Report of the Commission of Enquiry/Chapter 5
Chapter V.
SHANGHAI.
The Shanghai affair.
(See Map No. 11.)At the end of January, fighting broke out at Shanghai. The story of that affair has already been told in its broad outlines down to February 20th by the Consular Committee appointed by the League. The fighting was still in progress when the Commission arrived at Tokyo on the 29th, and several discussions took place with members of the Japanese Government on the origin, motives and consequences of their armed intervention in this place. When we reached Shanghai, on March 14th, the fighting was over, but the negotiations for an armistice were proving difficult. The arrival of the Commission at this moment was opportune, and may have helped to create a propitious atmosphere. We were able to appreciate the tense feeling which had been created by the recent hostilities and to obtain an immediate and vivid impression both of the difficulties and of the issues involved in this controversy. The Commission was not instructed to continue the work of the Consular Committee or to make a special study of the recent events there. In fact, we were informed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that the Chinese Government had expressed themselves as opposed to any suggestion that the Commission should delay its journey to Manchuria for the purpose of studying the situation at Shanghai.
We heard the views of both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on the Shanghai affair, and were the recipients of a large amount of literature from both sides on the subject. We also visited the devastated area and heard statements from Japanese naval and military officers on the recent operations. In an individual capacity, too, we bad conversations with the representatives of many shades of opinion on matters which were fresh in the memory of everyone living in Shanghai. But we did not, as a Commission, officially investigate the Shanghai affair and therefore express no opinion upon the disputed points connected with it. We shall, however, for purposes of record, complete the story of the operations from February 20th until the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops.
Narrative of events at Shanghai from February 20th onwards.
(See Map No. 12.)The last report of the Consular Committee ended, it will be remembered, by stating that the Japanese, on February 20th, opened a new attack in the Kiangwan and Woosung areas. This attack brought no marked success to the Japanese troops, despite the fact that it was continued on the following days, but it enabled them to learn that parts of the so-called Chinese Bodyguard Army—viz., the 87th and 88th Divisions—were now fighting against them as well as the 19th Route Army. This fact, together with the difficulties which the nature of the country presented, decided the Japanese to reinforce their troops by two more divisions—namely, the 11th and 14th.
On February 28th, the Japanese troops occupied the western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by the Chinese. On the same day, the Woosung fort and fortifications along the Yangtse River were again bombed from the air and from the sea, and bombing-planes operated over the whole front, including the aerodrome at Hungjao and the Nanking Railway. General Shirakawa, who was appointed to the supreme command of the Army, arrived in Shanghai on February 29th. From this date onwards the Japanese Headquarters announced substantial progress. In the district of Kiangwan they advanced slowly, and the Naval Headquarters stated that the opposing forces at Chapei showed signs of giving way as a consequence of the daily bombardment. On the same day, the aerodrome at Hangchow, which is 100 miles distant from Shanghai, was bombed from the air.
On March 1st, as the frontal attack had advanced but slowly, the Japanese Army Commander initiated a wide enveloping movement by landing the main force of the 11th Division at some distance on the right bank of the Yangtze River, in the vicinity of Tsiyakow, for the purpose of making a surprise attack on the left flank of the Chinese Army. The manœuvre was successful in compelling an immediate retreat of the Chinese forces beyond the 20-kilometre limit originally asked for in the Japanese Commander's ultimatum of February 20th. Woosung fort had been evacuated by the Chinese troops when, on March 3rd, it was entered by the Japanese troops after many aerial and naval bombardments. On the previous day, bombing operations had been extended as far as 7 kilometres east of Quinsan Station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, with the alleged object of preventing the transportation of reinforcements to the Chinese front.
On the afternoon of March 3rd, the Japanese Commander gave the order to stop fighting. The Chinese Commander issued a similar order on March 4th. A strong complaint was made by the Chinese that the 14th Japanese Division was landed at Shanghai between March 7th and 17th, after the cessation of hostilities, and about a month later was transported to Manchuria in order to reinforce the Japanese troops there.
In the meantime, attempts to secure a cessation of hostilities through the good offices of friendly Powers and of the League of Nations had been continued. On February 28th, the British Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, received on his flagship the delegates of both parties. An agreement on the basis of mutual and simultaneous withdrawal and of a temporary character was proposed. The conference was not successful, owing to the differing opinions of the two parties as to the basis of the negotiations.
On February 29th, the President of the Council of the League of Nations made recommendations which contemplated, amongst other things, "a mixed conference in the presence of other interested Powers in view of the final conclusion of the fighting and for a definite cessation of hostilities, subject to local arrangements". Both parties accepted, but a successful outcome of the negotiations was rendered impossible by the conditions of the Japanese delegates, who demanded that: (1) the Chinese troops should first begin to withdraw, and (2) the Japanese, having ascertained that the withdrawal was taking place, should then retire, not, as formerly stated, to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement streets, but to an area extending from Shanghai to Woosung.
On March 4th, the Assembly of the League, recalling the suggestions of the Council, (1) called on both Governments to make the cessation of hostilities effective; (2) requested other interested Powers to inform the Assembly on the execution of the previous paragraph; and (3) recommended negotiations, with the assistance of other Powers, for the conclusion of the arrangements in order to render definite the cessation of hostilities and to regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, wishing to be informed by the Powers on the development of these negotiations.
On March 9th, the Japanese sent a memorandum to the Chinese through the intermediary of the British Minister, in which their readiness to negotiate on the basis of the points laid down by the Assembly was expressed.
On March 10th, the Chinese replied through the same channel that they too were ready to negotiate on this basis, but on condition that the conference should be limited to matters pertaining to the definite cessation of hostilities and the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese troops. On March 13th, the Japanese intimated that they were not disposed to regard the Chinese reservations as modifying the sense of the resolutions of the League of Nations or in any way binding on themselves. They thought that both parties should meet on the basis of the resolutions.
On March 24th, the Sino-Japanese Conference on the cessation of hostilities was opened. In the meantime, the withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces had actually begun. On March 20th naval and air contingents left Shanghai, reducing the remaining strength to something not far above normal. The Japanese Headquarters announced on March 27th, on the occasion of further withdrawal, that this had nothing to do with the above-mentioned Conference or with the League of Nations, but was simply the outcome of the independent decision of the Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army to recall units no longer required at Shanghai.
On March 30th, the Conference announced that, on the preceding day, an agreement relative to a definite cessation of hostilities had been reached, but further difficulties supervened and it was not till May 5th that a complete armistice agreement was ready for signature. It provided for a definite cessation of hostilities, fixed a line to the west of Shanghai as a temporary limit for the advance of Chinese troops, pending further arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions, and provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement roads (streets) as previous to January 28th. Certain areas outside the Settlement had to be temporarily included, because the number of Japanese troops was too large to be quartered within the Settlement alone, but these do not require to be mentioned as they have since been evacuated. A Joint Commission, in which the assistant friendly Powers—the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy and the two parties were represented, was established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission was also to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the Japanese forces to the Chinese Police.
The Chinese added two qualifications to the agreement. The first declared that nothing in the agreement was to imply permanent restriction of the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory, and the second that it was to be understood that, even in areas temporarily provided for the stationing of the Japanese troops, a ll municipal functions, including that of policing, would remain with the Chinese authorities.
The terms of this agreement as a whole have in the main since been carried out. The evacuated areas were turned over to the Chinese Special Police Force between May 9th and 30th. The turning-over, however, of these four areas has been somewhat delayed. It was but natural that, when the Chinese owners of houses and factories, officials of railways and companies, and others began to re-enter the evacuated areas, numerous complaints concerning looting, ·wilful destruction and carrying away of property should have been addressed to the Japanese military authorities. In the opinion of the Chinese, the whole question of reparations remains for further negotiations. They estimate the casualties in killed, wounded and missing as 24,000 officers, men and civilians, and the total material loss at approximately 1,500,000,000 Mexican dollars. A draft agreement dealing with the extra-Settlement road areas bas been initialled by representatives of the Shanghai Municipal Council and of the Chinese Municipality of Greater Shanghai, but it has not yet received the approval of either the Municipal Council or of the City Government. The Municipal Council has referred it to the Senior Consul for the observations of the Consular Body.
Effect on the Manchurian situation of the Chinese resistance at Shanghai.The Shanghai affair undoubtedly exercised considerable influence upon the situation in Manchuria. The ease with which the Japanese had been able to occupy the greater part of Manchuria, and the absence of any resistance by the Chinese troops, not only led to a belief in Japanese naval and military circles that the fighting quality of the Chinese Army was negligible, but also caused profound depression throughout China. The stout resistance put up from the first by the Chinese 19th Route Army, with the assistance later of the 87th and 88th Guard Divisions, was hailed throughout China with the greatest enthusiasm, and the fact that the original 3,000 marines had to be supplanted by three divisions and a mixed brigade of the Japanese Army before the Chinese forces were finally dislodged and driven back after six weeks of fighting created a profound impression upon the Chinese morale. The feeling prevailed that China must be saved by her own efforts. The Sino-Japanese conflict was brought home to the people throughout China. Everywhere opinion hardened and the spirit of resistance increased. Former pessimism gave place to equally exaggerated optimism. In Manchuria, the news from Shanghai put fresh heart into the scattered forces still opposing the Japanese troops. It encouraged the subsequent resistance of General Ma Chan-shan and stimulated the patriotism of the Chinese all over the world. The resistance of the Volunteer Armies increased. Expeditions to suppress them met with indifferent success, and in some areas the Japanese stood on the defensive, taking up positions along certain railway lines, which were frequently attacked.
The incident of Nanking, February 1st, 1932.The hostilities at Shanghai were followed by several other incidents, one of which was the short bombardment of Nanking. This incident created much excitement and alarm, even outside China. It happened on the late evening of February 1st, but did not last for more than an hour. The incident was probably caused by a misunderstanding, but bad the important consequence of a temporary removal of the Chinese Government from Nanking to Loyang.
Chinese and Japanese versions both of the origin and of the facts are widely divergent. Two justifications were given to us from Japanese sources. The first was that, since the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai, the Chinese had extended the Lion Hill Forts, constructed trenches and established artillery positions at the gates near the river and on the opposite side of it, thus making military preparations on a scale sufficient to arouse concern amongst the Japanese, who had warships on the river. The second was that the vernacular papers had spread untruthful stories of Chinese victories at Shanghai, which had caused great excitement among the Chinese population of Nanking. In consequence, Chinese employed by Japanese were, it is alleged, forced by threats to give up their situations, and Chinese merchants refused to sell even the necessary food supplies to Japanese residents, including the Consular staff and the crews of warships.
The Chinese did not comment on these complaints. They assert that the general uneasiness and tense atmosphere prevailing were caused by the fact that the Japanese, after the Shanghai outbreak, increased the number of their warships from two to five, and subsequently to seven (the Japanese authorities give the number as six, these being three old gunboats and three destroyers); that the Commander of the warships landed a certain number of sailors and put them on guard duty before the wharf of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha, where the Japanese Consular staff and all the Japanese residents had taken refuge on a hulk. With the events of Shanghai fresh in their memories, such measures may well have filled the minds of the already-excited population at Nanking with fears of a similar experience.
We know from a report of the Police Commissioner of Nanking to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the authorities at Nanking who were solely responsible for the protection of their own subjects and of foreign nationals at that place greatly resented the landing of Japanese naval forces. They addressed representations to the Japanese Vice-Consul, who replied that he was unable to do anything in the matter. At the same time, special instructions were given to the local police station at Hsiakwan, where the warships were anchored and the above-mentioned wharf was situated, to prevent, if possible, any contact between Chinese and Japanese in this area, especially at night-time. According to the Japanese official reports, their refugees were taken on board a steamer of the name Nisshin Kìsen Kaisha during the days following January 29th, and a considerable number were transported to Shanghai. On the late evening of February 1st, the Japanese assert that three gunshots were suddenly fired, apparently from the Lion Hill Forts. At the same time, Chinese regulars fired on the Japanese naval guards on the river banks, causing two casualties, of which one was fatal. The fire was returned, but directed only at the immediate neighbourhood of their landing-place and stopped as soon as the firing from the shore bad ceased. Such is the Japanese version. The Chinese, on the other hand, stoutly deny that any firing at all took place, but allege that eight shells in all were fired at the forts, at Hsiakwan station and at other places, accompanied by machine-gun and rifle firing, and that during this time searchlights were directed at the shore. This caused considerable panic amongst the inhabitants,. who rushed into the interior of the city; but no casualties were reported and the material damage was not great.
It is also possible that the incident was first started by the firing of crackers by the excited Chinese population, celebrating a supposed victory at Shanghai.