Page:The Czechoslovak Review, vol3, 1919.djvu/68

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46
THE CZECHOSLOVAK REVIEW

osition. I expect that Roumanians and Jugoslavs will reach an agreement, especially in the matter of the Banat.

I ned not say that our relations with Jugoslavs are most cordial, sealed by common fights; common frontiers with Roumanians would make possible more direct relations. Both in our own and in Jugoslav political circles there exists the absolute conviction of the necessity for our direct geographical union. Austrian-Germans now ask for this territory, but the Magyars have recently told them that the territory in question has numerous Croat and Slovene elements. In any case the fact that we have no territorial controversy with the Roumanians and the Jugoslavs will make possible most intimate harmony. I conferred with representatives of both nations, and we reached an agreement; the Greeks also through their leading men, especially Venizelos, approved of this entente. If the contested questions between the Jugoslavs and the Italians are made up, as we have good reasons to hope, then the pan-German Mittel-Europa will be replaced by a close understanding of states from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and on through Switzerland to France. That would be a strong wall against Germans, if they should wish to keep up their plans against the east; it would protect Russia, thus separated from Prussia.

Strong Russia, united on a federative basis, is needed both by us and by Europe. Russia is going through a difficult crisis. Incapable and degenerate czarism fell, just as Viennese and Berlin czarism fell, but the Russian revolution has not been sufficiently creative; Russians have not learned how to administer, and without administration there is no democracy. I doubt whether Russia can be made well by self-help without the help of the Allies- I cannot explain this plan in detail. I merely indicate the direction in which it is desirable that foreign politics should develop.

This sketch must be completed by mentioning our relations toward the Germans and the Magyars. As far as Germans of our own lands are concerned our program is well known; territory inhabited by Germans is our territory and will remain ours. We constructed our state, we maintained it, we are reconstructing it now; I wish that our Germans would colaborate with us, as that would be a better policy than their present mistaken efforts. I understand of course that they are in a difficult position. They accepted unfortunately the aggressive pan-German program against the Czechs and too willingly they misconstrued the world situation. They were drunk with the first apparent successes; our Germans became victims of false Austrianism and of shortsigted Hapsburgs. It is easy to understand that they are sore over their fatal miscalculations and over the fact that we were right. I repeat: We constructed our state; and that determines the fundamental position of our Germans who came here originally as immigrants and colonists. We have the full right to the resources of our territory necessary both for our industry and that of the Germans living among us. We cannot and will not sacrifice strong Czech minorities in the so-called German territories. We are also convinced that economic motives lead our German countrymen toward us. It is for them to take the right attitude. Let them remember that in 1861 they asked the king together with us that he should allow himself to be crowned King of Bohemia. I sincerely wish that we might soon reach an agreement.

To be sure it will be difficult for us to forget that our Germans and all the Germans in Austria accepted without protest inhuman cruelties of Austrian and Magyar soldiers; it will be difficult to forget that our Germans were the most violent supporters of pan-Germanism. But nevertheless we will accept them, if they make up their minds to work with us. No one can take it ill, if we are careful after many bitter experiences, but I promise that minorities in our state will enjoy equal national rights and civic equality. The American Republic undertook a civil war rather than admit a secession of the south.

Neither will we admit a secession of our nationally mixed north. By creating a truly democratic local government we shall have the means for the solution of the national question. To draw a straight boundary line is out of question on account of the mixed population, and the problem is not merely national, but also to a large extent social.

The old Austria-Hungary was a clear organization of violence aimed against the majority of its peoples. As for our duty toward the present German Austria, if the Austrian Germans abandon their lust of domination, if they abandon their pan-German plans, if they will act kindly toward us and refuse to interfere in our affairs, then satisfactory relations of neighbors are possible and Austria may be able to retain its independence. I believe that in that way the difficult problem of Vienna may be solved best for the Germans themselves. We shall naturally be moved by considerations for our large minority in Vienna.

Our relations to the Germans of Germany will depend on what politics they will pursue. We hope that the defeat of Prussian militarism will be the victory of the German people, but it is necessary that the German people abandon its aggressive policies in the east and devote its great abilities to the organization of the nation and of mankind. This is a nobler aim than the Pan-German aim.

At this point President Masaryk used the Slovak speech. He said: It is not necssary to say much about the Magyars. Up to the sixties of the last century they played a modest role, but at that time the fertility of their soil made itself felt and they gained in economic importance