Jump to content

United States v. Google

Add links
From Wikisource
←
United States v. Google (2024)
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
→

​

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.,

UNITPlaintiffs,

UNITPlaintiv.

GOOGLE LLC,

GOOGDefendant. 		)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 		Case No. 20-cv-3010 (APM)
STATE OF COLORADO et al.,

UNITPlaintiffs,

UNITPlaintiv.

GOOGLE LLC,

GOOGDefendant. 		)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 		Case No. 20-cv-3715 (APM) (APM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

​

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
5
FINDINGS OF FACT
7
I.IIVPARTIES AND RELEVANT NONPARTIES
7
A.Parties
7
B.Key Third Parties
9
II.IVGENERAL SEARCH ENGINES
13
A.Overview
13
B.How a GSE Works (Greatly Simplified)
14
C.Types of Queries
16
D.Search Engine Results Page
19
E.The Expense of Developing and Maintaining a GSE
21
F.GSE Distribution
24
1.Default Distribution
24
2.Other Search Access Points
31
G.The Importance of Scale
34
H.Artificial Intelligence
39
I.User Data and Privacy
43
III.VGOOGLE SEARCH
46
A.Product Development
46
B.Branding
47
C.Internal Quality Studies
48
IV.IIOTHER PLATFORMS
50
A.Special Vertical Providers
50
B.Social Media Platforms
55
V.IIITHE DIGITAL ADVERTISING INDUSTRY
57
A.Search Advertisements
57
1.Search Ads on GSEs
59
2.SVP Search Ads
67
B.Display Ads
67
C.Social Media Ads
70
D.The Marketing Funnel
72
E.Shifting Spend
76
​
F.Text Ads Auctions (Also Greatly Simplified)
81
1.Pricing Knobs
83
2.Increasing Text Ads Prices
85
3.Limiting Advertiser Control
93
G.SA360
98
VI.IITHE RELEVANT CONTRACTS
101
A.Browser Agreements
101
1.The Google-Apple Internet Services Agreement
101
2.Mozilla-Google RSA
115
3.Other Browser Agreements
118
B.Android Agreements
118
1.Mobile Application Distribution Agreements
118
2.Revenue Share Agreements
123
3.Mobile Services Information Agreements
133
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
134
I.VIILEGAL FRAMEWORK
134
II.VIMONOPOLY POWER: GENERAL SEARCH SERVICES
136
A.Principles of Market Definition
137
B.General Search Services is a Relevant Product Market
140
1.Peculiar Characteristics and Uses
140
2.Industry or Public Recognition
144
3.Unique Production Facilities
146
4.Google’s Proposed Query Product Market
147
C.Google Has Monopoly Power in the General Search Services Market
152
1.Direct Evidence
154
2.Indirect Evidence—Market Share
156
3.Indirect Evidence—Barriers to Entry
157
4.Google’s Counterarguments
161
III.VMONOPOLY POWER: ADVERTISING MARKETS
165
A.Search Advertising Is a Relevant Market, But Google Does Not Have Monopoly Power in It
166
1.Search Advertising Is a Relevant Product Market
166
2.Google Does Not Have Monopoly Power in the Search Ads Market
180
B.Google Has Monopoly Power in the General Search Text Ads Market
185
​
1.General Search Text Ads Is a Relevant Product Market
185
2.Google Has Monopoly Power in the General Search Text Ads Market
189
C.The Evidence Does Not Support a Market for General Search Advertising
191
IV.IIEXCLUSIVE DEALING
197
A."Competition for the Contract" Is No Defense
198
B.The Microsoft Exclusive Dealing Framework Is Applicable
203
C.The Challenged Agreements Are Exclusive
204
1.Browser Agreements
204
2.Android Agreements
210
V.IIIEFFECTS IN THE MARKET FOR GENERAL SEARCH SERVICES
214
A.The Exclusive Agreements Cause Anticompetitive Effects in the General Search Services Market
214
1.The Exclusive Agreements Foreclose a Substantial Share of the Market
216
2.The Exclusive Agreements Have Deprived Rivals of Scale
226
3.The Exclusive Agreements Have Reduced Incentives to Invest and Innovate
236
B.The Exclusive Agreements Do Not Result in Procompetitive Benefits
248
1.Benefits in the Market for General Search Services
248
2.Benefits in Other Markets that Redound to the Benefit of the Search Market
252
3.Cross-Market Benefits
255
VI.IIEFFECTS IN THE MARKET FOR GENERAL SEARCH TEXT ADVERTISING
258
A.The Exclusive Agreements Foreclose a Substantial Share of the Market
258
B.The Exclusive Agreements Allow Google to Profitably Charge Supracompetitive Prices for Text Advertisements
259
C.The Exclusive Agreements Have Allowed Google to Degrade the Quality of its Text Advertisements
263
D.The Exclusive Agreements Have Capped Rivals’ Advertising Revenue
264
VII.ISA360
265
A.The Sherman Act Imposes No Liability on Google for Its Refusal to Grant Feature Parity to Microsoft Ads on SA360
266
B.Plaintiff States Have Not Proven that Google’s SA360 Conduct Had Anticompetitive Effects
271
VIII.INTENT AND SANCTIONS
272
A.The Court Need Not Make a Finding of Anticompetitive Intent
274
B.The Court Declines to Impose Sanctions
275
CONCLUSION
276
APPENDIX (not in original TOC)
A-1

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse

Retrieved from "https://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_v._Google&oldid=14614876"