Theages (Burges)

by Plato

INTRODUCTION

In placing in a consecutive order the Theages, Rivals, and Hipparchus, I have followed the arrangement adopted by Stalbaum. For he conceives that they were written, if not by the same hand, at least by a kindred mind, and are all equally unworthy of Plato, despite the attempt made by Socher and Knebel to reverse the judgment of Boeckh, Heindorf, Schleiermacher, and Ast. For though some of the arguments brought forward by the impugners of the dialogue have been refuted, says Stalbaum, by its defenders, yet there still remains evidence enough to prove its spuriousness. For not only is it in matter and manner at variance with the subject and style adopted by Plato, but it contains likewise such remarkable instances of plagiarisms rather than imitation, as to leave little doubt of the writer being only a Plato in disguise; to say nothing of some peculiarities in language, not to be found in the writings of the philosopher and his contemporaries. The dialogue is, however, reckoned amongst the genuine works of Plato by Diogenes Laertius, iii. 57, on the authority of Thrasyllus, a Platonist of the time of Tiberius, as we learn from Suetonius in Tiberius, 14, and the Scholiast on Juvenal, vi. 576; and it is quoted as such by Aelian, V. H. viii. 1. While Lamprias, in the list of the works of Plutarch, n. G8, mentions one, “On the Theages of Plato.”

According to Stalbaum, Wympensee, in Diatrib. de Xenocrate, p. 96, conceived that the author of the dialogue was perhaps the philosopher of Chalcedon. But Stalbaum himself feels disposed to refer it to Antipater, who flourished about A. c. 150, and who was the teacher of Panaetius, and the disciple of Diogenes of Babylon, and who wrote, as appears from Cicero de Divinat. i. 3, a work on the wonderful divinations made by Socrates, of which there are some curious instances given in this dialogue; and as both Cicero, and Plutarch in his treatise, On the Daemon of Socrates, seem to have made use of the work of Antipater, so probably did the author of this dialogue.

THEAGES

Persons of the Dialogue

• Demodocus
• Socrates
• Theages

DEMODOCUS:

I want, Socrates, to speak with you in private1 about some matters, if you are at leisure; and if your want of leisure be not very great, for my sake however make leisure.

SOCRATES:

Nay, I am at leisure in other respects, and on your account very much so. If then you wish to say any thing it is in your power (to do so).

DEMODOCUS:

Are you willing then for us to retire out of the way, to the portico of Zeus Eleutherius2 hard by?

SOCRATES:

If it seems good to you.

DEMODOCUS:

Let us go then, Socrates. All natural productions, growing out of the earth, and other animals as well as man, appear to subsist in nearly the same manner. For to such of us as cultivate the ground it is a thing the most easy in the case of plants, to prepare every thing prior to planting, and even the planting itself. But when what has been planted is in a living state, the care of it becomes great and painful, and difficult. The same thing appears to take place with respect to human beings likewise. I form this conjecture as regards other things from my own affairs. For of this my son, whether one must call it the planting, or the procreating, it is the easiest of all things; but his education is difficult, and I am continually in fear about him. On other points much might be said; but the desire which now possesses him alarms me very much. It is not indeed an ignoble one, but it is dangerous. For he desires, Socrates, as he says, to become a wise man. I suspect that certain youths of his own age, and of the same ward, have been going down to the city, and repeating certain discourses, and disturbed his mind very much. Of these he is emulous; and for a long time is giving me great trouble, thinking it fit that I should pay attention to him, and pay money to some of the sophists, who might make him a wise man. For the money indeed I care less than nothing3, but think that, in going whither he is hastening, he is running into no small danger. Hitherto I have by soothing restrained him; but as I am no longer able (to do so), I think it best to yield to him, lest by frequently associating (with others)4 without me, he should be corrupted. Hence I am come for this very purpose, that I may place him with some one of those, who are considered to be sophists. Opportunely then for us have you appeared, with whom, as I am about to engage in affairs of this kind, I wished very much to consult. If then you have any advice to give respecting what you have heard from me, it is both lawful and needful (to do so).

SOCRATES:

Counsel, Demodocus, is said to be a sacred thing.5 If then any other consultation is sacred, this is so, about which you are now considering. For there is not a thing, about which a person may consult, more divine, than about the instruction of himself and of those related to him. In the first place then, let you and I agree together as to what we think that thing is, about which we are consulting; lest I may not perchance6 take it to be one thing, and you another; and we afterwards perceive, when the conference has proceeded far7, that we are an object of ridicule, both I who give, and you who request, advice, in not thinking the same upon any thing.

DEMODOCUS:

You appear to me, Socrates, to speak correctly; and it is meet so to do.

SOCRATES:

And speak I do correctly, but not entirely so; since I make a trifling alteration. For I am thinking, that perhaps this youth may not desire that, which we think he desires, but something else; and in that case we shall be still more absurd in consulting about something different. It appears, therefore, to me to be the most correct to begin by inquiring of him what the thing is, which he desires.

DEMODOCUS:

It appears very nearly to be the best to do as you say.

SOCRATES:

Tell me then what is the name of this handsome8 youth? what must we call him?

DEMODOCUS:

His name, Socrates, is Theages.

SOCRATES:

You have given your son, Demodocus, a beautiful and sacred-like name. Tell us, Theages, do you say that you desire to become a wise man? and do you think it fit for this your father to find out the acquaintance of such a person as may make you wise?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Do you call those men wise, who are skilled in that, respecting which they have a knowledge, or those, who have not?

THEAGES:

Those, who have a knowledge.

SOCRATES:

What then, has not your father caused you to be instructed, or taught you (himself)9, what others are taught, who are the sons of fathers good and honourable10; for instance, letters, to play on the harp, to wrestle, and other exercises?

THEAGES:

Yes, myself.

SOCRATES:

Do you think then there is still a want of some knowledge, to which it is proper for your father to pay attention for your sake?

THEAGES:

I do.

SOCRATES:

What is it? Tell us it, that we may gratify you.

THEAGES:

My father knows it, Socrates; for I have often mentioned it to him. But he designedly says this to you, as if truly he did not know what I desire; for in this and other matters likewise he opposes me, and is unwilling to place me with any one.

SOCRATES:

But all that you have hitherto said to him, has been said, as it were, without witnesses. Now therefore make me a witness and state before me what is the wisdom you desire. For come now, if you should desire that wisdom, by which men steer ships, and I should happen to ask you—What is the wisdom, Theages, of which being in want you blame your father, because he is unwilling to place you with a man, through whom you might become wise? what answer would you give me? What would you say this wisdom is? Is it not the pilot s art?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And if you desired to be wise in that wisdom, by which persons direct11 chariots, and afterwards blamed your father, on my asking you what this wisdom is, what answer would you give me? Would you not say it is the charioteer’s art?12

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

But is the wisdom, of which you have now a desire, nameless, or has it a name?

THEAGES:

I think it has (a name).

SOCRATES:

Whether then do you know it, but not its name? Or its name likewise?

THEAGES:

Its name likewise.

SOCRATES:

Say then what it is.

THEAGES:

What other name, Socrates, can one say it has, than that of wisdom?

SOCRATES:

Is not then the charioteer’s art wisdom likewise? Or does it appear to you to be ignorance?

THEAGES:

It does not.

SOCRATES:

But wisdom?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

For what do we use it? Is it not for that, by which we know how to manage horses when yoked?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Is not then the pilot’s art wisdom likewise?

THEAGES:

To me at least it appears so.

SOCRATES:

Is it not that, by which we know how to manage?

THEAGES:

It is.

SOCRATES:

But what is the wisdom of which you are desirous? What by it do we know how to govern?

THEAGES:

By it we know, it seems to me, how to govern men.

SOCRATES:

What, sick men?

THEAGES:

No.

SOCRATES:

For that wisdom is the physician’s art. Is it not?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Is it that then, by which we know how to regulate singers in choirs?

THEAGES:

It is not.

SOCRATES:

For this is the musician’s art.

THEAGES:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:

But is it that, by which we know how to regulate those, who are engaged in gymnastic exercises?

THEAGES:

No.

SOCRATES:

For this is the gymnast’s art.

THEAGES:

It is.

SOCRATES:

Is it that of those, who do what? Be ready to state it to myself, as I have the preceding to you.

THEAGES:

It is that, by which persons (do something) in the city.

SOCRATES:

Are there not then in a city persons who are sick?

THEAGES:

Yes. But I am not speaking of these only, but also of the others in the city.

SOCRATES:

Do I then understand the art of which you are speaking? For you appear to me to say it is not that, by which we know how to govern mowers, and grape-gatherers, and planters, and sowers, and threshers; for it is the husbandman’s art, by which we govern these. Is it not?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Nor are you speaking of that, by which (we govern) sawyers, and planers, and turners; for does not this belong to the carpenter’s art?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

But perhaps you are speaking of that wisdom, by which we govern all these, and husbandmen, and carpenters, and all artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women.

THEAGES:

Of this wisdom, Socrates, I have for a long while ago been wishing to speak.

SOCRATES:

Can you say, that Aegisthus, who slew Agamemnon at Argos, had dominion over what you have mentioned, artificers skilled and unskilled, and men and women, all taken together, or over some other things?

THEAGES:

No; but over these.

SOCRATES:

What then, did not Peleus, the son of Aeacus, have dominion over those very kind of persons in Phthia?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And you have heard that Periander, the son of Cypselus, was a ruler in Corinth.

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

And did he not rule over the very kind of persons in his city?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

What then, do you not think that Archelaus,13 the son of Perdiccas, who was lately14 the ruler in Macedonia, had dominion over the same kind of persons?

THEAGES:

I do.

SOCRATES:

And over whom do you think that Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, ruled in this city? was it not over these kind of persons?

THEAGES:

How not?

SOCRATES:

Can you tell me then, what appellation Bacis15, and the Sibyl16, and our countryman Amphilytus17, bore?

THEAGES:

What else, Socrates, than oracle-chaunters?

SOCRATES:

You speak correctly. But endeavour to give me an answer as to what appellation Hippias and Periander bore through the same kind of dominion?

THEAGES:

Tyrants, I think; for what else (could it be)?

SOCRATES:

Whoever then desires to have dominion over all the men together in the city, desires this very same dominion, the tyrannic, and to be a tyrant.

THEAGES:

So it appears.

SOCRATES:

Do you then say that you desire this dominion?

THEAGES:

It seems so from what I have said.

SOCRATES:

O you wicked (youth)! Do you desire to tyrannize over us? And have you for a long time blamed your father, because he did not send you to the school of some tyrant-teacher?18 And are not you, Demodocus, ashamed of yourself? who, having known a long time ago what this youth desired, and having likewise the power of sending him, where you might have made him that skilful artist in wisdom, of which he is desirous, have, notwithstanding, begrudged him this, and are unwilling to send him? But now, you see—since he has spoken against you before me—let us consult in common, you and I, to whose school we may send him; and through associating with whom he may become a wise tyrant.

DEMODOCUS:

Let us, by Zeus, then, Socrates, consult; for it appears to me that there is need of no despicable counsel in this affair.

SOCRATES:

Permit us first, thou good man, to interrogate him sufficiently.

DEMODOCUS:

Interrogate him.

SOCRATES:

What then, Theages, if we should make use of Euripides?19 For he some where says,

Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise.

If then some one should ask Euripides—In what say you, Euripides, do tyrants become wise by the conversation of the wise? just as if he had said,

Farmers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would he (reply that they are wise) in any thing else than in things pertaining to agriculture?

THEAGES:

In nothing else but those.

SOCRATES:

But what, if he had said,

Cooks become wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? What would he have answered? Would it not have been—In things pertaining to cooking?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

Again, if he had said,

Wrestlers are wise, by converse with the wise—

and we had asked him—In what are they wise? Would he not have said—In things pertaining to wrestling?

THEAGES:

Yes.

SOCRATES:

But since he says,

Tyrants are wise, by converse with the wise—

upon our asking him—In what say you, Euripides, are they wise? What would be his answer?

THEAGES:

By Zeus, I do not know.

SOCRATES:

Are you willing then for me to tell you?

THEAGES:

If you are willing.

SOCRATES:

It is that, which Anacreon says Callicrete20 knew. Or do you not know the song?

THEAGES:

I do.

SOCRATES:

What then, do you also desire the conversation of a man, who happens to be a fellow-artist with Callicrete the daughter of Cyane, and who knows the art of a tyrant, as the poet says she did, in order that you may become a tyrant over us and the city?

THEAGES:

You have for some time, Socrates, been laughing at and playing with me.

SOCRATES:

What then, do you say that you do not desire this wisdom, by which you may rule over all the citizens? And doing this, would you be any thing else but a tyrant?

THEAGES:

I would pray, indeed, I fancy, to be a tyrant over all men, or, if not of all, of the greatest part; and I think that you, and all other men, would do the same, and perhaps still more, to be a god.21 But I did not say that I desired this.

SOCRATES:

But what then, after all, is this which you desire? Do you not say that you desire to rule over the citizens?

THEAGES:

Not by violence, nor as tyrants do; but I desire to rule over the willing, in the same manner as other men of note in the city.

SOCRATES:

Do you mean, as Themistocles, and Pericles, and Cimon, and such as were skilled in state affairs?

THEAGES:

By Zeus, I mean those.

SOCRATES:

What then, if you happened to be desirous of becoming wise in horsemanship, by going to whom do you think you would become a skilful horseman? would it be (by going) to others than those skilled in horses?

THEAGES:

By Zeus, not I.

SOCRATES:

But (you would go) to those very men, who are skilled in these matters, and who possess horses, and who continually use both their own and many that are the property of others.

THEAGES:

It is evident I should.

SOCRATES:

What then, if you wished to become wise in the throw ing of darts, think you not that you would become skilled by going to those engaged in the art of dart-throwing, and who possess darts, and continually use many darts, both their own and those belonging to others?

THEAGES:

It appears so to me.

SOCRATES:

Tell me then, since you wish to become wise in state affairs, think you that you will become wise by going to any others than those statesmen, who are skilled in state affairs themselves, and who continually make use of their own state and many others, and have an intercourse both with the Greek and Barbarian states? Or do you think, that by associating with certain other persons, but not with these, you will become wise in those things, in which they are wise?

THEAGES:

I have heard the discourses, Socrates, which persons say you have spoken22, how that the sons of those very statesmen were in no respect better than the sons of shoemakers: and you appear to me to have spoken most truly, from what I am able to perceive. I should be senseless then, if I thought that any one of these could impart to me his wisdom, when he could not in any respect benefit his own son; if indeed he were able on these points to benefit any person whatever.

SOCRATES:

What then, O best of men, would you do, if you had a son, who should give you trouble of this kind, and say that he desired to become a good painter, and blame you, his father, because you were not willing to expend money for the sake of these things, while he was despising painters, the artists in this very matter, and unwilling to learn from them; or if, being desirous to become a piper or harper, he should act in this manner towards pipers or harpers? In what way would you treat him, and whither would you send him, when thus unwilling to learn from those persons?

THEAGES:

By Zeus, I (do not know). 23

SOCRATES:

Now then, as you are doing these very things to your father, do you wonder at and blame him, if he is in doubt how he shall treat you, and whither send you? For we will place you with whomever of the Athenians you wish, the most skilled24 in state affairs, and who will be with you gratuitously25; and at the same time you will not lose your money, and likewise be in greater repute with the many than by associating with any one else.

THEAGES:

What then, Socrates, are not you one of the excellent men? For if you are willing to associate with me, it is sufficient, and I seek no other26.

SOCRATES:

Why say you this, Theages?

DEMODOCUS:

He does not, Socrates, speak badly; and at the same time by doing this you will gratify me. Since there is nothing I should consider a greater piece of good luck than for my son to be pleased with your society, and for you to be willing to associate with him. And indeed I am ashamed to say how very much I wish it. I entreat both of you, therefore, you, Socrates, to be willing to associate with him, and you, my son, not to seek to associate with any other than Socrates; and you will thus release me from many and dreadful cares. For I now very much fear for him, lest he should meet with some other person able to corrupt him.

THEAGES:

Do not, father, feel any longer any fear for me, if you can but persuade Socrates to permit me to associate with him.

DEMODOCUS:

You speak very well. And after this, the conversation, Socrates, will be directed to you. For I am ready, so to say in few words, to give up to you both me and mine, and the nearest related, whatever, in short, you may require, if you will take this youth to your bosom, and benefit him as far as you can.

SOCRATES:

O Demodocus, I do not wonder that you are so importunate, if you think that your son can be especially benefited by me. For I do not know any thing about which he, who is endued with intellect, ought to be more anxious, than how his son may become the best of men. But from whence it has appeared to you that I am more able to benefit your son towards his becoming a good citizen, than you are yourself, and from whence he has thought that I can benefit him more than you, I very much wonder. For, in the first place, you are older than I am; and in the next place, you have held many offices, and those the greatest among the Athenians; and you are honoured by the people of the Anagyrusian ward27, by much the most, and no less so by the rest of the city. But neither of you can see any one of these things in me; and next, if Theages here despises the society of statesmen, and seeks after certain others who profess themselves able to instruct young men, there is Prodicus of Ceos, and Gorgias the Leontine, and Polus the Agrigentine, and many others, who are so wise, that they go to cities and persuade the noblest and wealthiest of the young men, who are permitted to associate gratuitously with any one of the citizens they please,—they persuade, I say, these to give up those of their own city, and to associate with them, and to put down moreover a consider able sum28 of money, and, as a remuneration, to give them thanks besides29. Of these, then, it is reasonable for your son and yourself to select some one; but (to select) me it is not reasonable; for I know none of that blessed and beautiful learning, although I wish I did; but I am always somehow asserting that I happen to know, I may say, nothing but a mere trifle relating to matters of love30. But in that kind of learning I lay claim31 to being more skilled than any one man of the past or present time.

THEAGES:

See you, father, how Socrates does not appear to me to be very willing to pass the time with me. For, as to myself, I am ready, if he is willing. But he says this, playing with us. For I know some of the same age with myself, and (others) a little older, who, before they associated with him, were worth nothing; but when they had been with him, in a very little time they appeared to be better than all, to whom they were previously inferior.

SOCRATES:

Do you know then, son of Demodocus, how this is?

THEAGES:

Yes, by Zeus, I do; and that, if you are willing, I too shall be able to become such as they are.

SOCRATES:

Not so, thou excellent youth; but you are not conscious how this occurs; and I will tell you.32 There is, by a divine allotment, a certain daemon that has followed me, beginning from childhood. This is a voice, which, when it exists, always signifies to me the abandonment of what I am about to do; but it never at any time incites me. And, if any one of my friends communicates any thing to me, and there is the voice, it dissuades me from that very thing, and it does not suffer me to do it. Of this I will produce you witnesses. You know the beautiful Charmides, the son of Glauco. He once happened to communicate to me that he was about to contend for the stadium33 at Nemea; and immediately, on his beginning to say, that he meant to contend, there was the voice. And I forbade him, and said, While you were speaking to me, there was the voice of the damion; do not, therefore, contend. Perhaps, said he, the voice signified to you, that I should not conquer; but, though I should not be victorious, yet, by exercising myself at this time, I shall be benefited. Having thus spoken, he engaged in the contest. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire of him, what happened to him after this very act of contending. And if you are willing to inquire of Clitomachus, the brother of Timarchus34, what Timarchus said to him, when, being about to die, he went right against the daemon35, both he and Euathlus, the runner in the stadium, who received Timarchus when he was an exile, will tell you what he then said.

THEAGES:

What did he say?

SOCRATES:

O Clitomachus, said he, I indeed am now going to die, because I was unwilling to be persuaded by Socrates. But why Timarchus said this, I will tell you. When Timarchus rose from the banquet, together with Philemon the son of Philemonides, with the view of murdering Nicias the son of Heroscomander, they two alone were cognizant of the plot; and Timarchus, as he rose, said to me, What do you say36, Socrates? Do you continue drinking; but I must rise up (and go) some where. I will, however, return shortly, if I am successful. And there was the voice. And I said to him. By no means, said I, rise up; for there has been to me the usual daemon signal. Upon this he stayed. And after a slight interval, he was again going away, and said—Socrates, I am going. And there was again the voice. Again, therefore, I compelled him to stay. The third time, wishing to escape me unnoticed, he rose up without saying any thing to me, and escaped unnoticed, having watched me, while I had my attention otherwise engaged; and thus departing he perpetrated the acts, through which he went away about to die. Hence he told his brother, what I have now told you, that he was going to die, through his not believing in me. Further still, you will hear from many respecting the events in Sicily, what I said concerning the destruction of the army37. And the things that are past, you may hear from those that know them; but you may now make trial of the daemon signal, if it says any thing to the purpose. For on the departure of Sannio the beautiful38 for the army, there came to me the signal; and he is now gone with Thrasyllus39, to carry on the campaign right through Ephesus and Ionia. And I think that he will either die, or that he will meet with an end40 something near to it. And I very much fear for the rest of the enterprise. All these things have I said to you, because this power of this daemon is able to effect every thing with respect to the intercourse of those, who pass their time with me. For it is opposed to many; and it is not possible for those to be benefited by passing their time with me, so that it is not possible for me to live with them. With many, however, it does not prevent me from conversing; and yet they are not at all benefited by being with me. But they, whom the power of the daemon assists to the intercourse, are those whom you have noticed; for in a short time they make a proficiency. And of those, who make a proficiency, some have the benefit firm and lasting; but many, as long as they are with me, advance in a wonderful manner; but when they separate themselves from me, they again differ in no respect from any person whatever. This did Aristides, the son of Lysimachus and grandson of Aristides, suffer; for, while passing his time with me, he made a very great proficiency in a short period; but afterwards an expedition took place, and he went away, sailing with it. On his return he found Thucydides41, the son of Melesias and grandson of Thucydides, passing his time with me. Now this Thucydides, the day before, had felt some ill against me during a conversation. Aristides, therefore, after he had seen and saluted me, and other matters had been talked of, observed—I hear, Socrates, that Thucydides thinks highly of himself, on some points, and is angry with you, as if he were really something. It is so, said I. What then, said he, does he not know what a slave42 he was before he associated with you? By the gods, said I, it does not seem that he does. But I too, said he, am in a ridiculous situation, Socrates. What is it? said I. It is, said he, that, before I sailed away, I was able to converse with any man whatever, and not to appear inferior to any one in argument, so that I sought the society of men the most elegant; but now, on the contrary, I shun any one, whom I perceive to be instructed, so ashamed am I of my own littleness. But, said I, whether did this power leave you suddenly or by degrees? By degrees, he replied. When was it present with you, said I? Was it present while you were learning something from me, or was it in some other way? I will tell you, said he, Socrates, a thing incredible indeed, by the gods, but true. I never, at any time, learnt any thing from you, as you know. I made, however, a proficiency when I associated with you, even if I was only in the same house, though not in the same room; but more so when I was in the same room with you; and I seemed to myself (to improve) much more when, being in the, same room, I looked at you, when you were speaking, than when I looked another way. But I made by far the greatest proficiency, when I sat near you and touched you43. Now, however, said he, all that habit has entirely oozed away. Of such kind then is, Theages, the intercourse with myself; for, if it is pleasing to the god, you will make a very great and rapid proficiency; but if not, not. See, then, whether it is not safer for you to be instructed by some one of those, who have a power over the benefit, with which they benefit men, than by me, who (have the power) to do only whatever may happen.

THEAGES:

It appears to me, Socrates, that we should act in this manner, namely, to make a trial of this daemon by associating together. And, if he is favourable to us, this will be the best; but if not, then let us immediately consult what we shall do, whether we shall associate with some other person, or endeavour to appease the divine power, that is present with you, by prayers and sacrifices, or any other method that the diviners may explain44.

DEMODOCUS:

Do not, Socrates, oppose the lad any longer on these points; for Theages speaks well.

SOCRATES:

If it appears proper so to act, let us act so.

Footnotes

1 The word idiologeisthai, says Stalbaum, is not found elsewhere in pure Greek; and he refers to Suicer in Thesaur. Eccles. i. p. 1434.

2 This portico was in the Ceramicus, as shown by Meursius de Ceramic § 4, quoted by Stalb.

3 I have translated as if the Greek were not kai elatton, but elatton e meden, as in Theaetet. § 92, hetton—e meden. Aesch. Prom. 974, Emoi d' elasson Zenos e meden melei.

4 Taylor has adopted “with others,” from “cum aliis,” found in Ficinus. But suggenomenos toi, “associating with some one,” found in all the MSS., is more correct.

5 The Scholiast, who vainly attempts to give a satisfactory account of this proverb, says it was found in the Amphiaraus of Aristophanes; while Zenobius, Proverb. Cent. iv. 40, attributes it to Epicharmus. It is found likewise in Plato Epist. 5. It was probably a saying, addressed to those who came to consult an oracle.

6 On this sense of pollakis, see at Alcib. i. p. 127, E. § 49.

7 Such is Stalbaum's version of porro tes sunousias, who quotes opportunely Sympos. p. 217, D., dielegomen porro ton nukton.

8 So Taylor, as if he wished to read, what the sense requires, kaloi in lieu of kalon—

9 To preserve the difference between didaskesthai and paideuein, I have inserted “himself.” Ficinus has simply “edocuit,” omitting kai epaideusen, which he probably considered superfluous.

10 By kaloi kai agathoi are meant what we should call persons both handsome and of polished manners.

11 Schleiermacher objects to the expression kubernan ta armata. But though the phrase is not elsewhere found in Plato, the metaphor might fairly be adopted here, just as Aeschylus has en prumei poleos Oiaka nomon in S. Th. 2.

12 With the whole of this passage compare Alcibiad. i. p. 125, § 44.

13 Of this Archelaus mention is made in Gorg. p. 471, D.

14 This “lately” refers to about five years previously.

15 Bacis was a prophet, who, long before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, predicted what would happen. Some of his prophecies are given by Herodotus in viii. 20. He is likewise frequently mentioned by Aristophanes, and in company with Sibulla in Eir. 1119, and 1116. DACIER.

16 From the fact of finding the same three oracle-chaunters similarly united by Themistius Or. iii. p. 46, A., where the Sibyl is called “the Erythrean,” it has been inferred that the writer had read this dialogue amongst those ascribed to Plato.

17 Respecting Amphilytus see Wesseling and Valckenaer on Herod, i. 62.

18 In defence of didaskalon, which Schleiermacher, with whom Beck agreed, wished to expunge, Stalbaum refers to Lobeck's “Disputat. iii. de Nominibus Adjectivis et Substantivis Ambiguis,” p. 12.

19 This verse is elsewhere attributed to Sophocles in Ajac. Locr. Fr., but given to Euripides by Plato in Rep. viii. p. 568, A.

20 This was a virgin who employed herself in teaching politics, as Aspasia, Diotima, and some others, did after her. The verses of Anacreon alluded to are lost. DACIER. Ficinus has, “Callicratem.” But that was the name of a man. Bergk in Anacreont. Relliq. p. 264, would read Kallikriten and Kallikrite, found in one MS. I should prefer Xalikreten. For the word xalikrete would mean “wine-mixed,” an epithet better suited to the lady by whom Anacreon, the wine-drinker, was instructed. The epithet is applied to spondai, “libations,” in Aesch. Fragm. 158. On the other hand, Egeria, the Nymph by whom Numa was instructed, was a water-drinker, as may be inferred from Juvenal, who speaks of a fountain dedicated to her.

21 Theages here alludes to what Socrates was wont to say, that men should endeavour to become similar to the deity.

22 Stalbaum here refers to Protag. p. 319, Gorg. p. 518, C., Meno, p. 93, D., and Alcibiad. I. p. 118, C.

23 So Taylor, for the sake of the sense, in lieu of “By Zeus, not I.”

24 Instead of kalon kai agathon, which are never, I suspect, thus united to an accusative, as deinos and sophos are, Ficinus has simply “praestantissimorum,” adopted by Taylor; and though the expression in the text is repeated just below, yet there Ficinus has correctly merely “ex bonis.” For Socrates could not be numbered amongst the kaloi, although he might be amongst the agathoi.

25 Stalbaum refers to Apolog. p. 19, E., § 4.

26 A similar compliment is paid to Socrates in Lach. p. 200, C. § 33.

27 According to the Scholiast, this was a ward of the tribe of Aentis; but according to Harpocration and Stephen. Byz., of Erectheus. Stalbaum refers to Boeckh Inscript. Graec. No. 210, and Grotefend De Demis Attic, p. 18.

28Instead of polun, Beck suggested polu, obtained from “multum,” in Ficinus.

29 The whole of this, says Stalbaum, has been taken almost verbatim from Apolog. p. 19, E. § 4.

30 Stalbaum refers to Sympos. p. 177, D. § 5, and Lys. p. 204, B. § 2.

31 Here poioumai is improperly used for prospoioumai, as remarked by Stalbaum.

32 Here is another passage transcribed, says Stalbaum correctly, from Apolog. p. 31, D. § 19.

33 The stadium was the course appointed for those who contended in the foot-race, as shown by an Aesopo-Socratic fable, quoted by Galen in Protrept. § 13.

34 I suppose this is Timarchus of Chaeronea, who desired to be interred near one of the sons of Socrates, who had died a little before. I could never find any vestige of this history elsewhere. DACIER. Nor has any one since his day been more fortunate.

35 The Greek is euthu tou daimoniou: which Ficinus has omitted, either from his not understanding those words, or not finding them in his MS. Serranus—“adversus daemonii mandatum”—of which Ruhnken approves on Timaeus, p. 127. But euthu is never said of a single person; only of a place, or many persons. Stalbaum, in ed. 1, correctly observes, that there is some error here.

36 As no mention is made of a previous conversation, it is not easy to understand Ti legeis.

37 By comparing this account with that in Thucyd. viii. 1, it would seem that Socrates proved his daemon to be a truer prophet than were the oracle-chaunters, who predicted that the Athenians would gain possession of the whole of Sicily.

38 I have adopted Stalbaum's notion, that tou kalou means the “beautiful,” not, as others, from the time of Ficinus, have rendered—“the son of Kalus.” For that adjective is never found as a proper name. Besides, we can now better understand why Socrates, who admired handsome young persons, took an interest in his fate.

39 The expedition against Ephesus under Thrasyllus, described by Xenophon in Hellen. i. 2. 1 took place in Ol. 92. 4, = 409, A. C., when, as we learn from Plutarch in Alcibiad. t. i. p. 39, § 29, the Athenians were defeated under the walls of the town and a trophy of brass was erected by the conquerors. S.

40 In lieu of elain, which is never found in prose Greek, the two oldest MSS. offer gelan, from which it is easy to elicit telein, the Attic future for telesein.

41 Both Aristides and Thucydides are alluded to in Lach. p. 179, A. § 2, as being the unworthy scions of a virtuous stock.

42 By comparing Xenophon in M. S. iv. 2. 39, quoted by Stalbaum, it would seem that Euthydemus and Aristides had been shown by Socrates to be no better than slaves, as Alcibiades is in Alcib. i. p. 135, D. 6 § 61; but that, instead of lamenting the fact, they took umbrage at the truth of the language applied to them by their teacher.

43 Stalbaum aptly refers to Sympos. p. 175, F. § 4.

44 On the technical word exegeisthai, “to explain a religious rite,” see Ruhnken on Timaeus, p. 111.