The War with Mexico/Volume 2/Notes On Chapter 32
XXXII. PEACE
1. 52Trist, nos. 16, confid., 17, confid., 18, 22-3. (Trist's despatches, as printed in Sen. 52; 30 1, are not in all cases complete.) Sierra, Evolution i, 223. (Outrages) Arco Iris, Nov. 9, 1847. Razonador in Nacional, Jan. 5, 1848. Nacional, Jan. 19, 1848. 80Almonte to Olaguíbel, Sept. 16, 1847. 335Thornton to Trist, Dec. 5, 1847. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 308-9, 315. Calhoun Corresp., 1163, 1166. 349Partridge to Miss W., May 22, 1848. 125Bonham to mother, Dec. 7, 1847. Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, pp. 17-23. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 327, 331. Wash. Union, May 22, 1847. 291P. F. Smith to Pierce, undated. Monitor Repub., Dec. 3, 14, 1847. Picayune, Dec. 23, 1847; Jan. 7, 8, 1848. 13Doyle, no. 18, 1848. (Damages) 76Circular, Oct. 3, 1847.
2. Sierra, Evol., i, 223. 13Thornton, no. 6, 1847. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 571. 52Trist, nos. 18, 22-8. Picayune, Nov. 30, 1847; Feb. 20, 1848. Protesta de la Diputación. Tributo á la Verdad, 58. Nacional, Jan. 8, 19, 1848. 80Olaguíbel, proclam., Dec. 9, 1847. 335Thornton to Trist, Dec. 5, 1847. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 23, 40, 45, 74. Correo Nacional, Feb. 7, 19; Mar. 21, 1848. (Aguas Cal.) 76Guerra to Relaciones, Jan. 24, 1848. 76Olaguíbel, Nov. 29. 76Gov. Oaxaca to Relaciones, Dec. 27. Monitor Repub., Nov. 15, 27, 29; Dec. 29, 1847. 366Correspondence between gov. S. L. Potosí and A. O. de Parada. 335Trist, memo. of second conference. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 20, private, 27 private, 28, private, 1847. No. American (Mexico), Dec. 14, 1847. 169Taylor to Crittenden, Nov. 1, 1847. 304Duncan to Quitman, Nov. 27, 1847. Webster, Letters, 343. 61Scott, Sept. 18. (Bankhead) 132Cushing to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847. 125Bonham to mother, Dec. 7, 1817; Jan. 12, 1848. Gallatin, War Expenses. 345Poinsett to Van Buren, June 4, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. 304Duncan to Quitman, Nov. 27. No. American (Mex.), Dec. 14. P. F. Smith, supra. Eco del Comercio, May 9, 1848. Correspondant, Nov. 15, 1847. Times, Jan. 15, 1848.
The substantial war elements were the Eventualists, Monarchists and Santannistas. The 76archives for this time are full of reports of political disturbances.
3. Polk, Diary, Nov. 20, 28, 30; Dec. 4, 18, 1847. 132Donelson to Buchanan, May 15, 1847, private. Ho. 60; 30,1, 1037 (Marcy). 52Trist, no. 22. P. F. Smith: note 1. Richardson, Messages, iv, 537-46. See chap. xxix, p. 183. Had the war continued it would not have been against Paredes or Santa Anna and the military class. It would have seemed to be a war of conquest directed against the Mexican nation, and even the peace party would have had to turn against us.
4. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 585. 13Thornton, nos.6,7,1847. 52Trist, nos. 16, confid., 18-20. 335Id. to Rosa, Oct. 20, 1847. Monitor Repub., Nov. 8, 10, 13; Dec. 29. Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 58 (Rosa). Richardson, Messages, iv, 572. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 22-3. México á través, iv, 704-5. Exposición ó Programa. Negrete, Invasión, li, app., 483, 516.
Trist reopened the negotiations naturally by forwarding to Luis de la Rosa, the minister of relations, a letter (dated Sept. 7) written by him as a reply to the note and counter-projet of the Mexican peace commissioners dated Sept. 6. In this he argued that Texas possessed good grounds for rebelling, and became independent; that, having been rightfully annexed by the United States, she had to be protected against invasion; that any previously existing boundary between her and Mexico had been obliterated by the revolutionary war, and she had a right to claim the Rio Grande as the boundary; that as Mexico would not negotiate on the subject, Polk was compelled to accept that delimitation; that in the resulting war the United States had occupied Mexican territory and now justly held it by right of conquest, yet not by the odious title of conquest resulting from war without good cause — not from a mere desire of obtaining territory (Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21). This letter and a brief accompanying note, which stated that his powers had not been withdrawn and expressed a desire to resume the negotiations, were transmitted by Thornton, now acting (in the absence of Bankhead and Doyle) as British chargé, who strongly urged upon Rosa the renewal of the negotiations (52Trist, no. 19). Rosa replied favorably, but said he was too busy just then, and needed certain documents. Later Peña explained the delay as resulting from the provisional character of his administration (52to Trist, Nov. 22). In reality the government desired to ascertain and influence public and Congressional sentiment before acting (Exposición dirigida). Rosa's reply to Trist said there appeared to be little hope of peace, but this was for self-defence (Trist, no. 20). 5. 52Trist, nos. 19,23. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 239. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 23. Monitor Repub., Nov. 17, 18, 23, 27; Dec. 26. (Deserters) Nat. Intellig., June 24, 1848. 76Rosa to govs., Oct. 20. 75Report of the meeting of governors. México á través, iv, 706. 335Thornton to Trist, Nov. 25, 1847. Dublán, Legislación, v, 305. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 567-8, 571-6. 335Davidson to Thornton, Nov. 23. Picayune, Nov. 30.
At the meeting Puebla, Querétaro, Michoacán, Guanajuato and S. L. Potosí states were represented by their governors, Zacatecas by her vice governor, and Jalisco by a commissioner. The President and the ministers were present. The meeting was advisory and confidential. The government took the ground that the war could not be continued and that Mexico should endeavor to obtain, not an honorable peace, but one as little humiliating as possible, and one that would save Mexican nationality; but it preferred war and promised to carry it on if given the necessary men and supplies. The governors naturally showed their repugnance to peace on such a basis, but could not offer adequate resources, and the one rational conclusion was inevitable. A report of the discussions may be found in the Gobernación archives, Mexico. The sessions began on Nov. 19 and concluded on Nov. 27. The insurrection came to a head on Dec. 19. News of Trist's recall helped to quiet the war party (52Trist, no. 22).
6. Pillow, address in Chicago Daily Democrat, Sept. 15, 1857. Polk, Diary, Oct. 4, 5, 20-3, 25; Dec. 30, 1847; Jan. 2, 1848. 52Sec. state to Trist, Oct. 6, 25. Richardson, Messages, iv, 541. 335Memo. of Trist on despatch of Oct. 6. Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 59-61 (Trist).
A private 335note (Oct. 24) from Buchanan to Trist, taken in connection with Polk's Diary, suggests a suspicion on the part of the administration that, in intimating that the United States might possibly not insist upon the Rio Grande line, Trist had purposely played into the hands of the Whigs, who were now asserting that the intermediate region did not belong-to us. This suspicion and the idea that Trist was helping Scott to injure the President's friends in the army would explain a great deal of wrath. Another personal 335note (Oct. 24) from Buchanan shows that the terms offered by Trist in September were now regarded as too moderate to be popular, and gives one the feeling that, especially since Trist had shown a disposition to weaken them, the prestige of the administration demanded his recall. Oct. 25 Buchanan said Trist had offered to give up a part of California, but Trist denied this (335memo.). Oct. 6 Marcy directed Scott to inform the Mexican authorities of Trist's recall (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1008). Trist's patriotism and sense of duty do not seem to have been affected by his recall. Nov. 27 he wrote to Buchanan that a commission should be sent to take up his work on the spot (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 230); and the next day, through Mrs. Trist, he 335adjured Buchanan to lose "not a minute" about this, proposing Scott and Butler. Dec. 31 Polk received indirectly a similar recommendation from Gen. Twiggs, and Sen. Davis (the Col. Davis of Monterey and Buena Vista) pointed out to him that, should Mexican commissioners go to Washington, probably their government would be overthrown during their absence, and they might be shot as traitors on their return (Diary, Dec. 31). Polk therefore virtually decided that Butler should take Trist's place as well as Scott's (ibid., Dec. 31; Jan. 2). Pillow (Address) attributed to his letter the recall of Trist. 7. Sen. Report 261; 41, 2. Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 59-66 (Trist). Sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 61 (Peña). 52Trist, nos. 21, 23. 13Thornton, nos. 11, 14, 1847. 335Id. to Trist, Nov. 22, confid.; Nov. 22, private; Nov. 25. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 583, 585. 335Trist to Thornton, Nov. 24, confid., Nov. 25, private. 75Peña at meeting of govs. 52Peña to Trist, Nov. 22. Trist's departure had to be delayed by the necessity of testifying at Pillow's trial.
8. (Traitorous) London Times, Mar. 15, 1848. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 140, 144 (Scott). 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 576. 13Thornton, no. 21, confid. Id. to Trist: note 7. Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2. Trist, no. 22. 137d. to Thornton, Dec. 4, 1847. 335Id. to Id., Nov. 24. 335Id. to wife, Dec. 4.
It has been said that Trist's decision was due to Scott, but Trist was not under Scott's control. Scott tried without success to dissuade him from breaking with Polk (335statement by Trist in his papers). 'Trist 335wrote to his wife, Dec. 4, "Knowing it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful consequences to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that chance," I decided to-day at noon to attempt to make a treaty; the decision is altogether my own. Sen. Rep. 261, the basis of which was evidently supplied by Trist, says that. Freaner, the correspondent of the New Orleans Delta, was "the only man who had been in any way instrumental in determining Mr. Trist to make the attempt." It has also been said that Scott and Trist wished to make the treaty because Polk now wanted more of Mexico, and they desired to "spite" him; but neither man was of such a type, no suggestion of the scheme appears in Trist's official or personal letters or in Thornton's reports to the Foreign Office, and public considerations are quite enough to explain Trist's course. Sen. Rep. 261 says that on Dec. 4 occurred an incident "in itself of the most casual, and trivial, and commonplace kind," which led to Trist's making the treaty. This has been thought to mean the postponement of the train with which he was to have gone down; but the above description does not seem to fit this important occurrence, and the author is inclined to believe that it refers to a chance meeting of Trist and Freaner, while Trist's decision hung in the balance. Freaner was regarded by Trist as an honest man of unusual sagacity, and he was a strong, sympathetic character. Peña held that, since his peace commissioners had been appointed, he could deal with the subject through them only, and hence, as they were at a distance, he could not possibly send a proposal to Mexico for Trist to carry home, as it) was suggested to him to do. 'Trist counted on one fact as lessening his responsibility: the government could disavow his work without embarrassment (52no. 22). See Napoleon's dictum (chap. xxvii, note 17, p. 398).
9. 13Thornton, no. 21, confid., 1847. 13Doyle, nos. 1, 3, 1847; 10, 1848. 52Trist, nos. 23-5. 256J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 27, 1847, private. Sen. 60; 30, 1, pp. 61 (Peña), 62 (Trist). (Rincón) México á través, iv, 705-7. 335Memo. re withdrawal of notice. 335Thornton to Trist, Nov. 24, priv.; Dec. 5, 11, confid. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 590. 335Trist to Peña, Dec. 26, 1847. Lee, Gen. Lee, 43. Noticias Muy Importantes. Richardson, Messages, iv, 545. 335Powers of the commrs. 335Trist, minutes of meetings, ete.
Doyle arrived at Vera Cruz on Nov. 30, and soon received from the Foreign Office a despatch (13no. 40) making clear its attitude of benevolent neutrality (Doyle, no. 3). Polk's message encouraged the Eventualists, because it showed that if they could defeat the present negotiations, the war would continue, the peace party would fall from power, and then the Eventualists would have American support in setting up a government according to their ideas. Rincón pretended to be ill. Associated with the ministry of Relaciones at this time as confidential advisers were such men as Pedraza, Lafragua and Cuevas.
10. Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21. 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 24, personal. 335 to Id., Oct. 25. 335Dimond to Id., Oct. 27. 73Lozano, no. 3, res., 1847. 335Trist, notes and memoranda. 335Notes of Trist and Couto. 335Thornton's translation of Mexican draft of treaty. 335Notes from Doyle and Thornton. (Unreasonable) México á través, iv, 706. Sierra, Evolution, i, 223. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 592, 596-7. 13Doyle, nos. 10 (with memoranda), 29, 1848. 13Palmerston to Mora, June 20, 1848. 52Trist, no. 27. Exposición dirigida, 6. (Trist's conduct) Negrete, Invasión, iv, 324.
Trist relied for guidance on his original instructions (Ho. 69; 30, pp. 48-7), the projet of a treaty accompanying the instructions (ibid., p. 47), 52instructions of July 13 and 19, 1847, former treaties of the United States, and our general principles and policy (52Trist, no. 27). See also Polk's Diary, Apr. 13, 1847. In regard to the western end of the boundary the instructions were faulty, and Trist found it necessary to use his judgment (52enclosure in his no. 27). Greatly fearing the designs of the Monarchists, he desired to have a secret article binding upon Mexico the constitution of 1824, and was willing to promise in return that enough American troops to support the government should remain five years; but the proposition was declined (13Doyle, no. 10, 1848). There was a difficulty in doing anything about Tehuantepec, for British interests were involved, and that matter was dropped by Trist in order to facilitate the adjustment of the boundary (Exposicién, supra). It did not signify much now, for the United States had its eye upon a better route (J. S. Reeves in Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 323). The subject that consumed the most time was the status of the people of the surrendered territory (Trist, no. 27). The Mexicans asked that their civil law should continue to rule there until the territory should be organized into states, but Trist (perhaps in the interest of slavery) would not consent (13Doyle, no. 10). 11. 13Doyle, nos. 10, 12, 13, 1848. Roa Bdrcena, Recuerdos, 568, 579, 591, 602-3, 605-6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1039 (Scott). 52Trist, nos. 25-7. México á través, iv, 706-8. 335Trist to wife, Dec. 26, 1847; to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848; to commrs., Jan. 29, 1848. 13Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28-9. (S. L. P.) 88Gov. S. L. P. to gov. Querétaro, Feb. 5, 1848; 77Relaciones, circular, Jan. 17; Nacional, Jan. 26 (plan); Feb. 2; Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 41, 43; México á través, iv, 706. 256Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28.
Pefia became the chief executive again because the expiration of Anaya's term (ordered by the Congress that elected him to occur on Jan. 8, since it was expected that the new Congress would have assembled by that date) left the country without a head, and the position devolved upon him as chief of the supreme court. L. de la Rosa was then appointed minister of relations. The plan of the S. L. P. governor was that four states — S. L. P., Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Jalisco — should combine, repudiate the national government, and continue the war, expecting other states to join them; but public opinion, even in his own state, failed to support him. Almonte was actively working against peace at this time, basing his arguments particularly on the attitude of the peace party in the United States and the poverty of the American treasury. Jan. 30 he called attention to the Whig majority in our House, said our Congress would probably refuse to send more troops to Mexico, and urged the Mexican. government to procrastinate. The reply of the government was a mere acknowledgment of receipt. Feb. 14 he argued that Walker's report showed we could not continue the war much longer. On the other hand there seems to be some reason to believe that personal relations and interests may have influenced the Mexican commissioners in favor of making the treaty (Puga y Acal, Documentos, letter no. 74). Marcy to Scott, Oct. 6, 1847: Your military operations are not to be modified by Mexican proposals to negotiate (Sen. .52; 30, 1, p. 140).
12. 13Thornton, no. 11, 1847. 13Doyle, nos. 4, 1847; 13, 14 and 18, 1848. Sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 65 (Trist). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1082 (Scott). Roa Bárecena, Recuerdos, 604-7. 13Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28, 29; to Rosa, Jan. 29. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 315-6. México 4 través, iv, 706-8. 335Memo. from Freaner.
The Mexican government naturally desired to keep all information about the treaty from its enemies. The public came to believe, however, that an important act had taken place on Feb. 2. Freaner carried the treaty to Washington. For two weeks escorts had been waiting at the proper points on the road to Vera Cruz. The Spanish representative, under his instructions, took no part in these negotiations. The Prussian minister, lacking both official authorization and personal influence, was equally inactive. France had no minister on the scene.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 557) says that "no man who so palpably disobeys the direct instructions of his government" as did Trist, could be fit to negotiate a treaty; suggests (p. 564) that it was improper to let the British coöperate in the matter; and argues (pp. 582-4) that Scott should have broken up the negotiations or else assumed the full responsibility for them, withholding from the Mexican government the fact of Trist's recall. All this and the rest are mere fault-finding, and the critic could and would have been much more severe, had the course he recommended been adopted. Of course he proves the obvious facts that Scott and Trist, in the interest of two nations and to accomplish what their government ardently desired, at great personal risk disregarded mistaken instructions, accepted British assistance without which they would probably have failed, and obtained a treaty which Polk himself, though he hated both of them, felt constrained to accept; but this was a truly glorious achievement. Scott had no right to act as Ripley says he should have done. The armistice, a military affair, was properly his concern, but negotiating a treaty was diplomatic business. Mackintosh, says Ripley (p. 563), had a hand in the negotiations, but this seems to be an error. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 524-5) says "it might perhaps have been well to replace Trist by a stronger man." But every possible man had been considered (p. 126), and a stronger man would probably have tried to drive the Mexicans and have failed. Trist they liked and trusted, yet could not deceive or frighten.
The chief points of the treaty signed on Feb. 2 were as follows (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 38): Art. 1. Peace. 2. Immediate armistice, and so far as possible a restoration of the constitutional order in the places occupied by the Americans. 3. After ratification by both governments the blockade to cease, the customhouses held by the Americans to be given up, and the interior to be evacuated as soon as practicable. Mexico to assist. Duties collected after Mexico's ratification to be paid over to her. 4. Immediately on the exchange of ratifications all Mexican places and public property to be given up, and all prisoners surrendered. The process to be completed within three months, unless the sickly season should require American troops to remain longer at designated points. 5. The new boundary (Rio Grande, southern and western lines of New Mexico, the Gila, the Colorado, the line between upper and lower California). The line to be run and marked by a joint commission within a year after the exchange of ratifications. No change in it to be made except with the free and formal consent of both nations. 6. The United States may navigate the Gulf of California and the Colorado to the Gila, and the two governments will arrange for "a road, canal, or railway" within a marine league of the Gila, should it be found practicable. 7. The navigation of the Gila and of the Rio Grande to New Mexico to be free to both countries. 8. All Mexicans in the transferred territory may go or stay, will have full power over their property, and may elect within a year to remain Mexican citizens. 9. Mexicans not so electing shall be admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States," and meantime shall have the rights "now vested in them according to the Mexican laws." No interference with Roman Catholic worship, property or ecclesiastical administration. 10. Mexican grants of lands (made before May 13, 1846) to be valid, and the period for fulfilling conditions to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications. 11. The United States to prevent or punish Indian incursions from its territory, and exact satisfaction for damage done, etc. 12. The United States to pay Mexico $15,000,000. (As to method of payment, see p. 248.) 13. The United States to pay the claims against Mexico already decided. 14. Also to assume all other claims arising before Feb. 2, 1848. 15. The latter claims are to be passed upon by an American commission (which will be supplied by Mexico, on demand, with needed books, etc.), and not more than $3,250,000 may be paid to satisfy the claims. 16. Each nation may fortify any point within its territory. 17. The commercial treaty of 1831, so far as compatible with this treaty, revived for eight years. 18. Supplies for American troops in Mexico to enter free of duty. 19. Provisions respecting merchandise brought into Mexican ports occupied by the Americans. 20. A provision regarding certain merchandise arriving at Mexican ports shortly after the restoration of the customhouses. 21. Should difficulties arise between the two countries, negotiations and arbitration — not reprisals or hostilities — to be employed, unless the circumstances forbid. 22. Provisions for resident merchants and prisoners in case of war between the two nations. 23. Ratifications to be exchanged at Washington in four months or, if practicable, sooner. Secret article. The four months of Art. 23 may be extended to eight months.
13. If we hold that Texas extended only to New Mexico, the treaty gave us 619,275 square miles (Donaldson, Public Domain, 124, 134). (Little) 198Gallatin, note on peace treaty; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 618; 13Palmerston to Mora, June 20, 1848. The U.S. Supreme Court held (Merryman vs. Bourne, 9 Wallace, 592) that the acquisition of California was "complete on the seventh of July, 1846." It said, "Conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country"; and the United States intended to do this in the region we took. On this and other points see Klein, Treaty, 247-81; Butler, Treaty-Making Power, i, 78, 168-9; U. S. Cavalry Journal, xxv, p-18; Reid, Problems, 271-5. It was necessary to take territory from Mexico to offset our claims, quashed by the war (Richardson, Messages, iv, 537), and partially offset the costs of a war forced upon us, for, had the treaty awarded us a money indemnity, she would not have been willing and morally able, even if theoretically able, to pay it. (See Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 40-1.) Aside from the question of right, too, the American people would have been profoundly dissatisfied to see our armies return empty-handed, and this feeling would probably have meant more to Mexico than the loss of her nominal territory (see Root in Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., p. 395). Mexico could give up more easily what she did than any equivalent territory. (Map) Gadsden line at N. E. is disputed.
An apparent inconsistency may be noted here, for on p. 138 of vol. i it was intimated that an agreement with Mexico was needed to fix the boundary of Texas. The explanation is that the United States had demonstrated its ability to hold the line, but the republic of Texas was not strong enough to prevent Mexican troops from going and remaining north of the Rio Grande.
The Mexican commissioners rejected the line of 32°, desired by the United States (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 91), for three reasons: 1, it would be for a long distance only a mathematical boundary; 2, it was liable, when surveyed, to cut off important points like Paso del Norte; 3, it would prevent land communication between Sonora and lower California (Exposición dirigida). It was proposed at one time to divide 8. Diego, but for that concession Trist demanded too much. Besides, 8. Diego belonged distinctly to upper California. Lower California was relinquished because inaccessible and poor. Not only for sentimental reasons but because otherwise the treaty, they believed, could not possibly be ratified, the Mexican commissioners were determined to hold all of Sonora and Chihuahua. Tamaulipas, happily, had made no protest against relinquishing her claim to the intermediate region (52Trist, no. 27). To ask the consent of the people in the acquired territory was not deemed necessary by the United States (Butler, op. cit., i, 83-4), but citizenship was not forced upon Mexicans by the treaty (art. viii). Art. x was demanded by the Mexicans (13Doyle, no. 10, 1848). Art. xix harmonized the American pledge that goods imported during our occupation of the ports should pay only the American tariff (52Buchanan to Trist, June 14, 1847), with the Mexican view that our tariff could not be operative beyond the limits of our occupation (Exposición dirigida).
An error regarding the assumption of our claims has prevailed. Two classes of claims were provided for: 1, those liquidated under the convention of 1839 but not covered by the three Mexican instalments (vol. i, p. 81); 2, all unliquidated claims antedating Feb. 2, 1848. Under the first head the United States paid, under the act approved July 29, 1848 (Statutes at Large, ix, 265), $2,090,253.19 including interest (A. J. Peters, asst. sec. treas. to the author, Nov. 30, 1915); under the second head the claims commission awarded (in 1852) $3,208,314.96, including interest (Sen. 34; 32, 1; documents preserved in the state dept.). The treaty provided that under the second head the U. S. should not be liable for more than $3,250,000. The phraseology of our projet regarding this matter, when literally translated, did not readily penetrate the Mexican mind, and hence was re-worked (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 294). Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, chap. xxxiv) gives many interesting details derived from the papers of Couto. Other details may be found in the Trist papers, Doyle's reports, and the Exposición dirigida (Negrete, Invasión, iv 296).
14. The armistice. 13Thornton, no. 21, 1847, confid. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 590-1. 13Doyle, nos. 10, 28, 29, 1848. 52Trist, no. 26. 335Thornton to Trist, Nov. 22, 1847, confid. 335Trist to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848. 335[Peña] to Mex. commrs., Jan. 11, private. 76Many communications, principally between the Mexican government and the Mexican armistice commrs. (instructions, reports, etc.), Feb., 1848. 60Butler to Marcy, Mar. 3,13. 76Id., Feb. 21, appmt. of W. and S. 76Lay to Mora, Apr. 27. 76To Lombardini, Mar. 4. (Terms) Dublán, Legislación, v, 345-8; Negrete, Invasión, iv, 334, 342; 111Butler, gen. orders, no. 18, Mar. 6, 1848. 76Circular, Mar. 10. México á través, iv, 706, 709. 76Otero, Mar. 31. 291Winship to Pierce, Mar. 5. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140 (Scott).
As we have seen, the Mexican government had frowned on elections held in occupied territory, probably fearing American pressure upon the voters. The reader may note an apparent inconsistency here. The war is represented sometimes as so lucrative that its continuance was desired by Mexicans, and yet it is said that the districts occupied by our troops felt its burdens, and for that reason desired peace. Both currents of sentiment existed. In some districts and at some times the one predominated; in other districts and at other times the other. Doyle assisted materially in the armistice negotiations. The armistice was signed on Mar. 2. Its terms were: 1, suspension of hostilities; 2, neither side to extend its occupation of territory; 3, all civilians to travel freely, all military persons under white flag; 4, "contributions" for February and March under American 65orders 376 and 395 to be suspended, etc.; 5, Mexicans to exercise full political rights, and officials recognized by the Mexican government to be recognized by the Americans; *6, no Americans to interfere with Mexican elections; *7, Mexican authorities to levy and collect taxes; *8, Mexican postal facilities might be re-established, and the Americans would protect them; *9, the Mexican government might take the stocks of monopolized articles; *10, public offices not occupied by Americans to be given up, and also, as soon as conveniently possible, all religious and charitable buildings; *11, Mexican courts to act exclusively except when a person belonging to the American army was originally a party, or the interest of the American government is concerned; *12, police to be established; *13, person and property to be protected; *14, Mexico to act freely against savages on the northern frontier, and American commanders to help with influence; 15, church property to be respected; 16, armed bodies assembled anywhere, to commit hostilities not authorized by either government, to be opposed by both governments; 17, the armistice to remain in force during the period fixed by the treaty, unless notice of terminating it is given. The starred articles have particular reference to territory occupied by the Americans. Some of the articles merely make obligatory what the Americans had been doing. Next after Art. 1, Art. 16 was chiefly important. The purpose of it was to prevent insurrections, and it could not fail to have that effect. The first intention was to keep Art. 16 secret, but the wisdom of publishing it soon became clear. The armistice was published at Querétaro on March 11. Some slight and unavoidable violations of it, particularly in the pursuit of guerillas, occurred, but no serious trouble.
15. Polk, Diary, Feb.19. (Learned) Vol. i, p. 123. Calhoun Corresp., 1119-21. 137Fisher to Calhoun, May 25, 1847. 52Trist, no.27. 210Simms to Hammond, Jan. 15, 1847. Nat. Intellig., May 19; Nov. 20, 1847. N.Y. Sun, May 17, 20; Aug. 20-1, 1847. London Times, Oct. 29, 1847. Dodd, Walker, 25. Bourne, Essays, 227-36. Benton, View, ii, 704. 108Storms to Bancroft, July 23, 1846. (Baker) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 279. (Secession) Smith, Annex. of Texas, 204-14, 287. U. S. Mag., Feb., 1847, p. 100.
16. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846; Nov. 23; Dec. 7, 1847; Feb. 21, 1848. 13Crampton, nos. 59, 1847; 8, 9, 1848. 108Bancroft to Greene, Nov. 3, 1847. Richardson, Messages, iv, 541. 345Niles to Van Buren, Jan. 20, 1848. 108Buchanan to Bancroft, Dec. 29, 1846, priv. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 197. Foote, Remins., 220. Monitor Repub., Mar. 10, 1848 (C. Landa). Calhoun Corresp., 741 (to A. P. C. and Mrs. C.). N. Y. Journ. Comm., Dec. 11, 1847; Feb. 4, 1848. N. Y. Herald (weekly), Nov. 30, 1847. N. Y. Sun, Jan. 24, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, pp. 157-60 (Dickinson), 215 (Crittenden), 219 (Foote), 256 (Dix), 302 (Sevier), 321 (Cass); app., 488 (Tompkins), 349 (Breese). Nat. Intellig., Jan. 31, 1848 (Cass). 345Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 29, 1847.
17. 13Crampton, no. 19, 1848. 345Niles to Van Buren, Jan. 20, 1848. 345Dix to Id., Jan. 27, 1848. (Mad) 335Statement by Trist, Nov. 4, 1857. Calhoun Corresp., 742 (to C.), 751 (to J. E. C.). Public Ledger, Jan. 4, 1848. N. Y. Sun, May 17, 1848. Bourne, Essays, 235. Cong. Globe, see note 16; also 428 (Cabell). Meade in Ho., Jan. 31, 1848, and Ho. debate on Ten Regt. Bill, Jan. 24-Feb. 3, passim. Niles, Feb. 5, 1848, p. 354. Sen. Misc., 8; 30,1. 137Hatcher to Calhoun, Jan. 5, 1848.
18. Polk, Diary, Sept. 4, 7, 1847; Jan. 4, 15, 24-5, 1848. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 146, 148 (Marcy). 52Trist, nos. 22, 25. 335Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 27, 1847, priv. 335Trist to Thornton, Nov. 24, confid.; to wife (for Buchanan), Nov. 28. 13Crampton, no. 38, 1847. 132Buchanan, memo., Jan. 5, 1848. 60Butler to Trist and reply, Mar. 17, 18, 1848.
19. Polk, Diary, Jan. 4, 5, 23, 1847; Feb. 19-21, 1848. 52Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 6, 25, 1847. Amer. Rev., Amer. Rev., Feb.Feb., 1848, p. 110 (Everything done by Congress for the war has been done under Polk's pledge to make peace as soon as justice and honor could be satisfied.). Richardson, Messages, iv, 544, 573-5. (P.'s looks) Monitor Repub., Mar. 10, 1848 (C. Landa); Tyler, Tyler, ii, 457. W. E. Dodd in Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, pp. 17-23. Id., Walker, 25-6. Picayune, Feb. 26; Mar. 3, 1848. (Sevier) Wash. Union, Feb. 4, 1848. 13Crampton, no. 19, 1848.
Polk intimated to the Senate that the treaty would need to be amended. Trist was confidentially authorized to pay $20,000,000 for what he actually obtained, $5,000,000 more for Lower California, and $5,000,000 for the right of transit across the isthmus of Tehuantepec (Polk, Diary, Apr. 13, 1847; Ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 44).
20. Polk, Diary, Feb. 19-21. 297Report of Cabinet meeting, Feb. 20, certified by Polk's private secy. Sen. Report 261; 41, 2. Sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 66-72 (Buchanan). 13Crampton, no. 21, 1848. Richardson, Messages, iv, 573-5. Klein, Treaty, Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas).
Buchanan probably desired to have the treaty go to the Senate. He would then share in the credit of the administration, should it be popular, and in the contrary event would be able to say that he opposed it (Polk, Diary, Feb. 21). Polk's accepting the treaty as the best agreement that could be obtained under the circumstances completely vindicated Trist's decision to make it and Scott's coöperation.
In April, 1848, the question of occupying Yucatan came up. The indigenes appeared to be on the point of exterminating the whites and as a desperate resource Yucatan offered herself simultaneously to England, France and the United States. Apr. 29 Polk recommended intervention to Congress, and this has been thought (Ills. State Hist. Soc. Trans., 1912, 17-23) to mean that he was ready to take Yucatan, upset the treaty, and bring about the dismemberment — perhaps the annexation — of Mexico. But the treaty, which had now been ratified by our Senate, contained in art. 5 a provision expressly intended to prevent us from annexing more of Mexico's territory without her consent (see Buchanan to Hilliard, Works, viii, 56), and to believe that after giving this pledge our Executive proposed to reverse his entire policy regarding Mexico and be guilty of such bad faith would require much more evidence than we have. It seems to the author that humanity combined with an avowed desire to keep European powers out of Yucatan fully explain what Polk did (see Polk's Diary, Apr. 25). Congress decided against occupying Yucatan. Its troubles were settled by an agreement between the two parties (Nat. Intelligencer, May 17).
21. Sherman Letters, 46-7. Polk, Diary, Feb. 28. Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas). N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Feb. 25-6; Mar. 1, 11. Niles, Feb. 26, 1848, pp. 401-3. 139Fulton to Campbell, Mar. 5. 198Berrien to Gallatin, June 7. Morse, J. Q. Adams, 307-8. Adams was stricken down two days after the treaty reached Washington. By this time the Senators understood its contents fairly well, no doubt.
22. Polk, Diary, Feb. 25-Mar. 10; Apr. 27. 13Crampton, no. 21, 1848. Meigs, Benton, 378. Benton, View, i, 694. 210Woodward to Hammond, Feb. 23. 210Alvord to Id., Feb. 24. Calhoun Corresp., 743 (to Mrs. C.), 745 (to T. G. C.). (Politicians) Benton, View, ii, 710. 253McLean, remarks. 345Blair to Van Buren, Mar. 3, 1848. N. Y. Journ. Commerce, Feb. 25; Mar. 1-3, 7, 11. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 3-37 (proceedings). Wash. Union, Mar. 2, 4. Balt. Clipper, Mar. 4. Balt. Patriot, Mar. 3. Nat. Intellig., Feb. 28; Mar. 4. Public Ledger, Feb. 24. N. Y. Herald, Oct. 30, 1847. Johnson, Douglas, 123. Webster, Writings, x, 3-33. Boston Courier, Feb. 24, 1848. Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 497 (Dayton).
The Whigs were suspected of trying to gain enough Democratic support. so that they could not be charged with beating the treaty as a party (Polk, Diary, Mar. 3; Public Ledger, Mar. 8). Webster's policy was not only unpatriotic but unintelligent, for a continuation of the war would probably have led either to defeat or to larger acquisitions; but perhaps he believed no bad results would occur before the next Presidential election. He knew the country as a whole wanted the treaty ratified for the sake of peace (Writings, x, 7), and he was unable to make the New England Whig Senators join him against the treaty. Calhoun wrote to Gallatin that, owing to diversity of opinion in the Senate, not even a majority could have been obtained for any proposition different from the corresponding proposition of the treaty (198Mar. 13, 1848). What increased the danger involved in rejecting the treaty was the prospect that, with both Scott and Taylor out of the field, operations — even should they not become unsuccessful — would lack the interest which had largely prevented the public from thinking of the cost and other ills of the conflict, and hence it would be impossible to support the war (132W. R. King to Buchanan, Oct. 5, 1847; Seward, Seward at Wash., i, 62). Feb. 28 the committee on foreign relations reported the treaty without recommendation. Webster at once proposed a commission. His motion was tabled Mar. 2 (Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 4, 9).
For Frémont (Benton's son-in-law) see chap. xxxi, note 19.
Benton was probably opposed to the treaty also because he had held that Texas ended at the Nueces. There was a particular reason for saying that we obtained the new territory by cession rather than by conquest. The latter construction would have raised the troublesome questions, What place is there under our Constitution for a conquered province, and what right has our government to hold foreigners in subjection (210B. Tucker to Hammond, Mar. 16, 1848)? Four senators did not vote. For an analysis of the vote see Rives, op. cit., 11, 636-7.
23. Dallas in Public Ledger, June 15, 1849. Sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 66-72 (Buchanan). Art. 10 was thought insulting to Texas and contrary to the terms of annexation. Probably American courts would not have enforced it, and almost certainly it would have caused much litigation. Sevier and Clifford were authorized to give Mexico (if necessary), after her ratification of the amended treaty, a choice between the two methods of payment (52to S. and C., Mar. 22, 1848). For the treaty as drawn and as amended see Ho. 50; 30, 2.
24. Polk, Diary, Mar. 11, 12, 14-18, 20, 23. Welles papers. 52Buchanan to Clifford, Mar. 18, 1848. Polk to Senate, Mar. 18: Richardson, Messages, iv, 577. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 318. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 4752 (Buchanan), 55 (Clifford, Sevier). Benton, View, ii, 711. 335Memoranda.
The amount paid for nominal services in securing the consummation (in Mexico) of Trist's treaty was $28,728.67, while he received nothing for doing the real work. Years later he was paid (Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2). It is true that disgust with Polk's course toward Scott and himself, and particularly with Polk's employing a man like Pillow, led Trist to say he would not serve again under Polk (835Nov. 28, 1847); but had the President now acted a manly part, Trist would no doubt have accepted the appointment given to Sevier. For R. E. Lee's feeling on the matter see Lee, Gen. Lee, 46. In the night of Mar. 11 Maj. Graham left Washington to notify Butler of the ratification of the treaty (Polk, Diary). Buchanan's letter to the minister of relations (Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 47-52) gave a conciliatory explanation of the amendments.
25. 13Doyle, nos. 18, 29, 1848. 83Relaciones, circular, Feb. 6. 76Circulars, Feb. 16, 18. Atalaya, Feb. 2, 1848. Correo Nacional, Feb. 7. Kenly, Md. Vol., 464. Exposición dirigida. Negrete, Invasión, iv, 296-334. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 615, 619. Rejón, Observaciones. Communicación circular. México á través, iv, 708-9. Eco del Comercio, Mar. 15. 80Junta legislativa of Méx. state to gov., Dec. 17, 1847; reply from Peña, Dec. 28. In view of previous notes, further citations here seem unnecessary.
26. (Impression) Polk, Diary, Mar. 9; Calhoun Corresp., 757 (to T. G. C.). 60Butler to Marey, Mar. 3, 13; Apr. 7. 18Doyle, nos. 18, 29, 41, 52, 1848. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 55-6 (S. and C.), 72 (Rosa). Correo Nacional, Feb. 7. México á través, iv, 710. Long, Memoirs, 62. Apuntes, 393. (Hunt up) 291Winship to Pierce, Mar. 5. 52Trist, nos. 25, 27, 29. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 64. 125Bonham to mother, May 14. Picayune, Feb. 27. (Hawked) Wash. Union, Apr. 9, 25 (letters from Mexico).
It was feared that Polk's haste in sending Sevier and Clifford would lead the Mexican Congress to feel that we were eager for peace; that the inexperience of those diplomats might tempt the Mexicans to test their ability; that the recall of Scott and Trist would have an unfavorable influence, and that Mexican Congressmen might hold off in order to be bought by the Americans with funds said to have been provided for the purpose (Polk, Diary, Feb. 7). On the other hand the refusal of the government to appropriate any part of the fifteen millions coming from the United States produced a good effect. It was an excellent sign that 'Almonte failed to get elected to the Senate. A quorum assembled May 3. Congress opened formally May 7. By May 9 the treaty was before it.
27. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 61 (8. and C.), 62-72, 76. Apuntes, 393-5. Exposición dirigida. Negrete, Invasión, iv, 296; app., 399. Ballentine, Eng. Soldier, ii, 295-6. México á través, iv, 710. Public Ledger, June 15, 1849 (Dallas). (Preparations) Richardson, Messages, iv, 544, 546. Wash. Union, June 9. Nat. Intellig., Mar. 14. 13Crampton, no. 19, 1848. 13Doyle, no. 54, 1848.
Peña said he regretted the amendments but — especially since no new negotiation was deemed possible — did not think the treaty should be rejected on account of them. The vote in the Chamber of Deputies, May 19, was 51 to 35; in the Senate, May 24, 33 to 4 (60Butler to Marcy, May 26). Action of the New Mexico Legislative Assembly looking toward absorption in the United States was of great assistance, for it stopped the cry that loyal citizens were being sold. Some 300-500 American deserters, who were at Querétaro, took a strong stand for peace, because they were likely to be captured and shot, should the war continue; and the Mexicans felt considerable responsibility for the deserters. Polk's Message of Dec. 7, 1847, declared strongly for pushing the war at the expense of Mexico, if she would not make a treaty, and announced that California and New Mexico would not in any event be relinquished. Under this spur our Congress voted additional forces. The Whigs held off, but dared not refuse to support the war (p. 291). The speeches particularly worthy of attention were those of Cass (Mar. 14) and Webster (Mar. 23). Noisy popular demonstrations of joy were lacking because there had been no business disturbances, no invasion and no sinking of ships, the seat of war was distant, for nine months nothing striking had occurred there, Taylor and Scott were out of the field, and few had personal reasons for feeling interested in our Mexican relations.
28. Richardson, Messages, iv, 679-87. Sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 72-3. Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 56-79. 60Butler to Marcy, May 21. Calendario de Ontiveros, 1847. Kendall, Narrative (N. Y., 1844), ii, 185, 192. (Distance) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1047 (Scott). Wise, Gringos (N. Y., 1849), 267-70. Richardson, Messages, iv, 630, 644. Nat. Intellig., June 24, 1848. Portrait of Pefia: city hall, Mex.
Apparently the Mexican government deferred the appearance of Sevier and Clifford at Querétaro (especially as they insisted upon having an American escort) lest it should seem to be acting under pressure or lest some untoward accident should occur. This course was doubtless wise. May 19 they were invited to come, for the Deputies had just ratified the treaty and the Senators were sure to do so. Sevier was ill on May 26. He returned to the United States soon after the formalities were concluded but Clifford remained as our minister. Rosa arrived at Washington in November, 1848, as the minister of Mexico. During their stay at Querétaro our commissioners were led to embody in a protocol some explanations of the treaty. In 1849 the Mexicans asserted that the protocol gave them additional advantages; and the Whigs — apparently encouraged by Benton, who was accused of acting in collusion with the Mexican minister — undertook to make trouble for the administration and perhaps invalidate the treaty. But it was unreasonable to pretend that such a document could modify a treaty previously ratified by the American Senate and the Mexican Congress. Besides, Sevier and Clifford gave explicit notice, before drawing up the protocol, that they had no power to modify the treaty (52Clifford to Cuevas, Apr. 30, 1849). At length the Mexican government admitted formally that the protocol was merely explanatory (52Lacunza to Clifford, July 13, 1849). See also on this subject Ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 76-9. Polk, Diary, Feb. 4, 6, 8, 10, 1849. Foote, Remins., 332-5. Sen. 1; 31, 1, pp. 69-89. Ho. 5, pt. 1, 31, 1, pp. 69-89. Meigs, Benton, 378-9. Richardson, Messages, iv, 679-87. Foster, Amer. Diplom., 320. Buchanan, Works, viii, 350 (to C.).
29. Memoria de . . . Relaciones, Jan., 1849. The chief cause of difficulty was that Clifford referred certain matters to Washington that he should have settled himself, and thus caused delay. The worst consequence was that the customhouse at Vera Cruz did not pass into Mexican hands at the appointed time, because no one had authority to surrender it. At length, however, Gen. Smith assumed the responsibility of doing this, and Clifford endorsed his action. Similar difficulties arose at Tampico and Mazatlin. (On this topic one may consult: 52Buchanan to Clifford, Aug. 15, 1848; 13Giffard, Apr. 10; July 16; 52Clifford to Smith, June 27; July 4; 52Smith to Clifford, July 8; and reply, July 18; 52Otero to Clifford, June 21;-July 1; Buchanan, Works, viii, 177, 268, 272, 284.) Complaint was made because a body of our troops, in order to go from Monterey, Mex., to New Mexico, crossed territory not actually in our possession. June 30 arrangements were completed for paying the $3,000,000 which Trist, and then Butler, had been authorized to draw (Polk, Diary, Feb. 23; 52Clifford, no. 15; Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107-9). July 4 the treaty was duly proclaimed by Polk (Richardson, Messages, iv, 627; Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 173); and two days later he recommended that provision be made for carrying it into effect (details in note 31). Mexico appropriated funds to bring from the surrendered territory such of her citizens as might desire to leave it (Negrete, Invasión, iv, 342-9).
30. Evacuation of northeastern Mexico. 61Wool to Jones, Mar. 21; June 8, 15; 61Jones to Butler, May 17; 61Id. to Wool, June 7, 17; 65gen. orders 25; 65Wool, orders 156, June 12 (announcing that peace had been made); 76A. de Leano, Monterey, June 25 (possession given yesterday); 76Aguirre to Id., Saltillo, June 29 (S. evacuated, June 14). 76Clarke to Mex. commander, Mazapil, Mar. 18. July 6, 61Wool wrote to the adj. gen. from the Brazos that four cos. of dragoons would soon set out for California, and Bragg's battery and one co. of dragoons for 8S. Fe under orders from the war dept.; and that all the volunteers except five mounted cos. had embarked.
The northwest. 61Price to Ralls, Apr. 16; 61Id. to vice gov. Chihuahua, Apr. 16; México á través, iv, 710; 76Price to Mex. commrs., May 1; 69Wool to Marcy, June 22; 61Id. to adj. gen., July 6. On Aug. 6 news of peace and the retention of upper Calif. (which went overland from La Paz in Lower Calif.) reached Mason at Monterey. He then ordered the N. Y. vols. discharged. This process was completed on Oct. 26 (Sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 573, 626). 61Mason to adj. gen., Aug. 19 (anticipatory orders given to Burton in Lower Calif. to evacuate on learning of peace). Sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 513 (Burton to Mason, June 27: official news of peace have come). Naval evacuation. Ho. 50; 30, 2, p. 52 (Buchanan). 48Mason to Shubrick or Jones, Mar. 11, confid. 48Id. to Jones, June 27 (Polk wished to retain Lower Calif., but did not wish to prevent peace by insisting; — do what you rightfully can to help friendly Mexicans come to the U. S., if they wish to do so). July 15 at La Paz 47Jones and Shubrick agreed that such persons should be transported to California, and that, in extreme cases of destitution caused by Mexican vengeance, reasonable compensation should be made out of the military contributions collected in that quarter. 76Comte. gen. Sonora, July 13 (U. S. vessels left Guaymas July 5). Gaxiola, Invasión, 215 (Lavallette evacuated Mazatlán June 17). The treaty had been received at Mazatlán on June 18. Ho. 50; 30, 2, p. 52 (B.). 52Jones to Anaya, June 13.
31. 60Butler to Marcy, May 21; June 2. 80Memo., May 30. 13Doyle, no. 66, 1848. 52Clifford, no. 13, 1848. México á través, iv, 711. Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 88. (Herrera) 52Rosa to Sevier and Clifford, June 2; 80Relaciones circular, June 13. Grant, Mems., i, 118. Sen. Rep. 32; 34, 1 (Naylor).
Arrangements were made by Butler and the ayuntamiento so that local Mexican guards began to patrol the city as soon as the Americans marched out (92memo.). Our troops began to leave the capital on May 30 (60Butler to Marcy, June 2). The order of march was: heavy artillery; Patterson's division (vols.); Marshall's division (vols.); Col. Bonham and third division (regulars); Kearny and second division (regulars); Butler and first division (regulars). Divisions were as a rule two days apart. Worth remained at the capital for a time after June 12 to dispose of surplus property. After Butler sailed (June 21) Worth was in command. July 6 Polk presented the consummated treaty to Congress, recommending the appropriation of $12,000,000 for Mexico, provision for a commissioner and a surveyor to run and mark the boundary line, and provision for commissioners to adjust the American claims against Mexico assumed by the United States (Richardson, Messages, iv, 587-93). Herrera was declared President on May 30.
32. 61Thomas to Brooke, May 21. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 585. 13Giffard to Doyle, Aug. 1. México á través, iv, 711. 61P. F. Smith, July 11. 61Worth to Smith, June 27. 254McClellan to "Tom," May 23. (Symbol) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 911 (Scott). (Verse) Oswandel, Notes, 587.
It seems unnecessary to cite the numerous orders regarding details.
For the embarkation see Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 201. For one reason or another a few men remained in Mexico. There was a plan to march some of the troops north from the capital, but it did not seem wise to ask the consent of the Mexican Congress. The original intention was to have the men going by water land as near their homes as practicable, but the northern men objected strenuously to the tedious voyage. The Mexicans and Americans awaiting execution were released. The members of the Mexican Spy Co. were offered $20 apiece and a trip to Texas. Our sick and wounded soldiers were provided for on their arrival in the United States.