United States Statutes at Large/Volume 5/27th Congress/2nd Session/Chapter 188

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United States Statutes at Large, Volume 5
United States Congress

Public Acts of the Twenty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, Chapter 188

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4010101United States Statutes at Large, Volume 5 — Public Acts of the Twenty-Seventh Congress, Second Session, Chapter 188United States Congress

Aug. 23, 1842.

Chap. CLXXXVIII.—An Act further supplementary to an act entitled, “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,” passed the twenty-fourth of September, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine.

Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20.
Commissioners appointed by the circ’t courts to take bail, &c. may exercise the powers of a justice of the peace in certain cases.
1789, ch. 20.Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the commissioners who now are, or hereafter may be, appointed by the circuit courts of the United States United States to take acknowledgments of bail and affidavits, and also to take depositions of witnesses in civil causes, shall and may exercise all the powers that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any of the United States may now exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offence against the United States, by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing the same, under and by virtue of the thirty-third section of the act of the twenty-fourth of September, Anno Domini seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, entitled “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States;” and who shall and may exercise all the powers that any judge or justice of the peace may exercise under and in virtue of the sixth section of the act passed the twentieth of July, Anno Domini seventeen hundred and ninety, entitledAct of July 20, 1790, ch. 29. “An act for the government and regulation of seamen in the merchant service.”

Justice, &c. may require defendants’ witnesses to give recognizance for their appearance to testify.Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That in all hearings before any justice or judge of the United States, or any commissioner appointed as aforesaid, under and in virtue of the said thirty-third section of the act entitled “An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,” it shall be lawful for such justice, judge, or commissioner, where the crime or offence is charged to have been committed on the high seas or elsewhere within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, in his discretion to require a recognizance of any witness produced in behalf of the accused, with such surety or sureties as he may judge necessary, as well as in behalf of the United States, for their appearing and giving testimony, at the trial of the cause, whose testimony, in his opinion, is important for the purpose of justice at the trial of the cause, and is in danger of being otherwise lost; and such witnesses shall be entitled to receive from the United States the usual compensation allowed to Government witnesses for their detention and attendance, if they shall appear and be ready to give testimony at the trial.

District courts to have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of all offences not capital.
Adjournments.Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of all crimes and offences against the United States, the punishment of which is not capital. And in such of the districts where the business of the court may require it to be done for the purposes of justice, and to prevent undue expenses and delays in the trial of criminal causes, the said district courts shall hold monthly adjournments of the regular terms thereof for the trial and hearing of such causes.

Punishment prescribed by 16th section of act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, changed.Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That, in lieu of the punishment now prescribed by the sixteenth section of the act of Congress, entitled “An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,” passed on the thirtieth day of April, Anno Domini one thousand seven hundred and ninety, for the offences in the said section mentioned, the punishment of the offender, upon conviction thereof, shall be by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence.

District and circuit courts to be always open for the purpose of filing libels, bills, &c.Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That the district courts as courts of admiralty, and the circuit courts as courts of equity, shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing libels, bills, petitions, answers, pleas, and other pleadings, for issuing and returning mesne and final process and commissions, and for making and directing all interlocutory motions, orders, rules, and other proceedings whatever, preparatory to the hearing of all causes pending therein upon their merits. And it shall be competent for any judge of the court, uponAny judge may direct and award such processes. reasonable notice to the parties, in the clerk’s office or at chambers, and in vacation as well as in term, to make and direct, and award all such process, commissions and interlocutory orders, rules, and other proceedings, whenever the same are not grantable of course according to the rules and practice of the court.

Supreme court to have power to prescribe the forms of bills, writs, &c.Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have full power and authority, from time to time, to prescribe, and regulate, and alter, the forms of writs and other process to be used and issued in the district and circuit courts of the United States, and the forms and modes of framing and filing libels, bills, answers, and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common law or in admiralty and in equity pending in the said courts, and also the forms and modes of taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and generally the forms and modes of proceeding to obtain relief, and the forms and modes of drawing up, entering, and enrolling decrees, and the forms and modes of proceeding before trustees appointed by the court, and generally to regulate the whole practice of the said courts, so as to prevent delays, and to promote brevity and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and to abolish all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.

Supreme court to have power to regulate the costs in the district or circuit courts.Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That, for the purpose of further diminishing the costs and expenses in suits and proceedings in the said courts, the Supreme Court shall have full power and authority, from time to time, to make and prescribe regulations to the said district and circuit courts, as to the taxation and payment of costs in all suits and proceedings therein; and to make and prescribe a table of the various items of costs which shall be taxable and allowed in all suits, to the parties, their attorneys, solicitors, and proctors, to the clerk of the court, to the marshal of the district, and his deputies, and other officers serving process, to witnesses, and to all other persons whose services are usually taxable in bills of costs. And the items so stated in the said table, and none others, shall be taxable or allowed in bills of costs; and they shall be fixed as low as they reasonably can be, with a due regard to the nature of the duties and services which shall be performed by the various officers and persons aforesaid, and shall in no case exceed the costs and expenses now authorized, where the same are provided for by existing laws.

Interest shall be allowed and levied by the marshal under execution upon all judgments, &c.Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That on all judgments in civil cases, hereafter recovered in the circuit and district courts of the United States, interest shall be allowed, and may be levied by the marshal, under process of execution issued thereon, in all cases where, by the law of the State in which such circuit or district court shall be held, interest may be levied under process of execution on judgments recovered in the courts of such State, to be calculated from the date of the judgment, and at such rate per annum, as is allowed by law, on judgments recovered in the courts of such State.^[1]

Approved, August 23, 1842.

↑ The decisions of the courts of the United States on the subject of interest have been:

The decree on bottomry is to consider the sum loaned and the premium as a principal, and to allow common interest on that sum for the delay of payment after it is due. The Ship Packet, 3 Mason’s C. C. R. 255.

An administrator is not liable to pay interest upon assets in his hands, unless under special circumstances. Neither is a partner, on partnership accounts before settlement, and a balance struck. Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Mason’s C. C. R. 284.

Interest will not be allowed against a trustee holding a fund where he had no interest, if there be no laches or neglect or use of the money on his part. Cassels v. Vernon, 5 Mason’s C. C. R. 332.

Interest or money in the hands of an administrator, is not chargeable where the same is retained in his hands until a suit shall determine the right of the claimant thereto. Wade v. The Administrators of Wade, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 477.

The court allowed the customary interest paid at Canton, on a note executed there. Cowqua v. Lauderbrun, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 521.

The correct general rule is to calculate interest up to the period when a payment is made, to satisfy which the payment should be first applied; and if it exceed the interest due, the balance is to be applied towards the payment of the principal; but if the payment is not sufficient to discharge the interest, the principal is not to be increased by adding to it the balance of interest due at the time, so as to produce interest on interest. Smith v. The Administrators of Shaw, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 167.

Where the plaintiff has stated an account on a principle unfavorable to himself, as to the charge of interest, he ought to be bound by it. Ibid.

There is no difference as to the application of the general rule relative to calculating interest on debts legally carrying interest, and on those debts where interest is given in the name of damages. Ibid.

The rate of interest fixed by the law of Georgia, the contract having been made there, will be allowed in the courts on such contracts, although it may exceed the interest allowed by law of the State in which the court sits. Jaffray v. Dennis, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 253.

The defendant settled his account at the treasury department in 1808, on which a balance was stated against him. In 1812 he claimed further credits, which were allowed to him, and which reduced the balance claimed in 1808. The courts instructed the jury to allow interest on the actual balance from 1808. United States v. Ormsby, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 195.

Where there have been running accounts between parties, and one party has been in the habit of transmitting his accounts regularly to the other, striking a balance, and charging or giving credit for interest, as the balance might be, and no objections have been made to it, and where this mode of stating accounts is shown to the custom of trade, such manner of charging interest is legal. Barclay v. Kennedy et al. 3 Wash. C. C. R. 350.

A usage to add interest to the annual account at the end of the year, and interest on the balance, does not apply in a case in which the commercial intercourse between the countries in which the parties respectively reside, had ceased when the account was transmitted; nor will it authorize the creditor to make other rests in the account. Denniston et al. v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 396.

Where an alien enemy has an agent in the United States, and this is known to the debtor, interest ought not to abate during a war. Ibid.

A promise was made by the defendant, the drawer of a protested bill of exchange, that if the plaintiff would give time, he would pay the bill when he should be able. In an action on the new promise, the plaintiff is entitled only to the sum stated in the bill, and to interest from the time when defendant was able; and not to any damages. If the jury give more, the court will set aside the verdict, unless the plaintiff enter a remittitur for the overplus. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 148.

If there has not been a previous demand of the penalty of a bond, or an acknowledgment that the whole is due, interest is recoverable only from the commencement of the suit, on a bond with sureties given to the Bank of the United States for the faithful discharge of the duties of cashier of the branch bank at Middletown, Connecticut. United States Bank v. Magill et al., Paine’s C. C. R. 661.

Interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages. Gilpins v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 86.

It is generally in the discretion of the jury to give interest in the name of damages. Willings et al. v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 172.

Damages for breach of contract do not bear interest. Youqua v. Nixon, Peters’ C. C. R. 224.

When an attachment is laid on money in the hands of a third person, interest ceases from the time of the attachment until it is dissolved; but where a debtor who is also a creditor lays an attachment in his own hands, interest is chargeable during the continuance of the attachment. Ibid. 303.

It is the usage at Canton to add interest to the other charges on the amount of the articles sold, and for which compensation is demanded. This will be allowed in the United States, on a Canton contract. Ibid.

Interest on debts due by citizens of the United States to the subjects of the king of Great Britain, ceased during the revolutionary war, and during the war of 1812; but the mere circumstance of war existing between two countries is not a sufficient reason for abating interest on the debts due by the subjects of one belligerent to the subjects of another. Conn et al. v. Penn et al. Peters’ C. C. R. 497.

A prohibition of all intercourse with an enemy during a war, furnishes a just reason for the abatement of interest on debts due to the subjects of the belligerent; until the return of peace. Ibid.

The rule as to the abatement of interest during the war, does not apply where the creditor, although a subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or has a known agent residing there, and who is authorized to receive the debt. Ibid.

An account current, received and not objected to in a reasonable time, becomes a settled account bearing interest from the time it is stated, and the balance is payable on demand. Bainbridge & Co. v. Wilcocks, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 538.

An account made up of principal and interest becomes one principal debt; the aggregate balance, where the account is thus settled, bearing interest. Ibid. 540.

Compound interest is not illegal, and may be recovered on an express promise, or one implied by law, as a part of the contract. Ibid. 541.

If an account contains a charge of interest during a war, it is recoverable if there is a promise to pay the amount after peace, or the account is in fact or law a settled account, from which a promise results by operation of law. Ibid. 542.

Whether the jury, in case in which a man covenants to convey lands without fraud, and it afterwards appeared that, in truth, he had no title to the land, when he covenanted to convey, should allow interest on the value of the lands at the date of the contract, must depend on the circumstances of the case, of which they are the proper judges; and it is competent to the defendant to give in evidence any circumstances tending to show interest should not be allowed. Letcher & Arnold v. Woodson, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 212.

The interest allowed on the personal estate, for the sums advanced by it to discharge the specialty debts, should, in accordance both with the general course of the court, and with justice in particular cases, be limited to twenty years. Byrd v. Executors of Byrd, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 171.

Where a mortgagee is in possession, and the annual rents and profits of the mortgaged estate, exceed the interest of the debt due, it seems that he should pay interest on the surplus rents and profits. Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Sumner’s C. C. R. 143.

In the ordinary cases, where the relation of the mortgagor and mortgagee is uncontroverted, if a mortgagee receive the rents of a mortgaged estate after his debt has been satisfied, and retain them to his own use, without paying them over to the mortgagor, he is chargeable with interest. Ibid.

If, however, there are sufficient equitable circumstances in favor of the mortgagee; as if he retained the rents under a mistake, supposing the rights of the mortgagor extinguished; he would not be liable for the interest until after notice of the adverse claim. Ibid.

Interest on the amount of the debt as ascertained by the decree of the circuit court, was allowed from the time of the judgment; but the damages allowed by the court were not permitted to bear interest. Jennings et al., Plaintiffs in Error v. The Brig Perseverence, 3 Dall. 336; 1 Cond. Rep. 154.

Interest is to be calculated to the present time, upon the aggregate sum of principal and interest in the judgment below; but not to the next term of the circuit court, when the mandate will operate, as the party has a right to pay the money immediately. Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 157.

Interest is, in general, allowed from the time a demand is made for the wages of a mariner; and if no special demand is made, then from the commencement of the suit. Gammell v. Skinner, 2 Gallis. C. C. R.

If captured property is ordered to be sold, then no interest is allowed. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 291; 2 cond. Rep. 98.

Interest commences on a pecuniary legacy at the expiration of one year from the decease of the testator, whatever may be the posture of the estate, unless some other period is specified in the will. The cases of infant children, not otherwise provided for, and of adopted children under age, are exceptions to the general rule. Sullivan v. Winthrop, 1 Sumner’s C. C. R. 1.

Where the executors invested certain sums, less than the whole amount of the legacy, in the name of the legatee; held, that this was, pro tanto, a payment of the legacy; and that the interest accruing on those sums, within the year from the time of such investment, belonged to the legatee. Ibid.

Where the vendor is indebted to the vendee, and the sale is made in order to pay the debt, the vendor must pay interest from the time the debt is liquidated until he makes a good title; and the vendee is accountable for the rents and profits from the time the contract is perfected, until it is specifically performed. Hepburn et al. v. Dunlop & Co., 1 Wheat. 179; 3 Cond. Rep. 529.

A party is as well entitled to interest on an appeal bond, as if he were to proceed on the judgment, if the judgment be on a contract for the payment of money. He is entitled to interest from the rendition of the original judgment. Sneed et al. v. Wister et al. 8 Wheat. 690; 3 Cond. Rep. 529.

The taking of interest in advance upon the discount of a note in the usual course of business by a banker, is not usury. This has long been settled, and is not now open for controversy. Thornton v. The Bank of Washington, 3 Peters, 40.

The taking of interest for sixty-four days on a note is not usury, if the note given for sixty days, according to the custom and usage in the banks at Washington, was not due and payable until the sixty-fourth day. In the case of Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581, it was expressly held, that under that custom the note was not due and payable before the sixty-fourth day; for until that time the maker could not be in default. Ibid. 40.

Where it was the practice of the party, who had a sixty day note discounted at the bank of Washington, to renew the note by the discount of another note on the sixty-third day, the maker not being in fact bound to pay the note according to the custom prevailing in the District of Columbia; such a transaction on the part of the banker is not usurious, although on each note the discount for sixty-four days was deducted. Each note is considered as a distinct and substantive transaction. If no more than legal interest is taken upon the time the new note has to run, the actual application of the proceeds of the new note to the payment of the former note before it comes due, does not of itself make the transaction usurious. Something more must occur. There must be a contract between the bank and the party at the time of such discount, that the party shall not have the use and benefit of the proceeds until the former note becomes due, or that the bank shall have the use and benefit of them in the mean time. Ibid.

The contract to accept the bills of exchange on which the action was brought, was made in Charleston, South Carolina. The bills were drawn in Georgia on B. and H. in Charleston, with a view to their payment in Charleston, where the contract was to be executed. The interest on the bill which was so drawn and was unpaid, is to be charged at the rate of interest in South Carolina. Boyce & Henry v. Edwards, 4 Peters, 111.

Interest is not chargeable on money collected by the marshal of the District of Columbia for fines due to the levy court, the money having been actually expended by the marshal in repairs and improvements on the jail, under the opinions of the comptroller and auditor of the treasury department, that these expenditures were properly chargeable upon this fund, although those opinions may not be well founded. Levy Court of Washington v. Ringgold, 5 Peters, 451.

In an action brought on a note given for payment for teas, the defence was, that teas of an inferior quality were delivered; the jury must not credit the defendant with the amount of damages, as of the day the teas were delivered, but as of the day when the verdict was rendered. The interest on the note is to be reckoned to the day of the verdict, and from that amount is to be deducted the amount of the damages ascertained by the jury. Youqua v. Nixon et al. Peters’ C. C. R. 229.

Assumpsit was brought for the proceeds of a cargo which was taken under legal process by the defendants, the consignees, in a foreign port, for the debts of the prior owners of the ship. Held, that the plaintiffs, the consignors, by bringing assumpsit, had waived the tort that the customary commissions should be allowed the defendants; but that the defendants were chargeable with interest from the receipt by them of the proceeds of the cargo. Ricketson v. Wright, 3 Sumner’s C. C. R. 335.

[p554-1] The decisions of the courts of the United States on the subject of interest have been:

The decree on bottomry is to consider the sum loaned and the premium as a principal, and to allow common interest on that sum for the delay of payment after it is due. The Ship Packet, 3 Mason’s C. C. R. 255.

An administrator is not liable to pay interest upon assets in his hands, unless under special circumstances. Neither is a partner, on partnership accounts before settlement, and a balance struck. Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Mason’s C. C. R. 284.

Interest will not be allowed against a trustee holding a fund where he had no interest, if there be no laches or neglect or use of the money on his part. Cassels v. Vernon, 5 Mason’s C. C. R. 332.

Interest or money in the hands of an administrator, is not chargeable where the same is retained in his hands until a suit shall determine the right of the claimant thereto. Wade v. The Administrators of Wade, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 477.

The court allowed the customary interest paid at Canton, on a note executed there. Cowqua v. Lauderbrun, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 521.

The correct general rule is to calculate interest up to the period when a payment is made, to satisfy which the payment should be first applied; and if it exceed the interest due, the balance is to be applied towards the payment of the principal; but if the payment is not sufficient to discharge the interest, the principal is not to be increased by adding to it the balance of interest due at the time, so as to produce interest on interest. Smith v. The Administrators of Shaw, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 167.

Where the plaintiff has stated an account on a principle unfavorable to himself, as to the charge of interest, he ought to be bound by it. Ibid.

There is no difference as to the application of the general rule relative to calculating interest on debts legally carrying interest, and on those debts where interest is given in the name of damages. Ibid.

The rate of interest fixed by the law of Georgia, the contract having been made there, will be allowed in the courts on such contracts, although it may exceed the interest allowed by law of the State in which the court sits. Jaffray v. Dennis, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 253.

The defendant settled his account at the treasury department in 1808, on which a balance was stated against him. In 1812 he claimed further credits, which were allowed to him, and which reduced the balance claimed in 1808. The courts instructed the jury to allow interest on the actual balance from 1808. United States v. Ormsby, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 195.

Where there have been running accounts between parties, and one party has been in the habit of transmitting his accounts regularly to the other, striking a balance, and charging or giving credit for interest, as the balance might be, and no objections have been made to it, and where this mode of stating accounts is shown to the custom of trade, such manner of charging interest is legal. Barclay v. Kennedy et al. 3 Wash. C. C. R. 350.

A usage to add interest to the annual account at the end of the year, and interest on the balance, does not apply in a case in which the commercial intercourse between the countries in which the parties respectively reside, had ceased when the account was transmitted; nor will it authorize the creditor to make other rests in the account. Denniston et al. v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 396.

Where an alien enemy has an agent in the United States, and this is known to the debtor, interest ought not to abate during a war. Ibid.

A promise was made by the defendant, the drawer of a protested bill of exchange, that if the plaintiff would give time, he would pay the bill when he should be able. In an action on the new promise, the plaintiff is entitled only to the sum stated in the bill, and to interest from the time when defendant was able; and not to any damages. If the jury give more, the court will set aside the verdict, unless the plaintiff enter a remittitur for the overplus. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 148.

If there has not been a previous demand of the penalty of a bond, or an acknowledgment that the whole is due, interest is recoverable only from the commencement of the suit, on a bond with sureties given to the Bank of the United States for the faithful discharge of the duties of cashier of the branch bank at Middletown, Connecticut. United States Bank v. Magill et al., Paine’s C. C. R. 661.

Interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages. Gilpins v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 86.

It is generally in the discretion of the jury to give interest in the name of damages. Willings et al. v. Consequa, Peters’ C. C. R. 172.

Damages for breach of contract do not bear interest. Youqua v. Nixon, Peters’ C. C. R. 224.

When an attachment is laid on money in the hands of a third person, interest ceases from the time of the attachment until it is dissolved; but where a debtor who is also a creditor lays an attachment in his own hands, interest is chargeable during the continuance of the attachment. Ibid. 303.

It is the usage at Canton to add interest to the other charges on the amount of the articles sold, and for which compensation is demanded. This will be allowed in the United States, on a Canton contract. Ibid.

Interest on debts due by citizens of the United States to the subjects of the king of Great Britain, ceased during the revolutionary war, and during the war of 1812; but the mere circumstance of war existing between two countries is not a sufficient reason for abating interest on the debts due by the subjects of one belligerent to the subjects of another. Conn et al. v. Penn et al. Peters’ C. C. R. 497.

A prohibition of all intercourse with an enemy during a war, furnishes a just reason for the abatement of interest on debts due to the subjects of the belligerent; until the return of peace. Ibid.

The rule as to the abatement of interest during the war, does not apply where the creditor, although a subject of the enemy, remains in the country of the debtor, or has a known agent residing there, and who is authorized to receive the debt. Ibid.

An account current, received and not objected to in a reasonable time, becomes a settled account bearing interest from the time it is stated, and the balance is payable on demand. Bainbridge & Co. v. Wilcocks, Baldwin’s C. C. R. 538.

An account made up of principal and interest becomes one principal debt; the aggregate balance, where the account is thus settled, bearing interest. Ibid. 540.

Compound interest is not illegal, and may be recovered on an express promise, or one implied by law, as a part of the contract. Ibid. 541.

If an account contains a charge of interest during a war, it is recoverable if there is a promise to pay the amount after peace, or the account is in fact or law a settled account, from which a promise results by operation of law. Ibid. 542.

Whether the jury, in case in which a man covenants to convey lands without fraud, and it afterwards appeared that, in truth, he had no title to the land, when he covenanted to convey, should allow interest on the value of the lands at the date of the contract, must depend on the circumstances of the case, of which they are the proper judges; and it is competent to the defendant to give in evidence any circumstances tending to show interest should not be allowed. Letcher & Arnold v. Woodson, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 212.

The interest allowed on the personal estate, for the sums advanced by it to discharge the specialty debts, should, in accordance both with the general course of the court, and with justice in particular cases, be limited to twenty years. Byrd v. Executors of Byrd, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 171.

Where a mortgagee is in possession, and the annual rents and profits of the mortgaged estate, exceed the interest of the debt due, it seems that he should pay interest on the surplus rents and profits. Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Sumner’s C. C. R. 143.

In the ordinary cases, where the relation of the mortgagor and mortgagee is uncontroverted, if a mortgagee receive the rents of a mortgaged estate after his debt has been satisfied, and retain them to his own use, without paying them over to the mortgagor, he is chargeable with interest. Ibid.

If, however, there are sufficient equitable circumstances in favor of the mortgagee; as if he retained the rents under a mistake, supposing the rights of the mortgagor extinguished; he would not be liable for the interest until after notice of the adverse claim. Ibid.

Interest on the amount of the debt as ascertained by the decree of the circuit court, was allowed from the time of the judgment; but the damages allowed by the court were not permitted to bear interest. Jennings et al., Plaintiffs in Error v. The Brig Perseverence, 3 Dall. 336; 1 Cond. Rep. 154.

Interest is to be calculated to the present time, upon the aggregate sum of principal and interest in the judgment below; but not to the next term of the circuit court, when the mandate will operate, as the party has a right to pay the money immediately. Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 157.

Interest is, in general, allowed from the time a demand is made for the wages of a mariner; and if no special demand is made, then from the commencement of the suit. Gammell v. Skinner, 2 Gallis. C. C. R.

If captured property is ordered to be sold, then no interest is allowed. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 291; 2 cond. Rep. 98.

Interest commences on a pecuniary legacy at the expiration of one year from the decease of the testator, whatever may be the posture of the estate, unless some other period is specified in the will. The cases of infant children, not otherwise provided for, and of adopted children under age, are exceptions to the general rule. Sullivan v. Winthrop, 1 Sumner’s C. C. R. 1.

Where the executors invested certain sums, less than the whole amount of the legacy, in the name of the legatee; held, that this was, pro tanto, a payment of the legacy; and that the interest accruing on those sums, within the year from the time of such investment, belonged to the legatee. Ibid.

Where the vendor is indebted to the vendee, and the sale is made in order to pay the debt, the vendor must pay interest from the time the debt is liquidated until he makes a good title; and the vendee is accountable for the rents and profits from the time the contract is perfected, until it is specifically performed. Hepburn et al. v. Dunlop & Co., 1 Wheat. 179; 3 Cond. Rep. 529.

A party is as well entitled to interest on an appeal bond, as if he were to proceed on the judgment, if the judgment be on a contract for the payment of money. He is entitled to interest from the rendition of the original judgment. Sneed et al. v. Wister et al. 8 Wheat. 690; 3 Cond. Rep. 529.

The taking of interest in advance upon the discount of a note in the usual course of business by a banker, is not usury. This has long been settled, and is not now open for controversy. Thornton v. The Bank of Washington, 3 Peters, 40.

The taking of interest for sixty-four days on a note is not usury, if the note given for sixty days, according to the custom and usage in the banks at Washington, was not due and payable until the sixty-fourth day. In the case of Renner v. The Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. 581, it was expressly held, that under that custom the note was not due and payable before the sixty-fourth day; for until that time the maker could not be in default. Ibid. 40.

Where it was the practice of the party, who had a sixty day note discounted at the bank of Washington, to renew the note by the discount of another note on the sixty-third day, the maker not being in fact bound to pay the note according to the custom prevailing in the District of Columbia; such a transaction on the part of the banker is not usurious, although on each note the discount for sixty-four days was deducted. Each note is considered as a distinct and substantive transaction. If no more than legal interest is taken upon the time the new note has to run, the actual application of the proceeds of the new note to the payment of the former note before it comes due, does not of itself make the transaction usurious. Something more must occur. There must be a contract between the bank and the party at the time of such discount, that the party shall not have the use and benefit of the proceeds until the former note becomes due, or that the bank shall have the use and benefit of them in the mean time. Ibid.

The contract to accept the bills of exchange on which the action was brought, was made in Charleston, South Carolina. The bills were drawn in Georgia on B. and H. in Charleston, with a view to their payment in Charleston, where the contract was to be executed. The interest on the bill which was so drawn and was unpaid, is to be charged at the rate of interest in South Carolina. Boyce & Henry v. Edwards, 4 Peters, 111.

Interest is not chargeable on money collected by the marshal of the District of Columbia for fines due to the levy court, the money having been actually expended by the marshal in repairs and improvements on the jail, under the opinions of the comptroller and auditor of the treasury department, that these expenditures were properly chargeable upon this fund, although those opinions may not be well founded. Levy Court of Washington v. Ringgold, 5 Peters, 451.

In an action brought on a note given for payment for teas, the defence was, that teas of an inferior quality were delivered; the jury must not credit the defendant with the amount of damages, as of the day the teas were delivered, but as of the day when the verdict was rendered. The interest on the note is to be reckoned to the day of the verdict, and from that amount is to be deducted the amount of the damages ascertained by the jury. Youqua v. Nixon et al. Peters’ C. C. R. 229.

Assumpsit was brought for the proceeds of a cargo which was taken under legal process by the defendants, the consignees, in a foreign port, for the debts of the prior owners of the ship. Held, that the plaintiffs, the consignors, by bringing assumpsit, had waived the tort that the customary commissions should be allowed the defendants; but that the defendants were chargeable with interest from the receipt by them of the proceeds of the cargo. Ricketson v. Wright, 3 Sumner’s C. C. R. 335.

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