Page:Ezzell v. Oil Associates, Inc.pdf/12

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Ezzell v. Oil Associates, Inc.
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be canceled for noncompliance with its terms, there would be a cloud left upon the title of the lessors, and it would be extremely difficult for them to secure another lease on the land. It is not like the case where a specified rental is to be paid for a definite term, a subsequent lessee would know exactly where he stood, and the risk he ran in accepting a lease which had a definite period to run, and a fixed sum of money to be paid as rental. Here the original lease provided for its duration for a period of five years, and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced in paying quantities. The consideration was a continuing one, to be paid only by the labor and expense of the lessee in the development of the property.

The lessors had a continuing interest in the leased premises, and the lessee was not at liberty to do with the property as he pleased. He could not use, or fail to use, it to the prejudice of the lessors. It would be very difficult for the lessors, in cases like this, to establish and prove their injury in damages. The lessee was not required to develop the property against his will. He could quit at any time he saw fit to do so, and the lessors could not require specific performance on the part of the lessee, however solvent he might be.

It is true that the court, in Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S. W. 286, 19 A. L. R. 430, in a suit by the lessors to cancel the lease on the ground that the lessee was drawing off the gas from the land through wells drilled on adjoining lands without drilling protection wells on the leased lands, held that a court of equity, having taken jurisdiction for the cancellation of the lease, might award damages to the lessors, but that is very far from holding that this was the only remedy the lessors had. Under the facts of that particular case, the remedy by damages was the only one that would avail the lessors anything. Part of the damages had already been incurred, and a decree cancelling the lease would not have given them an adequate remedy.

As held in Millar v. Mauney, 150 Ark. 161, 234 S. W. 498, the lessor might either sue for damages, or he might