The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Interim Report/Part 4

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PART IV - INTERIM RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 23 - INTRODUCTION

Limited Objectives

304. It is important to stress the limited objectives of the interim recommendations I can make in this Report. My purpose is to propose instant measures capable of being implemented forthwith and where possible before the commencement of the 1989/1990 season. They are designed to prevent overcrowding and crushing on terraces in the short term and to improve safety procedures. They do not and cannot meet all the problems or address all the issues of post-Hillsborough football. Wider issues such as membership schemes, identity cards, all-seater stadia, super-stadia and long term recommendations fall to be considered in my Final Report. So do a number of other specific matters such as a comprehensive review of the Green Guide, the problem of excessive pre-match drinking, fans without tickets and ticket touts. I mention these matters lest it be thought I have decided no recommendations need be made concerning them. I have not. But before deciding what if any recommendations to make about these and other matters, more evidence and study is required.

305. Accordingly, the main thrust of these interim recommendations, as a holding exercise, is to reduce numbers on the terraces, to increase vigilance and to achieve a proper balance in crowd control between prevention of disorder and maintenance of safety.

Perimeter Fences

306. It would be impractical and unwise to recommend works of construction or radical structural changes now, before completing the extensive study and consultation which will form stage two of this Inquiry. Hasty interim recommendations of that kind might well prove to be ill-judged after further study and require to be changed in a matter of months.

307. In particular, I do not at this stage make any recommendation as to removing perimeter fences or replacing them with structures of different design. Understandably, there was a wave of popular feeling against such fences in the immediate aftermath of Hillsborough. The horrifying spectacle of people being crushed against the fencing focussed blame for the disaster on the fences themselves. There were pleas to dismantle them and emotive references to the fans being treated like "caged animals". Some clubs removed their fencing straightaway. It was therefore very tempting to consider at an early stage making a recommendation that the fences should be removed. I confess to being so tempted.

308. Regrettably, only a month after Hillsborough, there were incidents which showed that violence and hooliganism are still liable to erupt at football grounds. On 13 May at Selhurst Park, Birmingham City supporters invaded the pitch and fought with supporters of the home club, Crystal Palace. Five police officers and 16 supporters were injured and required treatment at a local hospital. On the same day at a match between Bristol City and Sheffield United, spectators spilt onto the pitch and there was fighting on the terraces. At the Cup Final between Liverpool and Everton on 20 May, there was a pitch invasion, albeit a comparatively benign one.

309. Even the Football Supporters' Association (FSA) felt it necessary to say in their final submission,

"With some reservations, the FSA accept that perimeter fences are necessary for crowd control."

310. Bearing in mind those matters, and the need to consider further expert evidence, I have decided that it would be unwise and premature for me to make any recommendations now either to remove or to preserve or to alter the structure of perimeter fences. I shall make recommendations about them in my Final Report.

311. For the present, I would emphasise that, although the fencing prevented escape, the real cause of the Hillsborough disaster was overcrowding and it is against that danger that my interim recommendations are primarily directed. Whilst declining to recommend the removal of the fences, I do consider that the gates to the pitch should be kept open whilst the terraces are occupied. This will have, I hope, three beneficial effects. Obviously, an open gate is a more ready escape route than one which has to be locked. Secondly, the sight of open gates will be reassuring to spectators on the terraces. Thirdly, the existence of gaps in the fencing by reason of the open gates will concentrate the minds of police officers or stewards on the track to the need for careful monitoring of those on the terraces.

312. It will of course be necessary to have a police presence sufficient to prevent pitch invasion for improper reasons through the open gates. However, I am encouraged to think that this is not an insuperable problem by the fact that, for example at Anfield, Liverpool's ground, there were no gates in the perimeter fencing before it was taken down. There were instead gaps or "access points" as they are called in the Green Guide (paragraph 215). Their existence did not, so far as I am aware, prevent the authorities from maintaining order. Also, the gates were open throughout the replay of this ill-fated semi-final at Old Trafford on 7 May 1989.

'Reduced Numbers

313. In the assessment of figures for capacity, the criteria in Chapter 16 of the Green Guide were not at Hillsborough, and may not elsewhere, have been applied with sufficient rigour. Therefore, in addition to reminding and enjoining local authorities and clubs to make all necessary deductions when assessing the figure for maximum capacity in accordance with the Green Guide, I recommend reducing that figure by a further 15% as an interim measure.

Safety Certificate

314. The Safety Certificate procedure should, if it is properly administered and enforced, go far towards achieving crowd safety. Whether it succeeds depends upon the vigilance and commitment of the local authority issuing the Certificate. I do not know whether the poor performance of the local authority at Hillsborough was typical. Arguments have been put to me suggesting the need for some national oversight or inspection of local authority certification procedures. This raises complex issues which I shall want to consider further at stage two of the Inquiry. For the present, I make recommendations as to the content of Safety Certificates and arrangements for issuing, monitoring, enforcing, reviewing, amending and renewing them.

CHAPTER 24 - THE RECOMMENDATIONS

315. The recommendations which follow are the minimum necessary to ensure that existing football grounds can for the present be safely used, based upon the evidence which I have heard at Sheffield and other information I have received. They complement the recommendations which Mr Justice Popplewell set out after his inquiry at Bradford.

316. Those which are asterisked should be carried out before the 1989/90 season starts. The rest should be started forthwith and completed as soon as possible.

Maximum Capacities for Terraces

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1. Where a viewing terrace is divided into pens or areas which are self-contained, the Safety Certificate should specify the maximum number of spectators to be admitted to each such pen or area.

A pen or area is to be deemed "self-contained" notwithstanding that it has a gate or gates affording access to another pen or area and whether such gate or gates be open or shut.
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2. Each figure for maximum capacity should be assessed in accordance with Chapter 16 of the Green Guide ("the Green Guide figure") subject to the following qualifications:

(a)
in arriving at "the Green Guide figure", proper and realistic allowance must be made for all factors which should reduce the permissible density in accordance with the range of maximum figures specified in paragraphs 221 and 222 of the Green Guide;
(b)
after assessing "the Green Guide figure", a deduction of 15% should be made to improve the safety margin.
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3. Arrangements should be made:—

(a)
to limit the number of spectators entering each self-contained pen or area to the maximum capacity figure assessed in accordance with Recommendation 2 above either electronically, mechanically, by a ticketing arrangement, by counting or otherwise, and
(b)
to close off further access to such pen or area when its maximum capacity is about to be reached.

Filling and Monitoring Terraces

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4. There should be a written agreement between the club and the police setting out their respective responsibilities for crowd safety and control and in particular for the filling of each self-contained pen or other terraced area and the monitoring of spectators in each such pen or area to avoid overcrowding. Any variation of the agreement in respect of an individual match should be agreed in writing in advance.
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5. At each match, there should be on the perimeter track, for each self-contained pen or other terraced area, a steward (if the club is monitoring that area) or a police officer (if the police are monitoring it) whose sole duty is to check crowd conditions in that area for possible overcrowding or distress throughout the period the area is occupied by spectators. Whoever is so appointed should be in addition to any other steward or police presence. He should have ready access to the police officer authorised under Recommendation 9 below, and by radio to the control room.

Fences and Gates

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6. All police officers and stewards with duties in relation to the terraced areas and especially those with duties under Recommendation 5 above, should be fully briefed and trained with regard to the recognition of crowd densities, to the recognition of signs of distress and to crowd dynamics. Training should include demonstrations at the ground and photographs, designed to enable stewards and officers to recognise different crowd densities.
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7. All gates in radial or perimeter fences of pens or other self-contained areas should be painted in a different colour from the rest of the fence and marked "Emergency Exit".
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8. Where there are perimeter fences, all gates to the pitch should be kept fully open during the period when spectators are on the terrace.
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9. There should be in respect of each gate in a perimeter fence (or group of gates if they are close together) a police officer authorised to decide whether or not to allow spectators through a gate to relieve overcrowding. The officer so authorised in respect of each gate should be identified for each match and known to be so by all stewards and police officers in that vicinity. He should be able to make radio contact with the control room either himself or via an officer close at hand.
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10. Suitable and sufficient cutting equipment should be provided by the club at each ground where there are perimeter fences to permit the immediate removal of enough fencing to release numbers of spectators if necessary. Agreement should be reached as to whether the equipment should be used by police, the fire brigade or stewards. Whoever is to use it should be trained to do so. Whether to use it should be a decision of a nominated senior police officer at the ground.

Crush Barriers

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11. All crush barriers should be visually inspected immediately for signs of corrosion. Any barrier found to be affected by a significant degree of corrosion should be repaired or replaced.
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12. The layout of barriers in each pen or terraced area should be reviewed immediately to ensure that it complies with the criteria contained in Chapter 9 of the Green Guide. If it does not, the assessment of the maximum capacity figure for that pen or terraced area, in accordance with Recommendation 2 above, should reflect the fact.

Safety Certificates

 
13. There should be an immediate review of each Safety Certificate by the responsible local authority, which should consult the club in respect of which the Certificate is issued, the police, the fire service, the ambulance service and the building authority. Such a review should include an inspection of the stadium. Its object should be to ensure that the operative conditions of the Certificate are complied with and to add or substitute any condition shown to be necessary as a matter of urgency following the findings and recommendations in this report.
 
14. Any local authority within whose area there exists a sports stadium designated under the 1975 Act for which no Safety Certificate has yet been issued should proceed forthwith to remedy the situation.
 
15. Every Safety Certificate should be reviewed by the local authority at least once annually and each Certificate should require to be renewed annually.
 
16. Each local authority should review its arrangements for issuing, monitoring, enforcing, reviewing, amending and renewing Safety Certificates. Such review should require that there exists or is provided an accountable administrative structure whereby the functions of the local authority are regularly and effectively supervised by senior officers and elected members and decisions are properly taken in accordance with the local authority's rules.
 
17. To assist the local authority in exercising its functions, it should set up an Advisory Group consisting of appropriate members of its own staff, representatives of the police, of the fire and ambulance services, of the building authority, of the club and of a recognised supporters' club. The Advisory Group's terms of reference should encompass all matters concerned with crowd safety and should require regular visits to the ground and attendance at matches. The Advisory Group should have a chairman from the local authority, and an effective procedure. Its resolutions should be recorded and it should be required to produce regular written reports for consideration by the local authority.

Duties of each Football Club

 
18. Each turnstile should be inspected and its potential rate of flow measured. Thereafter, regular inspections should be made to ensure that each turnstile remains capable of admitting spectators at the rate anticipated.
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19. The correlation between each viewing area in the stadium and the turnstiles serving it should be such as to ensure that all the spectators intended to be admitted to that viewing area can pass through the turnstiles within one hour. If that cannot be done, the capacity of that viewing area should be reduced accordingly.
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20. Turnstiles should be closed when the permitted capacity of the area served by them is about to be reached and arrangements should be made to ensure quick and effective communication with turnstile operators for this purpose.
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21. Closed circuit television should be so installed as to enable crowd densities outside the ground, within

concourse areas and in pens and other standing areas, to be monitored before and throughout a match.
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22. All signposting for spectators both outside and inside the ground should be comprehensively reviewed. It should, in relation to the arrangements for each match, be unambiguous, eye-catching, simple and clear and should be designed to ensure the rapid movement of spectators to their appropriate viewing area.
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23. Information on tickets should be unambiguous, simple and clear and should correlate absolutely with the information provided in respect of each match both outside and inside the ground. Retained ticket stubs should contain information necessary to guide spectators once inside the ground.
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24. Information on tickets requesting spectators to be in position by a particular time should be reviewed by clubs in conjunction with the police to ensure that it corresponds with the planned arrangements for admitting spectators to the ground.
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25. Each club should consult with a recognised supporters' club as to the provision of pre-match entertainment aimed at attracting spectators to the ground in good time.

Police Planning

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26. The Chief Constable of each police force in whose area there is one designated stadium or more should nominate a chief officer to liaise with the management of each football club and local authority concerned in respect of the safety and control of crowds.
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27. The Operational Order for each match at a designated stadium and the pre-match briefing of all officers on duty there should alert such officers to the importance of preventing any overcrowding and, if any is detected, of taking appropriate steps to remedy it.
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28. The Operational Order for each match at a designated stadium should enable the police to cope with any foreseeable pattern in the arrival of spectators at a match and in their departure. It should provide for sufficient reserves to enable rapid deployment of officers to be made at any point inside or outside the ground.
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29. The option to postpone kick-off should be in the discretion of the officer in command at the ground. Crowd safety should be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to exercise it.
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30. There should be available in the police control room the results of all closed circuit television monitoring outside and inside the ground and the record of any electronic or mechanical counting of numbers at turnstiles or of numbers admitted to any area of the ground. Officers in the control room should be skilled in the interpretation and use of these data.

Communications

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31. There should be sufficient operators in the police control room to enable all radio transmissions to be received, evaluated and answered. The radio system should be such as to give operators in the control room priority over, and the capacity to override, others using the same channel. Additional channels should be used, where necessary, to prevent overcrowding of the airwaves. Consideration should be given to sound-proofing the control room against excessive crowd noise.
 
32. To complement radio communications, there should be a completely separate system of land lines with telephone links between the control room and key points at the ground.
 
33. Within the control room, there should be a public address system to communicate with individual areas outside and inside the ground, with groups of areas or with the whole ground. Important announcements should be preceded by a loud signal to catch the attention of the crowd despite a high level of noise in the ground. This arrangement should be prominently advertised on every programme sold for every match.
 
34. Use should be made where possible of illuminated advertising boards to address the crowd. Consideration should also be given to the use by police officers of a simple code of hand signals to indicate to the control room the existence of certain emergencies or requirements.

Co-ordination of Emergency Services

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35. The police, fire and ambulance services should maintain through senior nominated officers regular liaison concerning crowd safety at each stadium.
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36. Before each match at a designated stadium, the police should ensure that the fire service and ambulance service are given full details about the event, including its venue, its timing, the number of spectators expected, their likely routes of entry and exit, and any anticipated or potential difficulties concerning the control or movement of the crowd. Such details should be readily available in the control rooms of each of the emergency services.
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37. Contingency plans for the arrival at each designated stadium of emergency vehicles from all three services should be reviewed. They should include routes of access, rendezvous points, and accessibility within the ground itself.
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38. Police officers posted at the entrances to the ground should be briefed as to the contingency plans for the arrival of emergency services and should be informed when such services are called as to where and why they are required.

First Aid, Medical Facilities and Ambulances

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39. There should be at each stadium at each match at least one trained first aider per 1,000 spectators. The club should have the responsibility for securing such attendance.
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40. There should be at each stadium one or more first aid rooms. The number of such rooms and the equipment to be maintained within them should be specified by the local authority after taking professional medical advice and should be made a requirement of any Safety Certificate.
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41. The club should employ a medical practitioner to be present at each match and available to deal with any medical exigency at the ground. He should be trained and competent in advanced first aid. He should be present at the ground at least an hour before kick-off and should remain until half an hour after the end of the match. His whereabouts should be known to those in the police control room and he should be immediately contactable.
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42. At least one fully equipped ambulance from the appropriate ambulance authority should be in attendance at all matches with an expected crowd of 5,000 or more.
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43. The number of ambulances to be in attendance for matches where larger crowds are expected should be specified by the local authority after consultation with the ambulance service and should be made a requirement of the Safety Certificate.