Against the forward line between Monte Maronia and Soglio
d'Aspio the Austrian attack made no headway at first, the
Cagliari Bde. and the Alpini holding firmly to their positions, but
in the end the first line was occupied, the Italians retiring to the
main line of defence, which ran from Monte Maggio by Campo-
molon to Spitz Tonezza. The Italian right was so far not heavily
attacked, and demonstrative attacks by the Austrians in the
Val Sugana were readily repulsed. Cadorna transferred his
staff from Udine to Thiene on May 16, and next day he found a
critical situation on his left. The Roma Bde., or rather what was
left of it, was coming back in the Vallarsa, and Col Santo had
been evacuated by the territorials, while the command of the
sector had lost touch with the Alpine battalions. In the
centre, too, the situation was bad. The Campomolon line was
being strongly attacked, and showed signs of yielding, though
reenforcements from the gth Div. had been promptly dispatched.
The line had been insufficiently prepared, and was being method-
ically knocked to bits by the very heavy fire of the Austrian
big guns. But the chief danger lay on the left, where there was
little to stop the Austrian advance between the Vallarsa and the
Val Terragnolo. Here, too, practically nothing had been done
to prepare the reserve positions, and owing to a mistaken order
the retiring troops had not occupied Monte Pasubio, the key
position now that Col Santo had gone. The Volturno Bde.,
of the loth Div., which was on its way to reenforce another
threatened sector, was diverted to the more critical point.
A battalion was hurried up in motor lorries, and marched up to
Pasubio by the Passo di Xamo. They arrived after a night
march, in the nick of time. Two hours later the first Austrian
patrols appeared and were quickly repulsed. The rest of the
Volturno Bde. followed, and held the position till they were
relieved and reenforccd by the 44th Division. By May 19 the
Austrians were attacking hard all along the line to which the
Italians had retired, from Coni Zugna and the Passo di Buole
to Pasubio, and the Campomolon line had gone. On May 18
the Austrian attacks, supported by very violent artillery fire,
broke the front of the Ancona Bde., and the rest of the 35th Div.,
threatened on the flank, withdrew during the night. The
retreat was covered by the Vicenza battalion of Alpini, who
fought a gallant rear-guard action, and a strong counter-attack
by the group of Alpini from Marostica checked the Austrian
pursuit. The 3Sth Div., with its reenforcements from the gth,
came back to the line Monte Aralta (south of the Posina)-Monte
Cimone-Barcarola, but the Italian centre was now broken.
There were gaps both to the right and left of the 35th, though
the Alpini were holding north of the Posina and the ayth Div.
was coming up rapidly to the valley.
It was a critical moment for the defending army. The Austrian right was increasing the pressure against the positions west of the Vallarsa, and was collecting forces for the first of the long series of attacks against Pasubio, which was only lightly held. The 44th Div. was on its way to the front, but had not yet arrived, and a large number of the guns in this .sector had been destroyed prematurely, in the belief that retreat was imminent. There was breathing space for a moment in the centre, but the Austrian left now came into action, Kraut- wald von Annan's III. Corps being launched against the Italian 34th Division. Ample Italian reserves were now on the move, the XIV. Corps being en route to fill the gap between the 35th and 34th Divs. and reenforce the latter, but it was a race. Krauss blames the Austrian XX. Corps (Archduke Charles) for waiting till the guns could be brought up to support a new attack instead of driving through at once to Arsiero with all available troops. Perhaps a column, perhaps a strong force, might have pushed straight on to Arsiero and beyond; and if so, it might have gone hard with the Italians. The risk was not taken, and the short respite gave time to close the doors in the face of the invader.
The course of the battle, with the necessity of bringing up reserve divisions, led to a reorganization of the attacking forces, von Koevess taking command of the left wing and Dankl of the right. In the Vallarsa and Pasubio sector the
attack developed strongly. The advance along the ridge from Zugna Torta, which had been throughout stubbornly contested by the Italians, had been definitely checked by a regiment of the Taro Bde. at Malga Zugna, and the Austrians endeavoured to break through by coming up from the Vallarsa against Passo di Buole. At the same time Pasubio was assailed with the utmost determination. Farther north the Archduke Charles was waiting for his guns and for reserves, and between him and the III. Corps Kirchbach's I. Corps was coming into action. The III. Corps was now hammering against the Italian 34th Div., whose position was precarious, and although Etna's Val Sugana troops had held their own against various tentative attacks, they were withdrawn to the second line of defence.
Although the wings were holding, the situation in the centre was very grave, and Cadorna considered that if the Austrians were able to concentrate on the weak spot and keep up the impetus of their attack they might succeed in breaking through to the plain. On May 20 he went to Udine, and after consulta- tion with the Duke of Aosta and Frugoni gave orders for the concentration of a reserve army in the Venetian plain. The movement of these troops, which were placed under the command of Frugoni, began on the night, of May 21, by road: the rail- ways were occupied with the transport of I. Army reserves (the X. Corps and various other units), and were not available till May 26. The first four corps of this reserve army (the V.), which were made up of units drawn from the II. and III. Armies, were ready on June 2.
Meanwhile the Austrians were continuing their advance in the centre, but the situation on the Italian left was improving. By May 22 the 44th Div., commanded by Gen. Bertotti, was in solid possession of both sides of^the Vallarsa road and of Pasu- bio, and in touch with Ricci Armani on its left. The latter was holding firmly on Coni Zugna and the Passo di Buole, and neither here nor on Pasubio could the repeated attacks of the Austrian right make any impression. On May 24 a desperate effort was made to storm the Passo di Buole and Pasubio, but the Sicilia and Taro Bdes., who held the Zugna ridge, and the right wing of the 44th Div. on Pasubio, repulsed the onset with very heavy losses. The columns attacking Passo di Buole suffered heavily from the flanking fire of the 44th Div. guns in the Vallarsa. The left wing of the division was not attacked in force and Bertotti was able to assist Ricci Armani with his guns. Next day the attack was renewed, heavy columns coming up the slopes against the Passo di Buole, only to be thrown back, broken and decimated, one brigade being practi- cally destroyed. The last attack in force was on May 30, when repeated efforts were made to storm the Pass, in vain. Al- though further attacks were made after this date the fighting never again reached the same intensity. The Austrian losses had been too heavy for them to continue their attacks in mass, and their attempts to advance in open formation were easily checked.
The importance of the defence at the Passo di Buole can hardly be over-estimated. If the Zugna ridge had fallen, the effect upon the Pasubio position, already a salient, would have been more than serious, and upon the holding of the Pasubio lines depended the maintenance of the positions held by the right wing of the V. Corps. On May 22, following upon the retreat from the Campomolon line, the troops holding the lines in the Seven Communes had been detached from the V. Corps, and the command in this sector had been given to Gen. Lequio, who had come from Carnia. On May 24 the rest of the V. Corps had for the most part retired beyond the Posina or down the Astico to the plain, and had been replaced by the 27th Division. If Pasubio went, the line south of the Posina was turned, and the Austrians had a new route to the plain by the Valli dei Signori, as well as the opening they were now making for, by the Lower Astico. Pasubio was the key of the situa- tion, and the Austrians hammered unceasingly against Ber- totti's right wing. The guns never ceased, and a long suc- cession of attacks broke in vain upon the Italian lines. The Austrian infantry advanced along the great ridge from Col
