The Emancipation of South America/Chapter 14
CHAPTER XIV.
CHACABUCO.
1817.
From San Felipe, San Martin sent off a trusty spy to Santiago with instructions to bring him back, on the third day, information of the movements of the enemy. He then set himself to work to prepare for battle, mounting his artillery and concentrating the different divisions. On the 10th February all the army was united on the open plain at the foot of the slope of Chacabuco.
On the 10th and 11th the engineers, protected by skirmishers, reconnoitred the roads and passes leading across the Sierra. On the 11th the spy returned, bringing answers to San Martin from his agents in the capital, and copies of the secret orders of Marcó. The spy had visited the barracks of the Royalist troops, and had counted those on the march for Chacabuco. San Martin then summoned a council of war.
The Sierra of Chacabuco rises to a height of 4,300 feet above the level of the sea. About three miles before reaching the summit, the main road from Santa Rosa to Santiago divides into two paths. That to the left, which is the shortest but also the steeper of the two, is still only a bridle-path; the other is now the main road, but was at that time little known. Both lead to the plain of Chacabuco, but the points at which they descend from the heights are nearly two miles distant one from the other. The left-hand path first reaches the lower ground near the head of a valley about three miles long, down which it winds until it joins the other path at the farmhouse of Chacabuco, which stands at the head of the plain.
From the summit of the Sierra the whole country is seen spreading out as a beautiful panorama. The plain at the foot, extending southwards some seven miles in the direction of Santiago, is shut in by the hills of Colina, through which there is a path. Behind lie the great masses of the Cordillera, to the west the spur runs on till it joins the coast range, as yet unseen.
San Martin informed his officers that he had determined to advance without waiting for the rest of his artillery, and to fight the decisive battle before the enemy had time to concentrate his forces. The army was to march in two columns by the diverging paths, which columns should debouch simultaneously upon the plain beyond, and attack the Royalist position in front and on the flank. The column of the right was put under command of Soler, and consisted of 2,100 men, with seven light guns. That of the left, under command of O'Higgins, consisted of 1,500 men, with two guns. The latter was to engage the attention of the enemy in front, without attacking the position, while Soler marched upon his left flank and rear, when a general advance would decide the day.
Atero, after the skirmish in the valley of Putaendo, had retreated to Chacabuco, and Marcó hurriedly sent reinforcements, offering the soldiery a reward of twenty dollars for each one of the enemy killed, and twelve for each prisoner; but, at the same time, he secretly sent off his baggage to Valparaiso, and not until the 10th did he appoint a commander for the army assembling at Chacabuco. He then selected Colonel Maroto of the Talavera regiment, who reached the headquarters at the farmhouse on the evening of the 11th. Maroto found under his orders 1,500 infantry, 500 cavalry, and five guns, a force far inferior in numbers to that of the invaders, and depressed in spirit, but they were the flower of the Spanish army. All that he had time to do that evening was to strengthen an outpost which was stationed on the summit in a position which commanded the eastern pass, purposing to occupy the heights with his entire force on the following day.
At two in the morning of the 12th February, under a bright moon, the Argentine army commenced their advance, the infantry leaving their knapsacks behind them. Flanking parties from Soler's division were the first to meet the enemy, but had barely time to exchange a few shots when the position was attacked by O'Higgins, who drove this advanced guard before him over the summit. The Royalists retreated in good order upon the main body, which had advanced three miles up the valley at dawn of day.
Maroto, believing that the whole force of the Patriots was in pursuit of his vanguard by the main road, withdrew his army across the valley, which was intersected by a muddy stream, and took up a strong position on the opposite slope, placing two of his guns so as to command the mouth of the pass, and extending his line to a hill on his extreme left, where he established a strong force of infantry, with the cavalry in the rear.
Zapiola, with three squadrons of the grenadiers, harassed the retreat of the Royalist vanguard, but could make no impression upon it, the ground being unfavourable for cavalry, but he succeeded in preventing the enemy from occupying two hills at the mouth of the pass, where they might have seriously hindered the advance of O'Higgins; and advanced into the valley till forced to retire by the fire of the two guns in position in front.
At 11 a.m. O'Higgins debouched from the pass, and drew up his infantry in line on the open ground under fire, of the enemy. For an hour he contented himself with returning their fire and beating off their skirmishers, till, as he afterwards said himself, his blood was boiling to be at them. In his excitement he forgot the positive orders of San Martin to wait for Soler before attacking the enemy, and gave the word to charge. His men advanced with alacrity, but were soon entangled in the muddy stream, which they in vain attempted to cross under the fire of the enemy, and finally retreated in disorder to the mouth of the pass.
San Martin, sitting on his war-horse, saw from the heights above the repulse of his lieutenant. At once he sent off his aide-de-camp Condarco to hasten the march of Soler. This is the incident in his life which is commemorated in the equestrian statue which now graces the Plaza San Martin in Buenos Ayres.
He then galloped down the slope and joined O'Higgins. As he reached the lower ground, he noticed an extraordinary movement in the ranks of the enemy, and then descried the head of Soler's column advancing rapidly on his flank.
O'Higgins again advanced, while the grenadiers under Zapiola charged the centre of the enemy, and sabred his artillerymen at their guns. The position was carried by the bayonet, and the Royalist infantry formed square on their centre. Colonel Alvarado, with the vanguard of the right wing, at the same time captured the hill on the left flank of the Royalists, while Necochea and Escalada charged the cavalry in the rear. The victors then fell simultaneously upon the square, which was speedily broken. Some of the fugitives made for the farmhouse in their rear, but found their retreat cut off by Soler, and were forced to surrender at discretion; others tried to escape by the valley, and there fell under the sabres of the grenadiers.
The Royalists lost in this action 500 killed, 600 prisoners, all their artillery, a standard, and two flags; while the loss of the Patriots was 12 killed and 120 wounded. But the moral effects of the victory were still greater; the disaster of Chacabuco spread panic among the adherents of the Royal cause all over Chile. Only three men were undismayed— Barañao, Ordoñez, and Sanchez.
Barañao, on the march with his hussars to join the army, was met at the entrance to the plain of Chacabuco by news of the disaster. He countermarched to Santiago, and offered Marcó to take up an infantry soldier behind each of his horsemen, and to fall upon the Patriot camp by night; but Marcó thought of nothing but his own safety, and fled to Valparaiso, leaving the capital in the hands of the populace.
On the 13th the Patriot army was in full march upon Santiago, Necochea, with his squadron of grenadiers, being sent in advance to maintain order in the city; where the next day the army entered amid the enthusiastic plaudits of the inhabitants. As a Chilian historian says:
"San Martin, occupied in carrying out his vast plans, cared little for these futile manifestations. He thought only of the resources for carrying on the work which he had gained by the victory."
On the 15th he issued a proclamation convoking an assembly of notables, who should name three electors for each of the provinces of Santiago, Concepcion, and Coquimbo, in order that they might appoint a chief for the State.
The Assembly, to the number of one hundred, met under the presidency of Don Francisco Ruiz Tagle, the provisional Governor, and declared that—
"They were unanimous in naming Don José de San Martin as Governor of Chile with full powers."
San Martin refused to accept the appointment, and summoned another Assembly, to the number of two hundred and ten, which by acclamation named General O'Higgins Supreme Director of the State, which was what San Martin desired. The new Director appointed Don Miguel Zañartu his Minister of the Interior, and Lieutenant-Colonel Zenteno, San Martin's secretary, Minister of War and Marine; and then issued a proclamation to the people and addressed a note to the foreign Powers.
When Marcó left the capital, his troops at once dispersed. Some of them, with Maroto at their head, reached Valparaiso, and at once embarked. The rest were made prisoners, among them Marcó himself, who had not even energy sufficient for a rapid flight. San Martin received the late Governor-General with great affability.
"Give me that white hand," said he, with bluff sarcasm; and, leading him to an inner room, he conversed privately with him for two hours, and then dismissed him.
San Bruno, who had murdered prisoners in the public jail, was also taken prisoner, and, being sent at once for trial, was quickly sentenced, and shot in the great square, which was an act of simple justice.
News of the victory of Chacabuco was received in Buenos Ayres on the 24th February. All day shouts of triumph echoed through the streets, while cannon roared from the fort and from the ships of the squadron anchored in the roadstead. The captured flags were hung out from the balconies of the Cabildo, grouped round a portrait of the victorious general. Medals were decreed to the soldiers who had fought under him, and to himself a special badge of honour, while his daughter, Maria Mercedes, received a life-pension of 600 dollars per annum, which her father devoted to her education.
Government also sent San Martin his commission as Brigadier-General, the highest military grade in the Argentine service. He, in accordance with his previously expressed determination, declined the honour, but asked for further supplies of men, arms, and money, to carry on the campaign, and appointed himself General-in-Chief of the united Argentine and Chilian armies.
After arranging with the Chilian authorities for the formation of a naval squadron, and establishing in Santiago a Supreme Council of the Lautaro Lodge, half Chilians and half Argentines, he announced his intention of returning to Buenos Ayres to concert measures with Government for the prosecution of the war.
The Cabildo of Santiago offered him ten thousand ounces of gold for the expenses of his journey, which he declined to accept for himself, but devoted it to the establishment of a public library in that city.
One month after the battle he passed by the scene of his late victory, and saw there a mound of earth, under which lay the dead of the 12th February of the Patriot army, most of them negroes from Cuyo, liberated slaves. This mound was the first landmark of the War of Emancipation.