anything like a categorical statement of the principles which were more and more gaining ground among the Allies. It was a proclamation due, largely in an indirect manner, to the activities of our various friends and ourselves. Although it had been drawn up with a view to Belgium and Serbia principally, the remaining countries not being expressly mentioned, it nevertheless showed what great progress had been made to the advantage of oppressed nations since February 1916, when Masaryk had explained to Briand our attitude towards the fundamentals of the Central European problem. I cannot precisely determine whether the wording of this reply was affected by our interventions and activities, which aimed at the adoption of a favourable point of view towards our cause in the note to President Wilson.
It was a source of considerable encouragement to us. We felt that the second projected reply of the Allies to President Wilson would give us an opportunity of achieving even more, and possibly even the maximum of what at that time could be secured.
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The Allied reply certainly produced a very strong effect in the Allied, neutral, and enemy States. We immediately had evidence of this. The Press notices emanating from the countries of the Central Powers clearly showed that the peace manœuvre had failed, and that the official circles there were keenly disappointed and, indeed, depressed. Attempts were made to conceal this, partly by violent language accusing the Allies of being responsible for a further prolongation of the war, partly by open threats that before long something extremely unpleasant would occur.
The truth of the situation was still more plainly revealed in the solemn declarations of the two Emperors to their nations and armies, in which they shift the responsibility for the continuation of warfare to the Allies. They emphasize the great victories which they themselves have hitherto gained over a number of States, and announce that they will compel the Allies by force of arms to accept the terms which they refused when offered in an amicable manner. The Central Powers, seeing that the diplomatic manœuvre had come to grief, adopted a new tone, evidently to ward off depression from their public opinion and demoralization from their army. As far as the
