude to larger military operations at an early date, aimed at the occupation of Jehol by the Japanese. The main lines of communication which still exist between China Proper and the Chinese forces in Manchuria run through Jehol, and the fear of a Japanese attack in this province, which is already claimed as part of the territory of "Manchukuo", is not unreasonable. Its imminence is freely discussed in the Japanese Press.
The Japanese version of the recent events submitted to the Commission by the Japanese Assessor is as follows:
An official attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters named Ishimoto was kidnapped by Chinese "volunteers" on July 17th from a train travelling between Peipiao and Chinchow, within the boundaries of the Province of Jehol. A small detachment of Japanese infantry with light artillery made an immediate attempt to rescue him, but failed in their purpose, and the result was the occupation of a village on the frontier of Jehol by Japanese troops.
During the latter part of July and in August, Japanese aeroplanes demonstrated several times over this part of Jehol and dropped some bombs, but "uninhabited areas outside the villages' were carefully selected. On August 19th, a Japanese staff officer was sent to Nanling, a small town situated between Peipiao and the provincial boundary to negotiate for the release of Mr. Ishimoto. On his return journey with a small infantry detachment, he was fired upon. In self-defence the fire was returned and, on the arrival of another infantry detachment, Nanling was occupied but evacuated on the following day.
Through the Chinese Assessor, extracts were submitted to the Commission from the reports of General Tang Yu-ling, the Governor of the Province of Jehol. These reports claim that fighting on a much larger scale took place, and that a Chinese battalion of railway guards was in action against a superior number of Japanese infantry, supported by two armoured trains. They claim that the bombing referred to by the Japanese was directed against Chaoyang, one of the larger towns in that region, and that, as a result, 30 casualties were caused among both military and civilians. The Japanese offensive was resumed on August 10th, when an armoured train attacked Nanling.
The information given by the Japanese Assessor concludes by stating that, although the maintenance of order in Jehol is "a matter of internal policy for Manchukuo, Japan cannot be indifferent to the situation in that region in view of the important role played by Japan in the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria and Mongolia, and that any disorders in Jehol would immediately produce very serious repercussions throughout Manchuria and Mongolia". General Tang Yu-ling concludes his report by stating that all possible measures were being taken to offer effective resistance should the Japanese attacks be renewed.
From these communications, it seems that an extension of the area of conflict in this region is a contingency which must be reckoned with.
Nature of resistance offered by the Chinese.Although the main Chinese Army was withdrawn within the Great Wall at the end of 1931, the Japanese continued to meet with opposition of an irregular kind in different parts of Manchuria. There have been no further battles such as occurred on the Nonni River, but fighting has been constant and widely dispersed. It has been the practice of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as "bandits" all the forces now opposed to them. There are, in fact, apart from bandits, two distinct categories of organised resistance to the Japanese troops or to those of "Manchukuo"—namely, the regular and irregular Chinese troops. It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of these two and, as the Commission was not able to meet any of the Chinese Generals still in the field, it is necessary to make reservations with regard to the reliability of the information given below. Chinese authorities are naturally reluctant to give away exact information about such troops as are still offering resistance to the Japanese in Manchuria. Japanese authorities, on the other hand, are disposed to minimise the numbers and fighting value of the forces still opposed to them.
Remnants of the original North-Eastern Armies.The remnants of the original North-Eastern Armies are to be found exclusively in the provinces of Kirin and Heilungkiang. The re-organisation of troops which took place around Chinchow late in 1931 was not of long duration, because all those units were subsequently withdrawn inside the Great Wall. But the regular Chinese troops, which, before September 1931, were stationed in the Sungari region and along the Chinese Eastern Railway, have never been seriously engaged with the Japanese troops, and continue to carry on a guerilla warfare which has given, and still gives, much trouble to the Japanese and "Manchukuo" forces. The Generals Ma Chan-shan, Ting Chao and Li Tu have acquired great fame throughout China as leaders of these troops. All three are former brigade-generals in command of railway guards or garrison troops in North Manchuria. Probably the greater part of the troops under their command remained faithful to their respective leaders and the cause of China after the destruction of the Young Marshal's regime. The strength of General Ma's troops cannot easily be determined, because, as will be remembered, this General changed his allegiance.
As Governor of Heilungkiang Province, he was in command of all the provincial troops, the number of which was given to us as seven brigades in all. Since the month of April, he has definitely taken up a position against Japan and "Manchukuo". The number of troops at his disposal between Hulan River, Hailun and Taheiho is estimated by Japanese authorities as six regiments, or between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu control six old brigades of Chang Hsueh-liang's Army, and have since raised in the country three additional brigades. Their total strength at the time of our Preliminary Report was estimated by Japanese authorities at about 30,000; but it is very probable that the troops of General Ma Chan-shan, as well as those of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu, have considerably diminished in number since the month of April and are now below the estimated figure. Both units, as will be seen later on, have suffered a great deal from concentrated attacks of regular Japanese troops since the occupation of Harbin. At present, they seem unable to hinder any operation by the Japanese troops and carefully avoid meeting them in the open field. The use of aeroplanes by the Japanese and the complete absence of this weapon on the other side account for the greater part of such losses as they have sustained.
Irregular forces. Volunteers.When considering the irregular forces, it is necessary to distinguish between the different volunteer forces in Kirin Province co-operating with the Armies of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. In our Preliminary Report of April 29th, 1932, we mentioned, on page 5, under the heading "Volunteers", three different volunteer armies and several minor corps, one of the latter between Tunhua and Tienpaoshan remaining in touch with these regular troops of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. Owing to the absence of railways and other means of communication in those districts, this corps still keeps the same position. Its Chief, Wang Teh-ling, united different "anti-Manchukuo" forces and kept them firmly under his command. Though this force may be of small significance compared with Japanese troops (which hardly exhibit any activity to the east of Tunhua), it seems well able to hold its own against the "Manchukuo" troops and maintains its position in a considerable part of Kirin Province. No evidence is available concerning the present activity of the "Big Sword Society" which, while keeping in touch with Wang Teh-ling, created considerable disturbance in the Chientao district. On the other hand, no action of importance has been undertaken against it by Japanese troops.
An official Japanese document has been submitted to the Commission enumerating a large number of so-called route-armies and other Chinese units, each containing not more than 200 to 400 men, which form the subdivisions of the volunteer armies. Their field of activity extends to the areas around Mukden and the Antung-Mukden Railway, to Chinchow and the boundary between Jehol and Fengtien Provinces, to the western branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to the district between Hsinmin and Mukden. Thus the area covered by these volunteers and the anti-Kirin forces combined comprises the greater part of Manchuria.
(See Map No. 6.)In the middle of August, fighting broke out in the immediate neighbourhood of Mukden, at different places of the southern part of the South Manchuria Railway, especially at Haicheng and at Yingkow. On several occasions, the Japanese troops have found themselves in a difficult position, but nowhere have the volunteers succeeded in attaining a victory of any importance. It seems doubtful whether any change in the general situation in Manchuria is to be anticipated in the near future, but, at the time of the completion of our Report, fighting continues over a wide area.
Bandits.As in China, banditry has always existed in Manchuria. Increasing or diminishing in numbers in relation to the activity or the weakness of the Government, professional bandits are to be found in all parts of the Three Provinces and their services were often employed by different parties for political purposes. The Chinese Government has presented to the Commission a document stating that, during the last twenty or thirty years, Japanese agents to a great extent instigated bandits to serve their political interests. A passage from the "Second Report of Progress of Manchuria to 1930", published by the South Manchuria Railway, is quoted in this document to the effect that, within the railway area alone, the number of cases of banditry had increased from 9 cases in 1906 to 368 in 1929. According to the Chinese document quoted above, banditry has been encouraged by the smuggling of arms and munitions on a large scale from Dairen and the Kwantung Leased Territory. It is asserted, for instance, that the notorious bandit chief, Lin Yin-shin, was provided in November last with arms, munitions and other means in order to establish the so-called Independent Self-Defence Army which was organised with the help of three Japanese agents and destined to attack Chinchow. After the failure of this attempt, another bandit chief got Japanese help for the same purpose, but fell into the hands of the Chinese authorities with all his material of Japanese origin.
Japanese authorities, of course, see the state of banditry in Manchuria in quite a different light. According to them, its existence is due exclusively to the inefficiency of the Chinese Government. They allege also that Chang Tso-lin, to a certain extent, favoured the existence of bandit gangs in his territory, because he thought that, in time of need, they could easily be converted into soldiers. The Japanese authorities, while admitting the fact that the complete overthrow of Chang Hsueh-liang's Government and Army greatly added to the number of bandits in the country, claim that the presence of their troops in the country will enable them to wipe out the principal bandit units within from two to three years. They hope that the organisation of "Manchukuo" police and of self-defence corps in each community will help to put an end to banditry. Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens who, on account of the complete loss of their property, were induced to take up their present occupation. Given the opportunity of resuming the occupation of farming, it is hoped that they will return to their former peaceful mode of life.
- ↑ Note by the Secretariat: All maps are to be found in the pocket of the Cover.
- ↑ The text of the telegram shown to the Commission at Peiping was as follows:
"Our relations with Japan have become very delicate. We must be particularly cautious in our intercourse with them. No matter how they may challenge us, we must be extremely patient and never resort to force, so as to avoid any conflict whatever. You are instructed to issue, secretly and immediately, orders to all the officers, calling their attention to this point."
- ↑ All the statements here given concerning numbers of units and strength of the Japanese forces are based on official Japanese information.