MIND IN EVOLUTION
able; but here and now they are nowise separable. What I have spoken of as two stories, a mental story and a bodily story, are therefore two stories, two versions of that which is given as the one and indivisible progress in the life and mind of this or that individual being.
Since, then, these two stories of one organism are closely connected, we must try to keep both in view; and since we want to get some clue to the “origin of mental species” we naturally ask whether we are justified in supposing that wherever there is life there also is mind, though perhaps in some very primitive form. Plants here present a difficulty; so let us restrict our attention to animals. Then we may say that, so far as we believe—and most of us do believe—even so simple an animal as an amoeba has something, however rudimentary, of the nature of enjoyment, and something, however incipient, of the nature of reference to its environment. Thus far we do suppose that where there is life there also is mind, though it may be a very simple form of mind. It is, then, for the physiologist to tell his story in terms of action and reaction under physical influence, and for the psychologist to tell his story in terms of enjoyment and reference.
It will, however, be noticed that what is thus attributed to the amoeba is enjoyment with reference to its environment. Nothing was said as to guidance of behaviour on the part of the amoeba. Why was this? Because opinions differ. There is divergence of view. Some of those who have studied with due care such lowly animals tell us they find quite convincing evidence that the behaviour of these organisms shows guidance of action on their part. Others say that, on the evidence as they read it, they are not prepared to attribute to a good many of the lower animals any guidance of action on their part. This raises a technical
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